Abstract
In this paper I want to deal with game theory, experience and rationality, and I will try to put these into historical perspective.
Inaugural address delivered at the Symposium “Game Theory, Experience, Rationality”, Institute Vienna Circle 1996 (partly transcribed by Eckehart Köhler).
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Selten, R. (1998). Game Theory, Experience, Rationality. In: Leinfellner, W., Köhler, E. (eds) Game Theory, Experience, Rationality. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1997], vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_2
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