Abstract
A key concept in evolutionary game theory is that of evolutionary stability [21, 20]. Originally defined for pairwise contests, i.e. symmetric two-person games, a mixed strategy x is said to be evolutionarily stable if it is a best reply to itself, and, moreover, is a better reply to any alternative best reply y than this is to itself. It has been shown that evolutionary stability has important implications for population dynamics based on evolutionary selection. In particular, an evolutionarily stable strategy, viewed as a population state in a finite game in which individuals are “programmed” to pure strategies, is asymptotically stable in the corresponding replicator dynamics [26].
I am indebted to the participants of the 1995 conference on Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology and Economics, Wilfried Laurier University and University of Guelph, Ontario, for stimulating discussions, and in particular to J.W. Weibull for valuable hints. I also benefited from important suggestions by anonymous referees and editors.
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Bomze, I.M. (1998). Uniform Barriers and Evolutionarily Stable Sets. In: Leinfellner, W., Köhler, E. (eds) Game Theory, Experience, Rationality. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1997], vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_19
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