Abstract
English translations of the phenomenon called Zeitlichkeit miss the mark and throw Being and Time off course at the very center of the issue that defines Heidegger’s work. What is the problem here? How to remedy it? In an effort to answer those questions, the essay unfolds as follows:
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Notes
“Clearing”: passim; cf. SD 71ff., 78.23–24; GA 5, 40.1–2, 71.35; GA 6845.11. Martin Heidegger, “Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens (1968),” in Japan und Heideggered. Hartmut Buchner, Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke, 1989, p. 230.9.
“whamessthatnesshowness”: This phrase seeks to emphasize the distinguishability, but to deny any true separability, of being (das Sein) from entities (das Seiende). Cf. Aristotle, PhysicsII, 1, 193b 4–5: oit xwptatÒv 8v ?ta.a.’ ij Katz tòv a.byov; and by analogy, III, 1, 200b 32–33: oinc gat!. St Klvrlatq papa to npótyµata. Cf. also 201a 8–9: bate Ktvijaewç Kal µetaßoX.ffç eatLV earl toaatra tSaa to öövtoç.
. In the received tradition, the triad that structures In-Sein is Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and Rede. As far as one can trace it back, that tradition first surfaces in Alphonse de Waelhens’ La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger (1942). However: (1) While the three phenomena are equiprimordial, it is not clear they are ex aequo constitutive “components” of the clearing. Befindlichkeit and Verstehen are defined and determined by Rede, but Rede is not the third structural component of the “Da” alongside those two, because (2) Rede would seem to be the already articulated synthetic-differential whole of being-in-the-world and, as such, the defining essence of Befindlichkeit and Verstehen without which Dasein could not see beings as… at all, much less articulate them in words. Construing Rede as the third of three constitutive moments of being-in-the-world suppresses the true “third” moment of that whole, namely, das verfallende Sein bei…. Moreover, in the final analysis it seems that there are not three constitutive moments of the clearing or of care, but only two, insofar as Befindlichkeit and Verstehen (like Existentialität and Faktizität) are but two aspects of one moment. Thus, in the case of Sorge, “already-aheadness” (Sich-vorwegim-schon-sein-in) is one moment, “falling-in-with” (das verfallende Sein bei…), is the other (SZ 192 ).
“To take something as something,” whether in constructing declarative sentences or in hammering nails — is what Heidegger means by entwerfen etwas auf... In English this usually comes out as “projecting something upon….” However, the Woraufhin of a projection is not “that upon which” I throw something but, formally, “that in terms of which” I take something. The Woraufhin could be the category predicated of a subject, or the task defining a tool, or the condition I think makes a certain phenomenon possible. I take Napoleon as a husband or an emperor; I use this stone as a missile or a paperweight; I think of being as created by God or as manifested in the clearing.
GA 29/30528.25 has “Ausbreitsamkeit” whereas the Simon Moser Nachschrift, 701.2, has “Ausbreitung.” The evocation of Augustine’s “distentio animi” (Confessiones XI, 26) is intentional. See Heidegger, “Des hl. Augustinus Betrachtung über die Zeit. Confessiones lib. XI,” conference at St. Martin’s Abbey, Beuron, October 26, 1930, typescript, e.g., p. 10. In SZ “Ausbreitung” is represented by “Sicherstrecken.”
In a much adapted sense one might hear an echo of Thomas Aquinas’ observation that the human intellect knows potency through potency: “aliter se habet intellectus divinus, atque aliter intellectus foster… [qui] sicut actum cognoscit per actum, ita etiam potentiam per potentiam cognoscat.” Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 71, [11], (Parma V, 51a).
Anticipation: Cf. In III Physicorum lectio 2 (Parma XVIII, 295b): “. quod iam in actu existens habet ordinem in ulteriorem actum; quia si tolleretur ordo ad ulteriorem actum,ipse actus,quantumcumque imperfectus,esset terminus motus et non motus…’; In VIII Physicorum lectio 10 (Parma XVIII, 500a): ”.movetur aliquid,quod cum sit in potentia,tendit in actum“; and S.T. I-11,30, 2, c.: ”Est autem alia ratio virtutis motivae ipsius finis vel boni,secundum quod est realiter praesens,et secundum quod est absens: nam secundum quod est praesens,facit in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens,facit ad seipsum moveri.“
Anticipatorily enacting one’s rtxoç: Commenting on Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX, 8, 1050a 8 (btpxi) yap rÒ o, evwKa) Aquinas says: “Dicit… quod omne quod fit vadens ad finemvadit ad quoddam principium. Nam finis cujus causa fit aliquidest quoddam principium. Est enim prius in intentione agentisquia ejus causa fit generatio.”(ParmaXX544a; Cathala edition, no. 1857, p. 539). Cf. S.T. I-II, 1, 1, ad 1: “... finis [qui est primus in intentione]… habet rationem causae.”
Absent in the direction of wholeness: Cf. In IV Sententiarum1715solutio 3, ad 1. [Parma VII/2, 781a): “Est enim quidam motus qui est actus imperfectiqui est exitus de potentia in actum; et talis oportet quod sit successivusquia semper expectat aliquid in futurum ad perfectionem suae speciei”; and in discussing angels at De Veritate 8, 14, ad 12 [Parma IX, 139a]): “... illa operatio per se cadit sub tempore quae expectat aliquid in futurumad hoc quod eius species compleatur; sicut patet in motuqui non habet speciem completam donec ad terminum perducatur.”
Heidegger on Aristotle on movement: The texts in Aristotle include Physics III1201a 10–11, 201a 27–29; 201 b 4–5; 2, 201 b 31–32 (èvépyeta… eacafç); De Anima III, 7, 431 a 8:11 yàp tdvriotç tab tcAot); êvÉpyeta (cf. S.T. I-II, 31, 2, ad 1: actus imperfecti; also In IV Sententiarum171, 5, solutio 3, ad 1: “Est enim quidam motus qui est actus imperfecti… [N.B.: Alius motus est actus perfecti
cDoes the “mystery” entail a “doubling” of concealment, a “concealing of concealment”? Whereas the published version of Vom Wesen der Wahrheit speaks of the mystery as “die Verbergung des Verborgenen im Ganzen” (GA 9194.4–5), Heidegger’s hand-corrected typescript of the original lecture (delivered on Thursday, December 11, 1930, in Freiburg im Breisgau), p. 20, calls it “die Verborgenheit des Verborgenen im Ganzen” with the (to me) clear indication that the “des” is a subjective genitive (“the state of concealedness of the concealed” or equally: “the concealed in its concealedness”) rather than an objective genitive that doubles the concealment (“the act of concealing the fact that the concealed is concealed”).
Nicomachean EthicsX, 7, 1178a 3. (Cf. VII, 5, 1149a 15.)
The best work in English on aspect is Robert I. Binnick, Time and the Verb: A Guide to Tense and Aspect (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), especially chapters 1 and 6. On the formal distinction between aspect and Aktionsartencf. ibid.139–149 and 202–207. Binnick’s work far surpasses Bernard Comrie’s (still useful) Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related ProblemsCambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1976. For aspect specifically in ancient Greek see further K.L. McKay, Greek Grammar for Students: A Concise Grammar of Classical Attic with Special Reference to Aspect in the Verb (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1974), pp. 214–224; and Hardy Hansen and Gerald M. Quinn, GreekAn Intensive Course: Preliminary Edition (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980), Unit 2.1, 3(b).
For modem Greek, besides Binnick I draw on Peter Mackridge, The Modern Greek Language (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 102–124, and W. Householder, Kostas Kazazis, Andreas Loutsouda, Reference Grammar of Literary Dhimotiki (The Hague, Mouton, 1964), chapter 5: 5.15.
For Dionysius’ text: Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica/Téxvr) Ltovuatou ypaµµttkot, ed. Gustav Uhlig, in Grammatici GraeciIi, (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1883; reprinted, Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1965), p. 53. E.T. by Alan Kemp, “The TEKHNÉ GRAMMATIKÉ of Dionysius Thrax” in Daniel J. Taylor, ed., The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 170–189, here, p. 181. (Kemp’s translation replaces T. Davidson’s 1874 translation, which first appeared in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy.)
Stephanus’ commentaries on the text of Dionysius Thrax are preserved only in fragments; for the present text see Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticamed. Alfred Hilgard, in Grammatici GraeciI, iii (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1901; reprinted, Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1965), n. 20: Scholia Vaticana §13, IIepl `pi tatoç, 251.4. Cf. further, ibid.Scholia Marciana405.14–15: tettXrlpwµévos: “[is as] having been fulfilled” (cf. Mark 1:15!). On Stephanus (fl. between A.D. 400 and 700) see Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie der classischen AltertumswissenschaftIII/A, ii, 2401a and b, s.v. “Stephanos,” no. 13; and J.R. Martindale, The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), II (A.D. 395–527), 1030, s.v. “Stephanus 16.” Note the anomaly of his absence from Robert A. Kaster, Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 361–363 and 464–465.
Cf. “... cruet meint jeneswas einer ursprünglich und eigentlich schon ist: das schon Ge-Wesende…”: GA 40108.
Cf. Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie4th ed. (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1871 [originally 1862–66]), I, 174f. (For very indirect evidence of Heidegger’s use of Ueberweg, see Martin Heidegger and Elisabeth Blochmann, Briefwechsel 1918–1969ed. Joachim W. Storck [Marbach am Neckar: Deutsches Literaturarchiv, 1989], 36.) See also Friedrich Bassenge, “Das TO évt elvat, tò hye t9f,1 Elvin etc., etc., und das TO it v eîvat, bei Aristoteles,” Philologus 104 (1960), 14–47 and 201–222, esp. VII, 205–222.
See, for example, Martin Heidegger, “Unbenutzte Vorarbeiten zur Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1929/30: Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt — Endlichkeit — Einsamkeit’” Heidegger Studies7 (1991), 6–12, esp. 11, where Gewesenheit in the framework of historicity is described as: “eigentlich hinter sich gebracht and gehalten im wesenhaften Vor-sich-bringen.” One must distinguish between the Wiederholen of onself in individual resolution and the Wiederholung of possibilities from one’s past. It is to latter that John D. Caputo refers to in his Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 86, when he writes: “As factical being, thrown into the world, Dasein carries its past with it, not in the sense of that which is over but in the sense of what Dasein has been (gewesen) all along.”
This section of the Greek is not present in the Latin version that Thomas Aquinas used, and so receives no comment in his In Metaphysicam IX, I. V. The Parma edition of the Opera Omnia provides a Latin translation at XX, 538b.
GA 522 and 70. N.B.: The no trim; mentioned at GA 570 n. “a” does not have its Aristotelian meaning (notrloLS in contrast to ttpç) but rather the pre-Aristotelian and generalized sense of “Ins-Werk-BringenHervor-bringen” etc.
The divergence here of Ross (II, 253) from Bonitz is well-known. Ross translates it Ioxvaota here (dubiously, I think) as “fat-removal” and follows Bywater’s emendation of the Greek to the effect: “… for example, thinning down or thinness [where there is no taoç].” Jaeger, Aristotelis MetaphysicaOxford: Clarendon, 1952, sides with Bywater (and implicitly Ross), but brackets out both i taxvaata and aÙT6 and notes: “oratio est admodum dura et obscurci et in libris corrupta.” In any case, I take loxvaota, “thinness,” as a ti.; here, not as a KtvtlaLç (“thinning”) as at 1048b 29. Like the Latina recens (“velut emaciandi ipse finis est emaciatio”)Apostle, and others, I follow Bonitz.
Aristotle uses the plural (rand, “the parts of the body”) for the entity both as going through the exercise program and as the goal of it. Hence the plurals at 21: ttttxpxovta and 6v.
Or perhaps: “... is in movement is such a way that [the desired body] that is the goal and purpose of the movement is not [yet] present.”
Cf. Met dfv note ttaveatat (1048b 26–27) and perhaps 6v i`ott nepa5 at 18. The Latina recens renders the latter (dubiously, I believe) as “quarum est aliquod extremum” (Aquinus, Omnia Opera: Parma XX, 538b). I think it should be “quarum est aliqui terminus.”
It may seem Aristotle hedges when he adds it ov tekcta at 1048b 21–22, but I do not think so. He means: It is, of course, a nptç in the broad sense of an “activity” or “doing” (cf. the generic taw nptgetxv at 1048b 18), but it is not a rtpBLS properly speaking, viz. “one that is fulfilled in the very doing [teketa] — because there is no rÉ o; [present here].”
The present perfect form liquidflica means “I know [insofar as I have learned].” Hence, this sentence has the meaning of: “One is learning and already knows.”
Gilbert Ryle misses the point of Metaphysics IX, 6, 1048b 23 (6p4 ttpa Kai éOpaKe) when he writes: “Aristotle points out, quite correctly (Met. IX, vi. 7–10) that I can say I have seen it’ as soon as I can say I see it.”’ Dilemmas: The Tonner Lectures1953Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1954, p. 102. His reference (“vi. 7–10”) indicates he may not have been using his left Loeb; perhaps that is why he does not engage the issue of “Aristotelian aspect.” For Heidegger’s remark on the passage: GA 9284.
Cf. ytyvetat and ytvóµcvov at 1050a 25, 26, 30, etc. At GA 9303 Heidegger remarks on this under the rubric of “Vollbringen.”
Cf. Nicomachean EthicsX, 2, 1173a 1–2: â ’ p nat SoKet, tat’ civat tpa tev Cf. GA 40108: “Sein heißt [den Griechen] Erscheinen.”
I have tried to say a word about interpreting SZ §65, 325.14–326.25, in “Heidegger’s New Aspect,” Research in PhenomenologyXXV (1995).
In the important debate over verb types, Mourelatos has definitively advanced the discussion far beyond the earlier work of Zeno Vendler and Anthony Kenny; indeed, one of the essay’s major threshold achievements is to have simply recognized the problem in terms of verbal aspect. See Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, “Events, Processes, and States,” in Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (1978), 415–434, in response to Anthony Kenny, ActionEmotionand WillLondon: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, pp. 172 ff. (cf. 173, n. 2 for Kenny’s correlation of his verb types with Aristotelian distinctions; also, the chart below), and Zeno Vendler, Linguistics in PhilosophyIthaca: Cornell U.P., 1967, esp. chapter 4 (with minor changes = his “Verbs and Times,” Philosophical Review66 [1957], 143–160). Using the non-aspectual framework of Kenny (combined with Vendler) and imbedding it within just the formal framework of Mourelatos, we can schematize the issues of Metaphysics IX, 6 and 8 as follows. [K = Kenny, M = Mourelatos, S = my own suggestions].
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Sheehan, T. (1995). Das Gewesen. In: Babich, B.E. (eds) From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire. Phaenomenologica, vol 133. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1624-6_10
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