Abstract
Second or higher order probabilities have commonly been viewed with scepticism by those working within the realm of probability and decision theory. The aim of the present note is to show how the notion of second order probabilities can add to our understanding of judgmental and decision processes and how the traditional framework of Bayesian decision theory can be extended in a fruitful way by taking such entities into account. Section one consists of a brief account of arguments put forth against higher order probabilities as well as of counterarguments. In order to provide an example of the applicability of second order probabilities a decision theory encompassing such probabilities will be presented in section two. In section three I will try to emphasize the value of second order probabilities for a deeper and more complete understanding of the notion of risk.
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Notes
Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature London: Clarendon Press, (1739) 1978, book I, part-IV, section I. See also Lehrer, K., “The Evaluation of Method: A Hierarchy of Probabilities Among Probabilities”, in Grazer, Philosophische Studien vol. 12113, 1981. For a more detailed discussion of the arguments presented in this section and for further references see Goldsmith, R.W. and Sahlin N.-E., “The Role of Second Order Probabilities in Decision Making”, in Humphreys, P.C., Svenson, O. and Vari, A. (eds.), Analysing and Aiding Decision Processes Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982.
See Brown, R.W. and Lindley, D.V., “Improving Judgments by Reconciling Incoherence”, Theory and Decision 1981. See also Lehrer, op. cit.
See Goldsmith and Sahlin, op. cit. For an interesting discussion of second order probabilities, see Marschak, J., “Do Personal Probabilities of Probabilities have an Operational Meaning?”, Theory and Decision vol. 6, 1975.
For a detailed presentation of this theory see Gärdenfors, P. and Sahlin, N.-E., “Unreliable Probabilities, Risk Taking, and Decision Making”, Synthese 1982, and “Decision Making With Unreliable Probabilities”, forthcoming. For a discussion of the theory see Levi, I., “Ignorance, Probability and Rational Choice”, Synthese 1982.
See Ellsberg, D., “Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. 75, 1961.
For a discussion of several outcome risk theories see Schaefer, R.E., “What are We Talking About When We Talk About ”Risk“?”, IIASA Research Memorandum 1978.
See also Gärdenfors and Sahlin, op. cit.
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© 1983 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Sahlin, NE. (1983). On Second Order Probabilities and the Notion of Epistemic Risk. In: Stigum, B.P., Wenstøp, F. (eds) Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory with Applications. Theory and Decision Library, vol 37. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1590-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1590-4_6
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