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Foundations of Bayesianism pp 161–174Cite as

Subjectivism, Objectivism and Objectivity in Bruno de Finetti’s Bayesianism

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Part of the book series: Applied Logic Series ((APLS,volume 24))

Abstract

The paper will focus on Bruno de Finetti’s position, which combines Bayesianism with a strictly subjective interpretation of probability. For de Finetti, probability is always subjective and expresses the degree of belief of the evaluating subject. His perspective does not accommodate a notion of “objective chance” in the way other subjectivists, including Frank Ramsey, do. To de Finetti’s eyes, objectivism, namely the idea that probability depends entirely on some aspects of reality, is a distortion, and the same holds for the idea that there exists an absolute notion of objectivity, to be grounded on objective facts. For him there is no problem of objectivity beyond that of the evaluation of probabilities in a Bayesian framework. This is a complex procedure, which includes subjective elements as well as the consideration of objective elements like observed frequencies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Bologna, Italy

    Maria Carla Galavotti

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  1. Maria Carla Galavotti
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  1. Department of Philosophy, King’s College, London, UK

    David Corfield  & Jon Williamson  & 

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Galavotti, M.C. (2001). Subjectivism, Objectivism and Objectivity in Bruno de Finetti’s Bayesianism. In: Corfield, D., Williamson, J. (eds) Foundations of Bayesianism. Applied Logic Series, vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1586-7_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1586-7_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5920-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1586-7

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