Abstract
Bayesian decision theories are formal theories of rational agency that tell us both what the properties of a rational state of mind are and what action it is rational for an agent to perform, given her state of mind. What makes a theory of this kind Bayesian is commitment to the following claims:
-
1.
The (only) factors relevant to rational decision making are the options available, the relative subjective desirability of the possible outcomes of choosing one or another option and the subjective likelihood that each outcome will be achieved, given the exercise of a particular option.
-
2.
To act rationally is to choose the option (or one of the options) which has the best expected consequences, given one’s partial beliefs and desires.
-
3.
Rational degrees of belief are probabilities.
-
4.
Rational degrees of desire are utilities.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
R. W. Bradley. A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory with Conditionals, Synthese, 116, 187–229, 1998
R. W. Bradley. The Representation of Beliefs and Desires within Decision Theory, PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1997.
E. D. Bolker. A Simultaneous Axiomatisation of Utility and Subjective Probability, Philosophy of Science, 34, 292–312, 1967.
D. Davidson and P. Suppes. Finitistic Axiomatisation of Subjective Probability and Utility, Econometrica, 24, 264–275, 1956.
P. C. Fishbum. Subjective Expected Utility: A Review of Normative Theories, Theory and Decision, 13, 139–199, 1981.
R. C. Jeffrey. The Logic of Decision, 2nd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
J. Joyce. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
D. H. Krantz, R. Duncan Luce, P. Suppes and A. Tversky. Foundations of Measurement,Volume 1, Academic Press, 1971.
J. Pfanzagl. Theory of Measurement, New York: Wiley, 1968.
F. P. Ramsey. Truth and Probability. In Philosophical Papers, ed. D. H. Mellor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
N.-E. Sahlin. The Philosophy of F. P Ramsey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
L. J. Savage. The Foundations of Statistics, 1954. 2nd edition, New York: Dover, 1972
M. J. Schervish, T. Seidenfeld and J. B. Kadane. State-dependent Utilities, Journal of the American Mathematical Association,85, 840–847, 1990.
J. H. Sobel. Ramsey’s Foundations Extended to Desirabilities, Theory and Decision, 44, 231–278, 1988.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bradley, R. (2001). Ramsey and the Measurement of Belief. In: Corfield, D., Williamson, J. (eds) Foundations of Bayesianism. Applied Logic Series, vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1586-7_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1586-7_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5920-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1586-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive