Abstract
Throughout the preceding four chapters we have seen that the criticisms of Feyerabend’s philosophy are based upon misunderstandings: instead of rejecting rationality wholesale, and embracing literal anarchism, Feyerabend can be seen as rejecting ‘Rationalist’ interpretations of rationality, and working towards an alternative conception of rationality. Moreover, this alternative conception of rationality is ‘anarchistic’ only in relation to ‘Rationalist’ conceptions of rationality, and is thus ‘anarchistic’ in name only. In discussing these misunderstandings of Feyerabend’s philosophy we have already encountered many of the positive elements within his philosophy: scientific theories can be compared via scientific values, rather than via scientific rules, and the comparison of scientific theories takes place within the context of a pluralistic, process-realist, metaphysics. However, before embarking upon a more systematic exposition of Feyerabend’s positive ideas, one last obstacle needs to be overcome.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Farrell, R.P. (2003). Feyerabend and Pluralism. In: Feyerabend and Scientific Values. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 235. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1542-3_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1542-3_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6309-0
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