Abstract
In chapter 1 we have seen that Feyerabend can be construed as conducting a reductio ad absurdum of what I have called ‘Rationalism’: the thesis that rationality is to be understood as the application of universal, a-temporal and necessary rules in an algorithmic manner. In conducting his reductio Feyerabend targeted specific versions of ‘Rationalist’ philosophy: empiricism and Popper. However, Feyerabend believed that his attack on ‘Rationalism’ was generally successful: any ‘Rationalist’ position will fall prey to reductio ad absurdum argumentation.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Farrell, R.P. (2003). Feyerabend, Lakatos and Anarchism. In: Feyerabend and Scientific Values. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 235. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1542-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1542-3_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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