Abstract
For a legal philosophy, understood as a theory of practical reason, the juridical theory of argumentation seems to be fundamental and indispensable. This, however, couldn’t get the consent of all trends in legal philosophy. Thus, all forms of objectivism - be it the based on ethical values, ontological one, or, the naturalistic one — as well as all forms of subjectivism, intuitionism, and emotivism are practically irreconcilable with the fundamental justification claim of argumentation theory.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Oeser, E. (2003). The Theoretical Model of a Deeper Argumentation. In: Evolution and Constitution. Theory and Decision Library, vol 37. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1502-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1502-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6503-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1502-7
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