Skip to main content

Realism and the Supposed Poverty of Sociological Theories

  • Chapter

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 71))

Abstract

My title may be misleading. This paper will argue that contemporary socio­logical theories are not impoverished. On the contrary, it is my observation that contemporary sociological theories are rich and diverse. There are abroad Marxists, functionalists, structuralists, phenomenologists, symbolic interactionists, ethnomethodologists, conflict theorists, labelling theorists, critical theorists, and so on. That they battle and proliferate strikes this philosopher of the social sciences as healthy, fruitful and exciting.3 As an editor, I never know what is going to flop into my in-tray next. In addition, there are certain maverick figures who are doing incredibly illuminating thinking at the theoretical level, especially Edward Shils, Raymond Aron, Ernest Gellner and Erving Goffman. So, much of my space will be given over to explaining how such richness can be denigrated and the claim of theoretical poverty made.

For all the Idols of the Mind or Profession regnant today the worst is that which Bacon might have placed among his Idols of the Theatre: the belief, first, that there really is something properly called theory in sociology, and second, that the aim of all socio­logical research should be that of adding to or advancing theory. It is a truth we should never tire of repeating that no genuinely good and seminal work in the history of sociol­ogy was written or conceived as a means of advancing theory — grand or small. Each has been written in response to a single, compelling intellectual problem or challenge pro­vided by the immediate intellectual environment. William James did not err in labelling as “tender minded” all systems-builders, whether religious or law, and placing under “tough minded” those who welcome and deal with life in its actual concreteness.

Robert Nisbet, Sociology as an Art Form, New York: O. U. P. 1976, p. 20

This paper was written while I was on sabbatical leave from York University and an Associate of the Center for Humanities, University of Southern California, in receipt of research monies from the Canadian Humanities and Social Science Research Council (no. 451-790154). I am grateful to those institutions. It was read in the lecture series `Philosophy and Sociology: Confrontation and Rapprochement’, University of Dayton, October 9, 1979, and to the Department of Sociology Colloquium, UCLA, November 7, 1979.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Reference

  1. See John C. McKinney and Edward A. Tiryakian (eds.), Theoretical Sociology, Per- ? ectives and Developments (Appleton Century Crofts, New York, 1970).

    Google Scholar 

  2. I must qualify this generalization by reference to the work of one of my students, Jean E. Saindon. In his Ph. D. dissertation he reports that there is much smoke and very little fire in the running debates between empiricist and idealist (or interpretative) sociology. See his `Epistemological Dogma in Sociological Thought’, Ph. D. Dissertation ( York University, Toronto, 1979 ).

    Google Scholar 

  3. Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972); and Center and Periphery (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975). Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought (Basic Books, New York, 1965); Eighteen Lectures on Industrial Society (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1967). Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964); Legitimation of Belief (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975); Spectacles and Predicaments (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979); Muslim Society (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981);Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis ( Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1974 ).

    Google Scholar 

  4. s W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice ( Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966 ).

    Google Scholar 

  5. The dynastic marriage has not been consummated in sociology as it has, e.g. in economics and geography. That should not be a matter of concern, as I shall argue below.

    Google Scholar 

  6. G. C. Archibald, `Method and Appraisal in Economics’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9 (1979), 305–316.

    Google Scholar 

  7. See my `Nationalism and The Social Sciences’, Canadian Journal of Sociology 1 (1976), 515–528.

    Google Scholar 

  8. This thesis is argued in detail in my Concepts and Society (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1972).

    Google Scholar 

  9. o I do not need a Chomskian innate capacity to learn language (as per his Cartesian Linguistics (Harper and Row, New York, 1966), all I need is a disposition to survive in the environment and hence to `develop’ tools that aid that quest.

    Google Scholar 

  10. See my `Cultural Relativism Again’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 5 (1975), 343–353.

    Google Scholar 

  11. This is Rule A, One, of Anthony Giddens’ New Rules of Sociological Method,(Basic Books New York, 1976), p. 160. The original is in italics.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Whether the position can even be affirmed without self-contradiction, I leave for another occasion. See also Concepts and Society,note 9 above, chapter 5.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Erving Goffman, Asylums (Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1961).

    Google Scholar 

  14. I argued this at length in The Revolution in Anthropology (Humanities Press, New York, 1964; Regnery, Chicago, 1968); and The Story of Social Anthropology,(McGraw-Hill, New York, 1972).

    Google Scholar 

  15. Leon Festinger, H. W. Riecken and Stanley Schacter, When Prophecy Fails (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1956). See also The Revolution in Anthropology,note 16 above, and Bryan Wilson, Magic and the Millennium (London, 1973).

    Google Scholar 

  16. Barbara Goodwin, Social Science and Utopia ( The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1978 ).

    Google Scholar 

  17. See K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963), chapter 1.

    Google Scholar 

  18. See Ernest Gellner, Cause and Meaning in the Social Sciences (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973), chapter 4.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958); A. R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966); Keith Dixon, Sociological Theory ( Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Boston, 1973 ).

    Google Scholar 

  20. Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology ( Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1967 ).

    Google Scholar 

  21. This seems to me to happen to the radical programme in the sociology of knowledge. See Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (1981), 173–243.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Consider the disappointment over Headstart that led Moynihan to propose “benign neglect”; over crime and penal problems that led to `labelling theory’; over Project Camelot that led to suspicion of all academic connections to government and so on.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Free Press, Glencoe (Ill.), 1937). See also B. Berelson and G. Steiner, Human Behaviour: An Inventory of Findings ( Harcourt Brace, New York, 1964 ).

    Google Scholar 

  24. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962).

    Google Scholar 

  25. His credentials are scrutinised in Robert Merton, `The Sociology of Science, An Episodic Memoir’, in Robert Merton and Jerry Gaston (eds.), The Sociology of Science in Europe (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1977). Some of my comments are to be found in `Laudan’s Problematic Progress and the Social Sciences’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9 (1979), 484–97 and my review of Kuhn’s essays, The Essential Tension, in Queen’s Quarterly 87 (1980), 65–8.

    Google Scholar 

  26. J. Agassi, `Scientific Schools and their Success’ in his Science and Society, (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981 ).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1983 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Jarvie, I.C. (1983). Realism and the Supposed Poverty of Sociological Theories. In: Cohen, R.S., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Epistemology, Methodology, and the Social Sciences. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1458-7_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1458-7_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8376-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1458-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics