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Economic and Environmental Risk and Uncertainty pp 163–171Cite as

Mixed Extensions of Games and the Saint Petersburg Paradox

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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLB,volume 35))

Abstract

The expected utility approach to the Saint Petersburg Paradox is extended to strategic games in normal form with a finite set of players.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, 24061, USA

    H. H. Haller

Authors
  1. H. H. Haller
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA

    Robert Nau

  2. Department of Business Economics, Norwegian School of Management, Sandvika, Norway

    Erik Grønn

  3. Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, California, USA

    Mark Machina

  4. Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Agricultural University of Norway, Aas, Norway

    Olvar Bergland

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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Haller, H.H. (1997). Mixed Extensions of Games and the Saint Petersburg Paradox. In: Nau, R., Grønn, E., Machina, M., Bergland, O. (eds) Economic and Environmental Risk and Uncertainty. Theory and Decision Library, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1360-3_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1360-3_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4849-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1360-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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