Abstract
I propose to show that the concept of ‘power’ can play a central role in a metaphysical theory appropriate to a realist philosophy of science. To begin I want to describe and contrast two main paradigms of action.
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Notes
See Ryle, G.: 1949, The Concept of Mind,London, Chapter 5 (2) [cf. below, pp. 339–357].
A similar point, starting from a different aspect of the problems of dispositional analyses, is to be found in Levi, I. and S. Morgenbesser: 1964, ‘Belief and Disposition’, American Philosophical Quarterly 1, 221–232, particularly Part 3 [reprinted below, pp. 389–409].
Ayers, M.: 1968, The Refutation of Determinism, London, pp. 80–89, 95 – 101.
Harré, R.: 1964, ‘Concepts and criteria’, Mind 73, 353 – 363.
For what follows, cf. also Joske, W. D.: 1967, Material Objects, London, Chapters 4, 5.
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Harré, R. (1978). Powers. In: Tuomela, R. (eds) Dispositions. Synthese Library, vol 113. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1282-8_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1282-8_13
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