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Singular Death-Sentences

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Denying Existence

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 261))

Abstract

Unicorns do not exist. Dinosaurs do not exist either. The sentence-frame “... does not exist” is used in ordinary language not only to reveal the unreality of certain items which are talked or written about, believed in, dreamt of or depicted, but also to report demise or extinction. That the existence-predicate serves to express two quite easily distinguishable concepts in these two kinds of use can be made clear by two simple idiomatic expansion tests. When we report the current nonexistence of prehistoric mammoths or of the Euston Arch we can smoothly add “now”, “any longer” or “these days” to the assertion. But it would be odd and misleading to say that Centaurs do not exist now or that El Dorado does not exist any longer (unless the appropriate mythology specifies that they would be extinct by the end of the twentieth century and we are asserting a fictional truth). Conversely, when we assert the absolute nonexistence of a particular hallucinated elf or of a very life-like fictional detective, we can idiomatically insert “really” between “does not” and “exist”. It would be quite awkward and misleading to do the same with our reports of present nonexistence. We might expand “Miss Marple does not exist” to “Miss Marple does not really exist” but would not expand “Agatha Christie does not exist” in the same way. Of course, we could exploit this ambiguity of “exists” and make statements like “Atlantis does not exist”, meaning, non-committally as it were, that either it was always imaginary or even if it once existed it no longer does, because according to the legend itself it went under the ocean in the year 950 B.C.

“And how shall we bury you?” asked Crito.

“In any way you like” said Socrates, chuckling quietly, “if you can get hold of me, and I don’t elude you.”

Phaedo

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Notes

  1. First of all, you must not confuse being dead with not being, a condition that occupies the vast expanse of time before birth…“ Italo Calvino (Mr Palomar p. 108).

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  2. See Peter Winch, “Ceasing to Exist” in Trying to Make Sense (1987) pp. 81–106.

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  3. See Yourgrau, “The Dead” (1987) p. 89.

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  4. If the projected house is built, the plan for the building is carried into effect and so is successful; but the reference made by the happy couple who said ‘Our house has four bedrooms’ is not made any more successful by the completion of the house“ — A.M. Honoré Philosophy (1969). Honoré argues that the reference was already successful before the house was built. So it could not be more successful. I disagree.

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  5. See Barry Miller, “Exists and Existence” in Review of Metaphysics,December 1986, p. 241, on two kinds of uniqueness.

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  6. See “Time and Thisness” by R.M Adams in Themes from Kaplan (1989).

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  7. With such a futuristic “singular” term, Donnellan says “we are in the somewhat odd position of possessing a mechanism for introducing a name that rigidly designates something, but a mechanism that is not powerful enough to allow us to use the name!” (Midwest Studies (2), 1977 p. 20).

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  8. Thus Bob Adams argues clearly: “My thisness, and singular propositions about me, cannot have preexisted me because if they had, it would have been possible for them to have existed even if I had never existed, and that is not possible” (Time of Thisness,ibid).

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  9. See G.E.M. Anscombe’s presidential address “Existence and Truth” in Proceedings of Aristotlean Society. Vol. 1987–88, p. 10 for a discussion of related problems and similar views.

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  10. I owe the idea of this argument to Dr. Jerry Valberg.

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  11. See “Afterthoughts” in Themes From Kaplan (Oxford, 1989) pp. 607–10.

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  12. Dummett (1981) p. 387.

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  13. See Routley (1980) p. 361.

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  14. See his Kant’s Dialectic (Cambridge, 1974) pp. 63–4.

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  15. This will amount to the view which Prior finds implausible and ridicules as follows “… there is only a single genuine individual (the Universe) — which gets John-Smithish or Mary-Brownish in such and such regions for such and such periods” (Past, Present and Future (1967) p. 174).

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  16. See C.J.F. Williams (1981) pp. 139–40.

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  17. See Williams (1981) p. 141.

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  18. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Plato’s Beard; historically it has proved tough, frequently dulling the edge of Occam’s razor“ (From a Logical Point of View,p. 2).

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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Chakrabarti, A. (1997). Singular Death-Sentences. In: Denying Existence. Synthese Library, vol 261. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1223-1_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1223-1_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4788-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1223-1

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