Abstract
In modern European history, military science and manufacturing in support of the armed forces surged with the evolution of the nation state. The standing armies of the time enforced a revolutionary reorganization of the prevailing artisan mode of production. Serial standardized manufacture of uniforms, boots and increasingly other military items was organized in state arsenals well before the emerging capitalist mode of production revolutionized the existing forms of production and established industrial manufacturing as the dominant mode. During the second half of the nineteenth century the industrial mode of production matured rapidly and eventually became the main source of military supplies. The state arsenals had long since lost their role as spearheads of modernization and rationalization.
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The renowned Kieler Weltwirtschaftsarrshiv is located in the prestigeous former guest house of the Howaldt Werft, overlooking the Kieler Foerde where warships paraded to please the Kaiser, the Romanovs and many other potentates before WW’ I.
The Manhattan project was clearly beyond the scope of any existing agglomeration of private risk capital, hence, the close link between government sponsored military research and the later civilian application of nuclear energy. The case of French and British nuclear industries and their evolution confirm the hypothesis.
In France this old paradigm survived longer than in other countries. For an analysis of this strategic anachronism see: Jean/-Paul Hebert, Production d’armement - Mutuation du Systeme francais, Paris 1995 (Documentation Francaise).
See: UNDP, Human Development Report 1992, New York (Oxford University Press) 1992, pp.86f.
The first authentic exposition of this line of thought within the UN-system was published in 1977. UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General, The economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects for peace and security, A/ 32188, Aug. 12, 1977.
A rigorous analysis of this face of Gorbachev’s policy which was not perceived at the time see: Andrs Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform, London (Pinter) 1991 (updated version).
The role of permanent mobilization of the economy within the Soviet system is superbly analyzed in: Jacques Sapir, L’economie mobilisee, Paris ( La Decouverte ) 1990. According to Sapir the Soviet system of regulating the economy amounts to a system of permanent “Kriegswirtschaft”, where one priority after the other exhausts the economy as a whole.
For a rigorous economic discussion of the issues involved in converting military-industrial structures see: UNIDIR, Economic Aspects of Disarmament: Disarmament as an Investment Process by Keith Hartley, UN Sales No.GV.E.93. 0. 3.
For an elaborate assessment of the Russian aviation industry and its on-going projects see: Rossi’skie aviamodel’ery pokazali stapye fason, in: Komersant’ Daily, June 21, 1995 p. 10.
The Lockheed - Martin Marietta merger probably does not yet mark the end of this process, which puts the leading European Defense manufacturers under extreme pressure to react.
For a preliminary assessment of this low-profile issue see: Petra Opitz, Peter Lock “Deferred costs of military Defense: An underestimated economic dimension”, in: Manas Chatterij et al. eds., Arms Spending, Development and Security, New York, New Dehli 1995, pp.252–265.
See in particular: OECD/TEP, Technology and the Economy, The Key Relationships, Paris 1992.
The case of computer aided manufacturing as an example of military RD spearheading technology, but at the same time, impeding rapid, more pragmatic approaches is convincingly discussed by Noble. Noble D.F. „Forces of Production, A Social History of industrial Automation“, New York (A.Knopf) 1984.
In order to optimize manoeuvrability an instable design was chosen. Thus, the flight control system, the central asset which had to be frozen at the hardware level, in order to facilitate the integration of the highly complex (and fatally sensitive) software was selected.
J.P. Contzen, How to ensure in the future a broader common base for civilian and military technologies?, Joint Research Center, European Commission, mimeo for CREDIT Seminar, Brussels 1995.
For a harsh criticism of the artificial maintenance of separate military specification by an insider, see the presentation of the chairman of Rheinmetall at the anual meeting of the German Society for Defense Technology in June 1993 in Bonn.
The French project to build a nuclear powered aircraft carrier drawn out over almost two decades highlights the dilemma of traditional naval construction in an environment of rapid technological innovation.
Space does not allow to discuss the entrepreneurial, rather than state-tutored naval designs of another rather successful private German yard, the Luerssen Werft. But it seems that a straightforward entrepreneurial approach to naval design was the key to Luerrsen’ s extraordinary export performance.
A number of recent export orders, the different national defense industrial bases are dependent upon, were placed under the condition to install internationally approved components rather than the nationally supplied ones. The French Leclerc tank is a case in point. Arab customers and the Swedes in a competition insisted on MTU-engines.
See: Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nations, Strong Army” National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, Ithaca, London 1994 ( Cornell). I am indebted to Phil Gummet who directed my attention to this study.
A recent document prepared by a group of the formost industrial associations including the arms and space industries confirms that this technology driven approach still guides the defense, industrial policy of the government. See: Federal’naja celevaja programma “Nacional’naja texnologiceskaja Baza” 1995–2005) Ocnovnie polozenija, Moscow 1995. (Federal target program, “National technological base (1995–2005) Basic situation). I am grateful to Dr. Ksenia Gonchar who drew my attention to this document.
This diversification should not be mistaken as conversion. It is acquisition of new business rather than conversion at the plant level.
The table is based on the European companies listed in Chapter 13 `Arms Production’ in the 1994 SIPRI-Yearbook.
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Lock, P. (1997). Military Technology and Its Linkage to the Civilian Economy. In: Dundervill, R.F., Gerity, P.F., Hyder, A.K., Luessen, L.H. (eds) Defense Conversion Strategies. NATO ASI Series, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1213-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1213-2_8
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