Abstract
In the second appendix to his ‘Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics’ (Post 1971), Heinz Post notes that
Acceptance, rather than rejection, is the more remarkable exercise of scientific judgment. (p. 253).
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Da Costa, N.C.A., French, S. (1993). Towards an Acceptable Theory of Acceptance: Partial Structures Inconsistency and Correspondence. In: French, S., Kamminga, H. (eds) Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 148. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1185-2_7
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