Abstract
There is a venerable philosophical tradition that views human beings as intrinsically rational, though even the most ardent defender of this view would admit that under certain circumstances people’s decisions and thought processes can be very irrational indeed. When people are extremely tired, or drunk, or in the grip of rage, they sometimes reason and act in ways that no account of rationality would condone. About thirty years ago, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman and a number of other psychologists began reporting findings suggesting much deeper problems with the traditional idea that human beings are intrinsically rational animals. What these studies demonstrated is that even under quite ordinary circumstances where fatigue, drugs and strong emotions are not factors, people reason and make judgments in ways that systematically violate familiar canons of rationality on a wide array of problems. Those first surprising studies sparked the growth of a major research tradition whose impact has been felt in economics, political theory, medicine and other areas far removed from cognitive science. In Section 2, we will sketch a few of the better known experimental findings in this area. We’ve chosen these particular findings because they will play a role at a later stage of the paper. For readers who would like a deeper and more systematic account of the fascinating and disquieting research on reasoning and judgment, there are now several excellent texts and anthologies available. (Nisbett and Ross 1980, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982, Baron 1988, Piatelli-Palmarini 1994, Dawes 1988, Sutherland 1994).
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Samuels, R., Stich, S., Tremoulet, P.D. (1999). Rethinking Rationality: From Bleak Implications to Darwinian Modules. In: Korta, K., Sosa, E., Arrazola, X. (eds) Cognition, Agency and Rationality. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 79. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1070-1_3
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