Abstract
A hundred years ago, even perhaps as recently as fifty years ago, progress would normally be made in experimental psychology, in formal logic, in philosophical analysis, in linguistic theory or in neurology, as if those were essentially distinct and independent subjects of enquiry. Moreover this standard feature of intellectual research was unhesitatingly endorsed by the structure of library catalogues, of university departments, of funding agencies and of professional journals. Even computer science was treated largely as just an ancillary to military codebreaking. But all these areas of research have now been absorbed and unified within the newly emerging ferment of ideas that has come to be known as cognitive science. So it is with the feeling of being on the crest of a wave in current scientific enquiry that we meet here at the 1997 International Colloquium on Cognitive Science which has been so efficiently organised by our joint hosts, the Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information and the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science of the University of the Basque Country.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
For references see L.J. Cohen, The Dialogue of Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 150ff.
R.E. Nesbitt and E. Borgida, “Attribution and the psychology of prediction”, Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 32, 1975, 932–943.
See L.J. Cohen, “Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4, 1981, 317–370
G. Gigerenzer, “How to make cognitive illusions disappear: beyond `Heuristica and Biases, in W. Stroebe and Miles Hewstone (eds.), European Review of Social Psychology, vol. 2, 1991, 83–115.
A. Tversky, and D. Kahneman, “Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases”, Science 125, 1974, 1124–1131.
A. Tversky, and D. Kahneman, “On the psychology of prediction”, Oregon Research Institute Research Bulletin 12, 1972, 4.
A. Tversky, and D. Kahneman, “Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases”, Science 125, 1974, 1124–1131.
C.J. Jones, and P.L. Harris, “Insight into the law of large numbers: a comparison of Piagetian and judgement theory”, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 34A, 1982, 479–488.
L.J. Cohen, “Twelve questions about Keynes’s concept of weight”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, 1986, 263–278.
L.J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
M. Bar-Hillel, “On the subjective probability of compound events”, in Organisational Behaviour and Human Performance 9, 1973, 396–406.
I. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: a Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Transactions in Human Factors in Electronics HFE-7, 1966, 29–37
L.R. Beach and C.R. Peterson, `Subjective probabilities for unions of events’, Psychonomic Science 5, 1966, 307–308.
L.J. Cohen, “Probability —the one and the many”, Proceedings of the British Academy LXI, 1975, 83–108.
H.P. Grice, “Logic and conversation”, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), The Logic of Grammar, Encino, California: Dickinson, 1975, 64–75.
S. Scribner, “Modes of thinking and ways of speaking: culture and logic reconsidered”, in P.N. Johnson-Laird and P.C. Wason (eds.), Thinking; Readings in Cognitive Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 483–500.
P.C. Wason, “Reasoning”, in B. Foss (ed.), Psychology, Harmondsworth: Penguin, New Horizons, 1966, 135–51.
P.C. Wason, and D. Shapiro, “Natural and contrived experience in a reasoning? roblem”, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 23, 1979, 63–71
Notably R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1950, 19–51.
L.J. Cohen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 42.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cohen, L.J. (1999). How Can Fallacies Arise about Fallacies?. In: Korta, K., Sosa, E., Arrazola, X. (eds) Cognition, Agency and Rationality. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 79. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1070-1_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1070-1_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5321-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1070-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive