Abstract
Taking seriously the arguments of Earman, Roberts and Smith that ceteris paribus laws have no semantics and cannot be tested, I suggest that ceteris paribus claims have a kind of formal pragmatics, and that at least some of them can be verified or refuted in the limit.
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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Glymour, C. (2002). A Semantics and Methodology for Ceteris Paribus Hypotheses. In: Earman, J., Glymour, C., Mitchell, S. (eds) Ceterus Paribus Laws. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1009-1_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1009-1_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6173-7
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