A Taxonomy for Substantialism

Abstract

A number of different forms of substantialism may lie between the extremes of Cartesianism and the identity-theory. Cartesianism may be thought of as representing one extreme of the possible versions of substantialism, when it casts body and soul as distinct substances or things that are completely independent of one another. The identity-theory may be thought of as the extreme in opposition to Cartesianism, when it characterizes body and soul as identical substances or things, not simply identical in token, but identical in kind or in type. The versions of substantialism discernible most often today can be appreciated as falling somewhere between the extremes of Cartesianism and the identity-theory. They neither identify fully body and soul, nor do they countenance the complete independence of soul from body. Rather, in one way or another, they argue for a distinction between body and soul, but insist that, in one way or another, soul is not a substance apart from the body. W. Sellars appears to develop a version of substantialism that falls between Cartesianism and the identity-theory, which may be described as ‘kind dualism’. In this form of ‘dualism’ a single substance is a member of non-identical, dual kinds, and it may be regarded in some respect as two kinds of things: a body and a soul. The ‘constitutionalism’ of D. Wiggins provides perhaps the best-known version of the substantialist alternatives to attributivism, which holds that the body ‘constitutes’ the soul. Wiggins did not, however, credit Aristotle with constitutionalism; he only thought that it was the view that Aristotle should have accepted if good sense were to be made of his hylomorphism and his efforts to explain the relation between body and soul. W. Charlton, who also espouses constitutionalism, thinks that it is Aristotle’s actual view. T. Irwin pursues a substantialist interpretation, which is close to the ‘kind dualism’ of Sellars, but which also exploits the constitutionalism of Wiggins. C. Shields has offered an interesting alternative version of substantialism in the form of what he calls ‘supervenient dualism’, according to which the soul ‘supervenes’ upon the body. Supervenient dualism shares features with constitutionalism, and it may be conceived as Shields’ effort to provide an antidote to what he takes to be the defects of constitutionalism. Since the resurgence of interest in Aristotle’s psychology in this century, Shields offers with his idea of supervenient dualism the first significantly original dualist interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology, which purports to be both dualist and substantialist, without being Cartesian. Each of these versions of substantialism will be reviewed as their advocates express them, and questions will be raised about their cogency without bringing into consideration the evidence for attributivism, which might be explicitly incompatible with the claims for any form of substantialism.