Abstract
Consider an individual
A l sees his partner B 2=b; in addition, A 1 sees himself seeing \({B_3} = \bar b.\) Thus, the partner exists in A l’ s inner world in two roles: as ‘reality’ (B 2) and as an image or a model of this reality (B 3). A 1, can see that his image B 3 differs from the ‘reality’ B 2. In this structure the individual can say, ‘I am mistaken’. Of course, the structure itself does not display modality; we cannot fix the formal differences between situations where an individual ‘is sure’ that he is mistaken and ‘supposes’ that he is mistaken.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Lefebvre, V.A. (2001). A Formal Representation of Doubts and Feelings. In: Algebra of Conscience. Theory and Decision Library, vol 30. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0691-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0691-9_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5751-8
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