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Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle pp 115–125Cite as

Why Should a Physical Object Take on the Role of Truth-Bearer?

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Part of the book series: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1998] ((VCIY,volume 6))

Abstract

The topic of this paper I would like to divide into two other questions than that of its title. The first question is the historical one and sounds like this: Why had Tarski chosen physical objects as truth-bearers in his original work from 1933 about truth in formalized languages?1 This historical problem may be still of importance not only from a historical point of view. Tarski’s truth-definition is still seen as one of undeniable importance for any contemporary philosophical analysis of truth.

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Notes

  1. Alfred Tarski, Pojpcie prawdy w jfzykach nauk dedukcyjnych. Warszawa: Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie, 1933; Alfred Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”,in: Alfred Tarski, Logic,Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1956, pp. 152–278. In what follows I will use the abbreviation for the two texts: Tarski 1933 and Tarski 1956.

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  2. Hartry Field, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth”, in: The Journal of Philosophy, LXIX: 13, 1972,pp. 347–375. John McDowell, “Physicalism and Primitive Denotation: Field on Tarski”, in: Erkenntnis, 13 (1978), pp. 131–152.

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  3. For more historical and philosophical details see my paper: “Truth-bearers from Twardowski to Tarski” in: K. Kijania-Placek & J. Woleriski (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer (forthcoming).

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  4. I doubt whether the collection of metalinguistic expressions which describes sentences in Tarski’s 1933 work defines univocally the notion of sentence. As one can easily find out, Tarski uses the notion of sentence in many senses. Sometimes “sentence” means a pure syntactically defined expression of a language or, in another places, a psycho-physical product of a psychological event; sometimes a sentence is a physical object and in another places a function without free variables. Finding the right meaning of “sentence” becomes more problematic if one assumes that a psycho-physical or a physical object, like a linguistic expression, can occur as an utterance or an inscription; and, if one additionally assumes that each of them can be understood either as individual occasion or as type or as general name. As for the choice the meaning of “sentence”, and as for the answer why should the thus understood sentence take on the role of the truth-bearer, see Section II below.

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  5. Alfred Tarski, “The Establishment of Scientific Semantics”, in: Tarski 1956, p. 406.

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  6. Alfred Tarski, “O ugruntowaniu naukowej semantyki”, in: Przeglgd Filozoficzny t. XXXIX (1936), pp. 50–57.

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  7. Alfred Tarski, ibid., pp. 50–57: “Finally, the axiomatic method leads in this instance to doubts from some general philosophical points of view: if, for instance, it proves to be the only possible one to establish scientific semantics and not be regarded as merely a transitory stage, then it would be difficult to bring the fact of existence of scientific semantics into harmony with postulates of the unity of science and of physicalism, which are propagated by a great number of philosophers from the so called Vienna Circle, it would be difficult to bring oneself so wide concept of physics which would include semantics”. (My translation and emphasis)

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  8. See: Przegl4d Filozoficzny XXXIX (1936).

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  9. In this context I am going to mention only the following texts: Klemens Szaniawski (ed.), The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989; Jan Woleriski, “Szkola lwowsko-warszawska: mkdzy brentanizmem a pozytywizmem” (the Lvov-Warsaw School: Between Brentanism and Positivism), in: Tomasz Lubowiecki, Artur Rojszczak (ed.), Filozofia Austriacka (Austrian Philosophy), Krakow 1994 (= Principia t. VIII-IX); Jan WoleOski, “Wobec logicznego empiryzmu” (Towards Logical Empiricism), in: Jan Wolenski, Szkola lwowskowarszawska w polemikach (The Lvov-Warsaw School in Polemics), Warszawa: Scholar, 1997.

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  10. See: Alfred Tarski, “Drei Briefe an Otto Neurath”, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 43 (1992), p. 24.

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  11. Erkenntnis Bd. 1, 1930/31, pp. 311–314. Quotation according to: Otto Neurath, Gesammelte philosophische und methodologische Schriften, Bd. 1–2, Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1981 p. 390.

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  12. Rudolf Carnap, Abriss der Logistik, Wien: Springer, 1929.

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  13. Tarski 1933, p. 11 footn. 8, p. 21 footn. 18, p. 67 footn. 60 and 61, p. 69 footn. 64.

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  14. See, for example: Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, “O znaczeniu wyrazeri” (On the Meaning of Expressions), in: Ksipga Pamigtkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie, Lwów: PTF, 1931, pp. 31–77.

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  15. See: Maria Kokoszynska’s letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from November 23, 1934, two days after Kokoszyriska’s arrival to Vienna. If not indicated otherwise, all letters cited in my paper come from correspondence of Kazimierz Twardowski as a head of the Polish Philosophical Society, which are archived in the Library of the Institute of Philosophy at Warsaw University. I would like to thank Professor Jacek J. Jadacki for his permission for using this material.

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  16. Alfred Tarski, “Drei Briefe an Otto Neurath”, loc.cit., pp. 25–26 [The phrase “the language” in the letter just quoted refers to Wittgenstein’s early position that only language exists].

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  17. Maria Kokoszynska’s letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from December 14, 1934.

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  18. Alfred Tarski, “Drei Briefe an Otto Neurath, in: loc.cit., p. 25.

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  19. ibid., p. 26.

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  20. Otto Neurath, “Die Neue Enzyklopaedie des wissenschaftlichen Empirismus” in: Scientia Milano, Dec. 1937, pp. 309–312.

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  21. Alfred Tarski, “Drei Briefe an Otto Neurath”, in: op.cit., p. 20.

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  22. The differentiation between modificational and attributive use of adjectives made above comes from Kazimierz Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, Wien: Hölder, 1894 (Engl. transi.: Kasimir Twardowski, On the Content and Object of Presentations, transi. by R. Grossmann, The Hague: Nijhoff 1977); see also his: “Z logiki przymiotników” (Issues in the Logic of Adjectives), in: PrzeglLd Filozoficzny XXX, 1927, pp. 292–294 (Engl. transi. in: J. Pelc. (Ed.), Semiotics in Poland 1894–1969, Dordrecht: Reidel 1979, pp.28–30.).

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  23. Jan Lukasiewicz, “Logika a psychologia” (Logic and Psychology), in: Przeglgd Filozoficzny X, 1907, pp. 489–492. Kazimierz Twardowski, “O czynnosciach i wytworach”, in: Ksipga Pamiitkowa ku uczczeniu 250-tej rocznicy zaloienia Uniwersytetu Lwowskiego przez króla Jana Kazimierza, Lwów: Uniwersytet lwowski, 1912, pp. 1–33 (Engl. trans.: op.cit., pp. 13–27).

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  24. Kazimierz Twardowski, “Teoria poznania. Wyklad czterogodzinny lato 1924–1925” (Theory of Knowledge. Four-hour lectures summer 1924–25), in: Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mys1i Spolecznej, vol. 21, 1975, pp. 246–250.

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  25. Kazimierz Twardowski, “O czynnosciach i wytworach”, in: loc.cit.

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  26. Stanislaw Ossowski, “Analiza pojgcia znaku” (The Analysis of the Notion of Sign), in: Przeglgd Filozoficzny, XXIX, 1926, pp. 29–56 (Engl. transi. in: J. Pelc, op.cit., pp.164–177).

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  27. Maria Ossowska, “O pojeciu wyrazania” (On the Notion of Expression), in: Przeglod Filozoficzny XXXI, 1928, pp. 145–147; Maria Ossowska, “Slowa i mysli” (Words and Thoughts), in: Przeglçd Filozoficzny XXXIV, 1931, pp. 203–258.

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  28. Jan Lukasiewicz, O zasadzie sprzecznosci u Arystotelesa (On the Law of Contradiction by Aristotle), Krakow: PAU, 1910, pp. 12, 28–30.

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  29. See: Peter Simons, “Nominalism in Poland”, in: F. Cognilione, R. Poli, J. Wolenski (eds.), Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School, Boston: Rodopi The, 1993 (=Poznan Studies vol. 28), pp. 207–231.

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  30. See for instance: Stanislaw Lesniewski, “Krytyka logicznej zasady wyl4czonego rodka”, in: Przegljd Filozoficzny XVI, pp. 315–352; Engl. transi. Stanislaw Leniewski, “The Critique of the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle”, in: Stanislaw Leniewski, Collected Works, edited by S.J. Surma, J.T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett and V.F. Rickey, Dordrecht: Kluwer/PWN, 1992. Tadeusz Kotarbinski, “Sprawa istnienia przedmiotów idealnych” (The Problem of the Existence of Ideal Objects), in: Ksivga pamigtkowa ku uczczeniu 25-letniej dzialalnosci nauczycielskiej na katedrze filozofii w Uniwersytecie Lwowskim Kazimierza Twardowskiego, Lwów: Uniwersytet Lwowski, pp. 149–170.

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  31. Kazimierz Twardowski, Zur Lehre…, op. cit.

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  32. See also: Jan Wolenski, Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.

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  33. Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Elementy logiki formalnej, teorii poznania i metodologii - skrypt autoryzowany (The Elements of Formal Logic, Epistemology and Methodology - Authorised Script), Warszawa: Wyd. Kola Filozoficznego i Kola Przyrodników, 1926; Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Elementy teorii poznania,logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk, Warszawa: Ossolineum 1929; Eng. version: Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge,Oxford: Pergamon, 1966; Tadeusz Kotarbinski, “Uwagi na temat reizmu” (Some Remarks on Reism), in: Ruch Filozoficzny 1–10, pp. 1–7; See also: Jan Wolenski, Kotarbinski, Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1990; Jan Wolenski (ed.), Kotarbinski: Logic,semantics and Ontology, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990; Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy,La Salle: Open Court.

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  34. Kazimierz Twardowski, “O tzw. prawdach wzglgdnych”, in: Ksipga pamigtkowa Uniwersytetu lwowskiego ku uczczeniu pipcsetnej rocznicy fundacji Jagielloriskiej Uniwersytetu krakowskiego, Lwów: senat Akademicki Uniwersytetu lwowskiego, 1900.

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  35. Tadeusz Kotarbiríski, “Zagadnienie istnienia przyszlosci” (The Problem of the Existence of the Future), in: Przegl’d Filozoficzny XVI, pp. 74–92; Stanislaw Lesniewski, “Czy prawda jest tylko wieczna, czy tek wieczna i odwieczna?”, in: Nowe Tory 18, pp. 493–528: Eng. trans.: Stanislaw Lesniewski, “Is All Truth Only True Eternally or Is It Also True Without a Beginning”, in: loc.cit.; Maria Kokoszynska, “Ober den absoluten Wahrheitsbegriff und einige andere semantische Begriffe”, in: Erkenntnis VI, 1936, pp. 143–165; Maria Kokoszynska, “W sprawie wzglednosci i bezwzglgdnosci prawdy” (On Relativity and Absoluteness of Truth), in: Przeglyd Filozoficzny XXXIX, 1936, pp. 424–425; Maria Kokoszynska, “What Means `Relativity of Truth’?”, in: Studia Philosophica, Vol. III, 1939–1946; Maria Kokoszynska, “A Refutation of the Relativism of Truth”, in: Studia Philosophica, Vol. IV, 1949–1950.

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  36. Stanislaw Lesniewski, “Krytyka logicznej zasady wylgczonego rodka”, in: loc.cit.

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  37. Tarski 1933, pp. 12–13, 27–29, 63–65,; Tarski 1956, pp. 162–164, 176–178, 212–214.

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  38. Tarski 1933, p. 5, Tarski 1956, p. 156.

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  39. Tarski 1933, p. 25, Tarski 1956, p. 174.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy, Jagellonian University, Grodzka 52, PL-31-044, Cracow, Poland

    Artur Rojszczak

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  1. Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland

    Jan Woleński

  2. Institute Vienna Circle, Vienna and University of Vienna, Austria

    Eckehart Köhler

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Rojszczak, A. (1999). Why Should a Physical Object Take on the Role of Truth-Bearer?. In: Woleński, J., Köhler, E. (eds) Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1998], vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0689-6_10

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