Abstract
According to a common opinion, the word ‘semantics’ (precisely: its French counterpart semantique’), derived from the Greek word semantikos (=having meaning, denoting), appeared for the first time, at least in modern times, in the book Essai de semantique, science de significations by M. J. A. Bréal (1897). However, Quine says in his lectures on Carnap:
As used by C. S. Peirce, “semantic” is the study of the modes of denotation of signs: whether a sign denotes its object through causal or symptomatic connection, or through imagery, or through arbitrary convention and so on. This sense of semantic, namely a theory of meaning, is used also in empirical philology: empirical semantic is the study of historical changes of meanings of words.1
For Bréal, semantics was a branch of general linguistics. In particular, semantics was occupied with so-called lexical meaning and its changes through time. Thus, semantics in this sense belonged to what was called “the diachronic treatment of language”. This tradition is fairly alive in contemporary linguistic theory. Quine’s description of the word ‘semantic’ in Peirce corresponds, which Quine explicitly states, to its use in philology. However, some linguists ascribe a more theoretical role to lingustic semantics. Karl Bühler is an example. In his Sprachtheorie (1934) he says that a theory of semantic functions of language is a part of theory of language.2 This account is to be found also among philosophers. It is also rather obvious that Peirce did not limit his semantic only to empirical studies. Linguists (and sometimes philosophers) also use the word ‘semasiology’ instead of ‘semantics’; Bühler proposed the term ‘sematology’ for a general theory of symbols.3
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Notes
W. V. Quine, “Lectures on Carnap”, in Dear Carnap, Dear Van The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work W. V. Quine and Rudolf Carnap, ed. by R. Creath, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press 1990, p.68. Unfortunately, I was not able to identify a place in which ‘semantic’ occurs in Peirce.
See Eng. tr. of this book: K. Bühler, Theory of Language, tr. by D. F. Goodwin, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company 1990, p. 34.
Ibid., p.33.
C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning A Study of the Influence upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism,London: Kegan Paul 1923, p.2. Ogden and Richards refer to a work by Dr. Postgate (1896), but I was not able to cjeck whether he used the word ‘semantics’.
See Eng. tr. of this book: T. Kotarbinski, Gnosiology The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, tr. by O. Wojtasiewicz, Oxford, Wroclaw: Pergamon Press, Ossolineum 1966, p. 20.
This review is included into Eng. tr. of Kotarbitiski’s book (see note 5).
See K. Ajdukiewicz, “On the Meaning of Expressions”, in K. Ajdukiewicz, The Scientific World-Perspective and Other Essays, 1931–1963, ed. by J. Giedymin, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1978, p. 2.
For historical data and useful discussions (in particular, on Carnap’s development from syntax to semantics), see A. Coffa, “Camap’s Sprachauffassung circa 1932”, in PSA 1976, vol. 2, ed. by F. Suppe and P. Asquith, East Lansing: The Philosophy of Science Association 1977, pp. 205–241;
A. Coffa, “Carnap’s Route to Semantics”, in Abstracts of the 7th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Salzburg, July 11th-16th, 1983, vol. 6, sections 13 and 14, ed. by G. Dorn, Salzburg: J. Hutteger OGH 1983, pp. 47–50;
M. Friedman, “Logical Truth and Analyticity in Carnap’s “Logical Syntax of language”“, in History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. XI, ed. by W. Aspray and Ph. Kitcher, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1988, pp. 82–94;
A. Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap To the Vienna Station,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, ch. 15;
Th. Oberdan, “The Concept of Truth in Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language”, Synthese 93, nos. 1–2, 1992, pp. 239–260;
S. Sarkar, “The Boundless Ocean of Unlimited Possibilities”: Logic in Camap’s Logical Syntax of Language”, Synthese, 93, nos. 1–2, 1992, pp. 191–237;
Th. Oberdan, Protocols, Truth and Convention,Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B. V. 1993, ch. IV; R. Cirera, Carnap and the Vienna Circle Empiricism and Logical Syntax,Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B. V. 1994, ch. 5.
This note is reprinted in A. Tarski, Collected Papers, vol. 4 1958–1979, ed. by S. R. Givant and R. M. McKenzie, Basel: Birkhäuser 1986, pp. 555–559.
A. Tarski, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den Sprachen der deduktiven Wissenchaften” (1932), reprinted in A. Tarski, Collected Papers, vol. 1921–1934, ed. by S. R. Givant and R. M. McKenzie, Basel: Birkhäuser 1986, pp. 613–617.
A. Tarski, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, in A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Meta-mathematics Papers from 1923 to 1938, tr. by J. H. Woodger, 2nd. ed., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1983, p. 252.
A. Tarski, “The Establishment of Scientific Semantics”, in A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics,p.401.
A. Ayer, A Part of my Life, London: Collins 1977, p. 116.
See Eng. tr.: R. Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, tr. by A. Smeaton, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1937, p. 9.
Ch. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs,in The Encyclopedia of the Unity of Science,ed. by O. Neurath, R. Carnap and Ch. Moms, vol. 1, no. 2, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1938, p.84 (page reference to the cloth edition of vol. I (1955)).
R. Carnap, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, in The Encyclopedia of the Unity of Science,ed. by O. Neurath, R. Carnap and Ch. Morris, vol. 1, no. 3, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1939, p.146 (page reference to the cloth edition of vol. I (1955)).
R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1942, p. 9.
W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1953, p. 130.
A. Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic I, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1956, p. 67.
A. Tarski, “The Establishment of Scientific Semantics”, p.401.
R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics,p. IX-X.
K. Gödel, “A Letter to Hao Wang (December 7, 1967)”, quoted in H. Wang, From Mathematics to Philosophy, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1974, p. 9.
R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics,p. XI-XII.
K. Gödel, “A Reply to Y. Balas”, quoted in S. Feferman, “Kurt Gödel: Conviction and Caution”, in Gödel’s Theorem in Focus,ed. by S. G. Shanker, London: Croom Helm 1988, p.107. However, as Feferman informs, this passage was crossed out by Gödel.
See Gödel’s letter quoted in note 22.
See J. Hintikka, “On the Development of the Model-Theoretic Tradition in Logical Theory”, Synthese 77, no. 1, pp.1–36; M. Kusch, Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium, Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Company 1989, Part I.
A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, vol. I, Cambridge: At the University Press, 1910, p. 12.
B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: At the University Press 1903, p. 42.
A. Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, passim.
H. Wang, Beyond Analytic Philosophy. Doing Justice to What we Know, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 1986, p. 144.
See J. Wolenski, “Gödel, Tarski and the Undefinability of Truth”, Yearbook 1991 of Kurt Gödel Society (1993), pp. 97–108.
A. Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap,ch. 16.
See Oberdan’s writings mentioned in note 8.
Quoted in Th. Oberdan, “The Concept of Truth in Camap’s Logical Syntax of Language”,p.243. This paper also reports further related discussions in the Vienna Circle.
R. Camap. The Logical Syntax of Language,p. 216.
R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. by P. A. Schilpp, La Salle: Open Court 1963, p. 60.
See I. Grattan-Guiness, “In Memoriam Kurt Gödel: His Correspondence with Zermelo on His Incompletability Theorem”, Historia Mathematica 6, 1979, pp. 294–304.
See K. Gödel, “On undecidable propositions of formal mathematical systems”, in K. Gödel, Collected Works, vol. I, pp. 362–363.
See S. Fefemian, “Kurt Gödel: Conviction and Caution”, p.105.
K. Gödel, “Über die Vollständigkeit des Logikkalkls” (1929), first published (together with Eng. tr.) in K. Gödel, Collected Works, vol. I, Publications 1929–1936, ed. by S. Feferman, J. W. Dawson, Jr., S. C. Kleene, G. H. Moore, R. M. Solovay, J. van Heijenoort, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986, pp. 60–100.
K. Gödel, “Die Vollständigkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionelkalküls” (1930), repr. (together with Eng. tr.) in K. Gödel, Collected Works, vol. I, pp. 102–123.
Eng. tr.: K. Gödel, “On formally undecidable propositions of Principia mathematica and related systems r, tr. by J. van Heijenoort, in K. Gödel, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 151.
I know this from Eckehart Köhler. For relationships between Gödel and Carnap, see his papers: “Gödel and Carnap in Vienna”, Yearbook of Kurt Gödel Society 1990,1991, pp.54–62; “Gödel und der Wiener Kreis”, in Jour Fixe der Vernuft Der Wiener Kreis und die Folgen,ed. by P. Kruntorad, R. Haller and W. Hochkeppel, Wien: Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1991, pp.127–158 and “Gödel and Carnap in Wien und Prague”, in Wien-Berlin-Prag DerAufstieg der wissenschaftliche Philosophie,ed. by R. Haller and F. Stadler, Wien: Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1993, pp.165–174.
See S. Feferman, “Kurt Gödel: Conviction and Caution”, p.109–110.
Quoted in H. Wang, A Logical Journey From Gödel to Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 1996, pp. 82–83.
Quoted in H. Wang, From Mathematics to Philosophy,p.8.
K. Gödel, “On formally undecidable propositions of Principia mathematica and related systems I”, p.181.
A. Tarski, “Contribution to the discussion of P. Bernays, Zur Beurteilung der Situation in der beweistheoretischen Forschung” (1954), repr. in A. Tarski, Collected Papers, vol. IV, p. 713.
A. Coffa, “Carnap, Tarski, and the Search for Truth”, Noûs XXI, 1987, pp.547–572; A. Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap,p.300. Of course, I do not deny that there are several affinities in ideas of Carnap and Tarski.
A. Tarski, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, p.253.
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Woleński, J. (1999). Semantic Revolution Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Gödel, Alfred Tarski. In: Woleński, J., Köhler, E. (eds) Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1998], vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0689-6_1
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