Abstract
In chapters five and six I attempted a somewhat detailed exposition and analysis of two forms of semantic analysis. It was assumed there that in the case of neither form of analysis, the concepts, meanings or other kinds of uses analysed are in any way affected by the process of analysis itself. The first question we want to ask in the present chapter is whether this assumption or presumption is as a matter of fact true; or whether our two forms of semantic analysis — particularly “exhibition analysis,” on which, in a certain respect, the other form of analysis itself rests — necessarily involve a modification of the analysandum.
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References
For a detailed criticism of the doctrine of internal relations and the Organic Theory of Reality see my The Coherence Theory of Truth: A Critical Evaluation ( Beirut, 1961 ), Chapter III.
Some Types of Philosophical Thinking,“ British Philosophy in the Mid-Century (London, 1957), edited by C. A. Mace, p. 121.
Though I myself regarded it as such, following Körner, in my “On Three Forms of Philosophical Analysis,” Proceedings of the zzth International Congress of Philosophy, Venice and Padua, vol. V, 1958, pp. 263–269.
Mind, vol. LXX, No. 277 (January, 1962 ), pp. 1–24.
Readings in Ethical Theory, pp. 415–429.
The Problem of Linguistic Inadequacy,“ Philosophical Analysis (Ithaca, New York, 195o), edited by Max Black, pp. 15–37. I am referring in particular to her discussion on pp. 26ff. But the analysis of a general idea, though it cannot consist in or include ”the removal of vagueness, or even the diminution of it“ (Ibid., p. 26), is a logically necessary first step, and so is an invaluable help, in any attempt to diminish or remove vagueness or marginal indeterminacy.
Cf. for instance Paul W. Kurtz, “Has Mr. Flew Abandoned `The Logic of Ordinary Use?”’ Philosophical Studies, vol. IX, Nos. 5–6 (October—December, x958), p. 76. See also Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, “Analysis of `Correct Language,”’ Mind, N. S. vol. LV, No. 220 (October, 1946), in which the author calls for the utilization of constructed language-systems in philosophy analogously to the employment of constructed forms in science.
For example Max Black and Alice Ambrose Lazerowitz, to mention only two such philosophers.
Many if not all of the above expressions and others like them have two or more ordinary senses or meanings. This does not, however, make them vague or otherwise imprecise. For an expression to be ambiguous in a given context, it must of necessity have two of more senses or meanings to begin with. But it is plainly false that expressions that have two or more senses or meanings are always used ambiguously in ordinary discourse. Also, ambiguity and vagueness are two different things.
This can be done, for instance, in the case of ‘happiness’ or ‘happy’; though it is not what philosophers have usually done. (See the section on open-texture.)
Cf. “Ordinary language is limited; it is frequently inconsistent with itself.” Paul Kurtz, op. cit., p. 76. Kurtz does not say in what way he thinks the latter is true, and does not offer any evidence in support of it. For, clearly, the burden of proof lies on anyone who maintains that ordinary language is inconsistent.
For a somewhat detailed criticism of the general view that ordinary language is intrinsically inadequate or defective, as well as for corroboration of other points made in the present chapter, see Alice Ambrose, op. cit., passim.
For a somewhat detailed attempt to show that Bell’s “view” is, in effect, a restriction of the meaning of ‘work of art’ to “significant form,” see Beryl Lake, “A Study Of The Irrefutability Of Two Aesthetic Theories,” Aesthetics And Language (Basil Blackwell, i954), pp. 107–113. I am assuming for the sake of illustration that `significant form’ does mean something, and that its meaning is part of the ordinary meaning of ‘work of art.’
Ibid., p. Iio.
Ibid., pp. loo-107, passim.
See my “Works of Art and Physical Reality,” Ratio, vol. II, 1959, pp. 148–161.
See my “Art-Names and Aesthetic Judgments,” passim. For other common examples of restriction of meaning of the present sort, see the section on extension of meaning.
The qualification is necessary, since the indeterminateness of the meaning of expressions may be of different kinds. One kind of such indeterminateness, distinct from marginal indeterminacy, is vagueness.
I should perhaps add that in respect to marginal indeterminacy or any other type of indeterminateness of the meaning of expressions except vagueness, if any, the meaning of an expression is not really determinate or indeterminate simpliciter: it is rather “sufficiently” or “not sufficiently” determinate in this or that particular context. It is for this reason that I said before that expressions involving marginal indeterminacy in their meanings are indeterminate only in relation to borderline cases — i.e., in terms of the present analysis, only when we attempt to employ them in relation to certain, but not all, objects or situations.
See my “What is rationality?” Theorie, vol. XXIV, 3; 1958. The above can also be used to illustrate the restriction of the meaning of an expression such that it is no longer applied to certain things to which it originally applied: i.e., if we limit the applications of ‘rational’ to moral situations.
The above applies only in a very limited way, if at all, to extremely general concepts (categories); except where the extension of meaning is limited to borderline cases. For more drastic extension may lead to type violation. (See chapter eight.)
I have already noted the practical difficulties involved in the attempt to apply these criteria to actual expressions. So I shall not say anything about them here.
As examples of “extention” of meaning which illustrate this, I might mention the traditional philosopher’s use of the word ‘is’ and its derivatives in the sense of `exists,’ or in the sense of ‘is real.’ The first is exemplified in Descartes’ “I think therefore I am”; the second in “Permanence is; change is not” (Parmenides) and “Change is; permanence is not” (Heraclitus). Similarly with the traditional philosopher’s use of `being,’ `non-being’ and `becoming.“’
The notion of existence (subsistence) as applied to Platonic universals is almost certainly a case in point.
Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, “Analysis Of `Correct’ Language,” Mind, vol. LV, No. 220 (October, 1946 ), P. 339.
Op. cit., pp. 24–25.
In this type of substitution or “translation” we have a good example of the attempt at a complete replacement of one meaning or one concept by another meaning or concept: at least
we interpret the Sense-datum Theory as providing us with (nothing but) an alternative language, not, or not also, a set of alleged empirical discoveries.
Cf. P. F. Strawson, “Construction And Analysis,” The Revolution In Philosophy (London, 1957), PP. 104–105, and passim.
Körner, for instance, does not distinguish the two. As I stated earlier, he regards Russell’s treatment of existential propositions in his Theory of Descriptions as an instance of “replacement analysis.” Whereas, as I shall try to show, the Theory of Descriptions involves the use of a different — our present — method.
Language, Truth and Logic (London, 1936), p. 69.
Ibid., p. pa.
I might mention here parenthetically that Moore likewise fails to see that in the case of his analysis of the concept hand as involved in the statement “This is a hand” (coupled with pointing to a hand) in terms of what he calls sense data, we have yet another sort of “division.” For the sense-data of a hand are not, according to Moore, parts of the hand or even of its surface: the relation between the hand and these sense-data is that of “source” to something arising from that “source” (“The Status of Sense Data,” Philosophical Studies, p. 192). If we understand the relation “being a source of” in a causal sense, which Moore’s extremely spare remarks about the notion of “source of” give credence to, though not if we think of the physical hand as the whole cause of the sense data of it which we directly apprehend (see Ibid., p. 192), we see that analysis as envisioned by Moore himself leaves no room for this sort of analysis. But causal analysis is certainly a common, important and perfectly legitimate activity and, if properly conducted, provides us with explicit definitions or parts of definitions of the verbal expressions expressing the analysandum (the concept of the phenomenon that is the effect, or of the object that is the patient). These definitions or parts of definitions may not, in many cases, give us the whole or part of what people ordinarily have in mind in using the relevant definienda. But they would provide us at least with the kind of explicit definitions that scientists frequently give us, without, in the present cases, necessarily modifying the meaning of the definiendum as it is understood and employed in ordinary discourse (if it is an expression occurring in ordinary language to begin with).
Logical Atomism,“ in Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series (New York, 1956), edited by J. H. Muirhead, p. 363. See also pp. 364–365.
Ibid., pp. 364–365.
Ibid., p. 365. For other, related consequences of the theory according to Russell, see History of Western Philosophy, Sixth Printing (New York, [1945]), pp. 83ff.
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Khatchadourian, H. (1967). Semantic Analysis III Analysis and Reconstruction. In: A Critical Study in Method. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0569-1_7
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