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Church’s Thesis and Hume’s Problem

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Logic and Scientific Methods

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 259))

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Abstract

We argue that uncomputability and classical scepticism are both reflections of inductive underdetermination, so that Church’s thesis and Hume’s problem ought to receive equal emphasis in a balanced approach to the philosophy of induction. As an illustration of such an approach, we investigate how uncomputable the predictions of a hypothesis can be if the hypothesis is to be reliably investigated by a computable scientific method.

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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Kelly, K.T., Schulte, O. (1997). Church’s Thesis and Hume’s Problem. In: Dalla Chiara, M.L., Doets, K., Mundici, D., van Benthem, J. (eds) Logic and Scientific Methods. Synthese Library, vol 259. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0487-8_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0487-8_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4786-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0487-8

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