Abstract
To many people, the name Rudolf Carnap means, above all, a naive, foundationalist empiricism in epistemology, verifiability theory of meaning in semantics and an eliminative approach to metaphysics, confirmationism in scientific methodology, accumulationism in matters of growth of science, and finally a dry, formalistic style of philosophizing which preoccupied itself with the logical analysis and rational reconstruction of the language of science.
Part of the research for this paper was carried out while I was a visiting fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh University. I am grateful to the center for its support. I would also like to thank Stephen Voss and Giora Hon for their valuable comments.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Borradori, G.: (1994), The American Philosopher, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Carnap, R.: (1934/1937), The Logical Syntax of Language,translated by A. Smeaton, Countess von Zeppelin. Originally published as Logische Syntax der Sprache, Schriften zur Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung,vol. 8. (Vienna: Verlag von Julius Springer), Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner and Co., London.
Carnap, R.: (1936/1949), R.: (1936/1949), ‘Truth and Confirmation’, in H. Feigl, W. Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, pp. 119–127.
Camap, R.: (1955), ‘Comments on Feigl’s “Philosophy of Science”’, dated 18 January 1955, Archive for Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, document no. RC 090–63–24. Quoted by the permission of the University of Pittsburgh; all rights reserved.
Carnap, R.: (1956), ‘The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts’, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 38–76.
Carnap, R.: (1958), ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’, in Meaning and Necessity, Second edn., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 205–221.
Carnap, R.: (1963a), ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 3–84.
Carnap, R.: (1963b), ‘Replies and Systematic Expositions’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 859–1013.
Carnap, R.: (1966), Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Basic Books, New York.
Coffa, A.: (1991), The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Friedman, M.: (1998), ‘On the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and its Philosophical Agenda’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29, pp. 239–271.
Friedman, M.: (1999), Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hoyningen-Huene, R: (1993), Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Irzik, G., Grünberg, T.: (1995), ‘Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46, pp. 285–307.
Irzik, G., Grünberg, T.: (1998), ‘Whorfian Variations on Kantian Themes: Kuhn’s Linguistic Turn’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29, pp. 207–221.
Jeffrey, R.: (1968), ‘Probable Knowledge’, in I. Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic, North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 166–180.
Kuhn, T.: (1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd. edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Kuhn, T.: (1976), ‘Theory change as Structure Change: Comments on the Sneed formalism’, Erkenntnis 10, pp. 179–199.
Kuhn, T.: (1977), The Essential Tension, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Kuhn, T.: (1987), ‘What are Scientific Revolutions?’, in L. Krüger, L.J. Daston, M. Heidelberger (eds.), The Probabilistic Revolution, Vol. 1, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, pp. 7–22.
Kuhn, T.: (1990), ‘Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation’, in W. Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 300–318.
Kuhn, T.: 1991, ‘The Road Since Structure’, in A. Fine, M. Forbes, L. Wessels (eds.) PSA 1990, Vol.2, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, pp. 3–13.
Kuhn, T.: (1992), ‘The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science’, Robert and Maurine Rothchild Distinguished Lecture, 19 November 1991, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, Cambridge.
Kuhn, T.: (1993), Afterwords’, in R Horwich (ed.), World Changes, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, pp. 311–341.
Kuhn, T.: (2000), The Road Since Structure, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Reisch, G.: (1991), ‘Did Kuhn Kill Logical Positivism?’, Philosophy of Science 58, pp. 264277.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Irzik, G. (2002). Carnap and Kuhn: A Belated Encounter. In: Gärdenfors, P., Woleński, J., Kijania-Placek, K. (eds) In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library, vol 316. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0475-5_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0475-5_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6145-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0475-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive