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Semantics and the Liar Paradox

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Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Handbook of Philosophical Logic ((HALO,volume 11))

Abstract

The semantical paradoxes are not a scientific subject like Inductive Definitions, Algebraic Geometry or Plasma Physics. At least not yet. On the other hand the paradoxes exert a strong fascination and many a philosopher or logician has spent some thought on them, mostly in relative isolation. The literature on the paradoxes is vast but scattered, repetitive and disconnected. This made it impossible to give a presentation in which all ideas in the literature receive their due.

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Visser, A. (2002). Semantics and the Liar Paradox. In: Gabbay, D.M., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0466-3_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0466-3_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6554-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0466-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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