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Logics for Defeasible Argumentation

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Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Handbook of Philosophical Logic ((HALO,volume 4))

Abstract

Logic is the science that deals with the formal principles and criteria of validity of patterns of inference. This chapter surveys logics for a particular group of patterns of inference, namely those where arguments for and against a certain claim are produced and evaluated, to test the tenability of the claim. Such reasoning processes are usually analysed under the common term ‘defeasible argumentation’. We shall illustrate this form of reasoning with a dispute between two persons, A and B. They disagree on whether it is morally acceptable for a newspaper to publish a certain piece of information concerning a politician’s private life.1 Let us assume that the two parties have reached agreement on the following points.

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  1. Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

    Henry Prakken & Gerard Vreeswijk

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  1. Henry Prakken
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  1. King’s College, London, UK

    D. M. Gabbay

  2. Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany

    F. Guenthner

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Prakken, H., Vreeswijk, G. (2001). Logics for Defeasible Argumentation. In: Gabbay, D.M., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0456-4_3

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