On Ability, Opportunity and Competence: An Inquiry Into People’s Possibility for Action
What does it mean to say that a man is able to perform an action? Is it true, as the standard philosophical analysis of ability indicates, that this man is in a state which is such that he would perform the action if he were to try? Is the counterfactual conditional the proper form for the analysis of the notion of ability?
KeywordsBasic Action Intentional Action Football Player Bodily Consciousness Practical Possibility
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