On Ability, Opportunity and Competence: An Inquiry Into People’s Possibility for Action

  • Lennart Nordenfelt
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 266)


What does it mean to say that a man is able to perform an action? Is it true, as the standard philosophical analysis of ability indicates, that this man is in a state which is such that he would perform the action if he were to try? Is the counterfactual conditional the proper form for the analysis of the notion of ability?


Basic Action Intentional Action Football Player Bodily Consciousness Practical Possibility 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lennart Nordenfelt
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Health and SocietyLinköping UniversitySweden

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