Actions in Action

  • Ghita Holmström-Hintikka
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 266)


This paper is a further development of a theory first presented in my book Action, Purpose and Will (1991). Here I continue to deal with the tripartition of agent causation: mere causation, instrumental action and purposive action. The concept of goal directed will is also subject for discussion. In this context, however, I shall bring these notions further in the direction of second-order actions and intentions. New in this regard are also attempted applications in computation as are investigations into instances of higher-order causations and actions with separate agents in particular the discussion on influence. As the logical foundations for the first-order cases are laid in my book I have no reason to go into detailed discussion here. I shall, nevertheless, for the sake of easier understandability collect the basic assumptions I make in an Appendix.


Agent Causation Action Theory Instrumental Action Legal Responsibility Practical Possibility 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ghita Holmström-Hintikka
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Boston UniversityUSA
  2. 2.University of HelsinkiFinland

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