Abstract
There seems to be a distinction of some sort between my actions on the one hand, like my bending my finger and my raising my arm, and mere ‘passive’ events that occur to my body on the other, like my finger’s bending and my arm’s rising. My finger can bend without my bending it; my arm can rise without me raising it. What are actions, if not events?
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Ruben, DH. (1997). Doing Without Happenings: Three Theories of Action. In: Holmström-Hintikka, G., Tuomela, R. (eds) Contemporary Action Theory Volume 1: Individual Action. Synthese Library, vol 266. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0439-7_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0439-7_15
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