Doing Without Happenings: Three Theories of Action

  • David-Hillel Ruben
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 266)


There seems to be a distinction of some sort between my actions on the one hand, like my bending my finger and my raising my arm, and mere ‘passive’ events that occur to my body on the other, like my finger’s bending and my arm’s rising. My finger can bend without my bending it; my arm can rise without me raising it. What are actions, if not events?


Proper Part Token Action Folk Psychology Conceptual Content Representational State 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • David-Hillel Ruben
    • 1
  1. 1.London School of EconomicsUK

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