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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 266))

Abstract

This paper concerns the general problem of explaining how personal action can belong to the natural causal order, and the specific difficulty posed by the need to accommodate mental actions for such “naturalist” or “naturalising” accounts of agency.

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References

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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Bishop, J. (1997). Naturalising Mental Action. In: Holmström-Hintikka, G., Tuomela, R. (eds) Contemporary Action Theory Volume 1: Individual Action. Synthese Library, vol 266. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0439-7_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0439-7_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4914-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0439-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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