Naturalising Mental Action

  • John Bishop
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 266)


This paper concerns the general problem of explaining how personal action can belong to the natural causal order, and the specific difficulty posed by the need to accommodate mental actions for such “naturalist” or “naturalising” accounts of agency.


Mental Action Free Action Causal Theory Naturalist Theory Free Agent 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Bishop
    • 1
  1. 1.The University of AucklandNew Zealand

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