Naturalising Mental Action
This paper concerns the general problem of explaining how personal action can belong to the natural causal order, and the specific difficulty posed by the need to accommodate mental actions for such “naturalist” or “naturalising” accounts of agency.
KeywordsMental Action Free Action Causal Theory Naturalist Theory Free Agent
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