Intention and Intentional Action

  • Myles Brand
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 266)


An adequate theory of human action will explain, among other things, how external events and the agent’s recent psychological history initiates bodily activity, which, in turn, affects changes in the world. If we take the initiating event to be an intending and the resultant activity to be an intentional action, then any adequate action theory will explain the relationship between intending and acting intentionally. My goal in this paper is to partially specify this relationship.


Action Plan Video Game Moral Responsibility Nodal Action Intentional Action 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Myles Brand
    • 1
  1. 1.Indiana UniversityUSA

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