Conclusion

Abstract

Within the tradition of analytical philosophy, the basic movements of this book have been the following. First, a general analysis of responsibility was set forth, one that was grounded in and based on some of the basic concepts of contemporary moral responsibility theory, and one which can be used in criminal justice contexts and is congruent with the basic elements of criminal responsibility under U.S. law. The analysis provides philosophical substance to the content of the notion of desert. Desert is not some ephemeral concept that is a primitive and understood only by way of retributivist intuitions. Rather, the notion of desert is based at least in part on the concepts of moral and legal responsibility. I stopped short of discussing and ensnarling readers in the quagmire of brilliant philosophical discussion that separates various contemporary philosophers of moral responsibility theory. Instead, I provided a view of responsibility with which many philosophers could concur. Even if it turns out that the analysis provided herein is incomplete or somewhat incorrect, the retributivist position I present and defend herein is not contingent on the plausibility of a particular analysis of responsibility anyway. For whatever (positive) responsibility theory is in the end the best (most plausible) is the one to which my version of retributivism and desert must subscribe. Moreover, my theory of responsibility and punishment does not assume that there must be responsible agents, only that there are, in all likelihood, some.