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Two-Dimensionalism and the Metaphysical Possibility of Zombies

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Foundations of the Formal Sciences II

Part of the book series: Trends in Logic ((TREN,volume 17))

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Abstract

Two-dimensionalism is a formal framework used in formal semantics, epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The technical background dates back to the early seventies, in particular to Krister Segerberg’s paper “Two-Dimensional Modal Logic”. The mathematical tools developed in that tradition can be used to model the relations between two semantical properties of concepts or expressions, which, according to two-dimensionalism, can be conceived to be two kinds of intensions. I shall present the general ideas of two-dimensionalism, and give a brief reconstruction and discussion of one application in the philosophy of mind.

I would like to thank Oliver Beermann, Dieter Birnbacher, Axel Bühler, Anneli Mottweiler, John Perry, Barry Smith, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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References

  1. Cf. [Cha02b].

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  2. To get a complete reconstruction of the use of two-dimensionalism in Chalmers’ argument, cf. [Byr00] or [BloSta199].

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  3. Cf. [Dav281, p. 263–267].

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  4. I will concentrate on identity only. Chalmers takes it that physicalism is best understood as a supervenience thesis, and hence argues against this supervenience. I think that physicalism should be formulated as an identity claim. Arguments in favor of my position can be found in [Per101]. For the purpose of the present paper the difference doesn’t matter.

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  5. Cf. [Kri172].

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  6. For problems concerning the conceivability of zombies in this sense cf. [Per101,Pol100,Coh1∞].

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  7. Cf. [Cha96]; compare [B yr00].

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  8. Cf. [Cha96].

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  9. This neat reconstruction is taken from [Byr00, 9]. 11 Cf. [Byr00, 10].

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  10. This move was considered in [Cha96, p. 134–136].

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  11. I’ m using “available information” in the technical sense introduced by [Bar3 97].

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  12. For a more critical evaluation of this framework see [Byr00].

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Cohnitz, D. (2003). Two-Dimensionalism and the Metaphysical Possibility of Zombies. In: Löwe, B., Malzkom, W., Räsch, T. (eds) Foundations of the Formal Sciences II. Trends in Logic, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0395-6_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0395-6_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6233-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0395-6

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