Abstract
We provide a short introduction to the theory of Bayesian Networks and construct a Bayesian Network model of confirmation with an unreliable instrument. We indicate how this model can be extended to investigate the varietyof-evidence thesis, the Duhem-Quine thesis and calibration in philosophy of science and to give precise accounts of notions such as reliability and coherence in epistemology.
The research was supported by a grant of the National Science Foundation, Science and Technology Studies (SES 00-80580), and grants of the TransCoop Program and of the Feodor Lynen Program of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Stephan Hartmann also thanks Jim Lennox and the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh for their hospitality.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Bovens, L., Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian Networks in Philosophy. In: Löwe, B., Malzkom, W., Räsch, T. (eds) Foundations of the Formal Sciences II. Trends in Logic, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0395-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0395-6_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6233-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0395-6
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