Abstract
By the term “analytically un/true proposition” I mean propositions that are true or untrue by definition. — I refer to the account of the fundamental concept, with examples, in the introductory survey (section A 2 (2) above). I further refer to the account in the same place of the critical force of this concept, and thus of why I consider it important to keep analytically un/true propositions separate from both definitions and characterisations. In what follows I shall look more closely at these two boundaries.
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Rerferences
For a brief but probably in essentials corresponding account, see Næss, Interpretation and Preciseness, p. 167.
See e.g. Næss, Logikk og metodelære [logic and methodology], respectively pp. 117 and 100 (“[A]nalytical propositions of the class we have gone through in this section are closely connected to determinations of concepts¡ [T]wo main ways [of interpreting a concept determination are] the regulative (normative) and the descriptive”); Sundby, ‘Legal Right in Scandinavian Analyses’, p. 89 in note 38 (“Definitions are not analytic sentences. The situation is rather this: In order to classify something as an analytic sentence, some sort of definition is presupposed”).
Wittgenstein, Zettel, section 438.
Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen ber die Farben, Part I, section 32, cf. Part III, section 19.
Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen,Part I, section 79, concluding remarks (Wittgenstein’s parenthesis omitted).
op. cit., Part I, section 354. See also Part I, sections 104, 392.
Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in particular pp. 23–37; Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p. 222; Næss, Logikk og metodelcere [logic and methodology], p. 115.
Næss, Logikk og metodelcere [logic and methodology], p. 115.
Loc. cit.
Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, p. 22; Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p. 222; F011esdal/ WallOe/ Elster, Argumentasjonsteori, sprâk og vitenskapsfilosofi [argumentation theory, language and the philosophy of science], pp. 221–22.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London 1922 (original German edition 1921).
Bolzano, Grundlegung der Logik, pp. 232, 234 (“identische Sätze”).
As examples of rather indeterminate usage, see Mill, A System of Logic,p. viii (the table of contents) cf. pp. 71–73; Scheel, ‘Om Rettens Grund som Udgangspunkt for Lxren om Retskilderne’ [on the foundation of law as a point of departure for the doctrine of the sources of law], p. 255.
Nxss, Logikk og metodelcere [logic and methodology], p. 115; F011esdal/ Walloe/ Elster, Argumentasjonsteori, sprâk og vitenskapsfilosofi [argumentation theory, language and the philosophy of science], p. 222.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Eng, S. (2003). Analytically un/true propositions. In: Analysis of Dis/Agreement — with particular reference to Law and Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0381-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0381-9_5
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