Abstract
In order to determine whether two participants in a discussion are in real dis/ agreement one must compare their propositions. Comparison presupposes common yardsticks and common features: Just as the comparison of two phenomena with respect to length presupposes that one has concepts of units of length and that these concepts are applicable to both phenomena, so the comparison of propositions with respect to dis/agreement will presuppose that one has concepts of types of proposition and that these concepts are applicable to both sets of propositions. — If one has no concepts of proposition types, or if one applies them to propositions in relation to which they are out of place, then the comparison will be only an apparent one (pseudo-discussion) and the result a misunderstanding (pseudo dis/agreement).
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References
Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’, p. 169.
Peter Wessel Zapffe. Here quoted from Andenæs, Innfgring i rettsstudiet [introduction to the study of law], p. 113.
Freedom of Information Act (Act No. 69 of 19 June 1970), section 3 first paragraph.
Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government, p. 161.
Palme, Politikk — det er â ville noe [politics — that is the will to achieve something].
Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, p. 34.
Collingwood, ‘Modem Politics’, p. 179.
Osterud, ‘Er nasjonalstaten foreldet?’ [is the national state a thing of the past?], p. 352.
Osterud, Hva er nasjonalisme? [what is nationalism?], pp. 102 et seq.
Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, p. 67
Various articles with this title in Stigen (ed.), Generasjoner i norsk filosofi [generations of Norwegian philosophy]; Deleuze/ Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?
Schjelderup, ‘Filosofiens vesen’ [the essence of philosophy], p. 48.
Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, p. 59: “[Questions of the What-is-x? form] is, perhaps, when unsupported by a context, the vaguest of all forms of question except an inarticulate grunt. It indicates less determinately than any other the sort of information the questioner wants” (my italics). — See also same writer, Definition, pp. 190, 192.
In accordance with normal language usage among lawyers I use the spelling “judgment” for a type of decision of the court. In all other cases I use the spelling “judgement”.
I use the word “fundamental” relative to the purpose and structuring of the present work. — A more complete survey of fundamental types of proposition is given in section II A below.
More precisely I could thus have used the formulation “the perspective of problem discussion and language decision”, but that would have been too cumbersome.
Ross, On Law and Justice, e.g. p. 39 final paragraph.
I shall be returning in more detail to the said propositions in Ross in sections II B 5.2 (5)(b)(ii), 7.3.2 (1); C 2.1 (1), 2.1 (2)(a)(i), 2.3, 3.1 (2); and III 2.2.2 (3).
Compare also section III 2.2.2 (3)(c) below, at and in notes 43–45, where in another connection I mention some other writers’ answers to a critically reflexive mode of questioning concerning propositions about “what meaning is”.
In the text at the present note and throughout this work I use the term “academic subject” in the broad sense of the Scandinavian “fag” and the German “Fach”, i.e. I use it of crafts, professional subjects and academic disciplines. Further, I use the term “science” (1) in the broad sense of the Scandinavian “vitenskap” and the German “Wissenschaft”, i.e. to cover natural, social and human sciences, and (2) as an abbreviation for “activity one traditionally terms ”science“ in this broad sense” — that is, I neither presuppose nor lay down anything contentious through this concept of ‘science’.
I use the formulation “legal theory” in a broad sense, also of discussions that are traditionally designated “legal philosophy”.
Concerning the everyday-language orientation, see in addition e.g. sections II B 1 (3); 2; and III 1.
On the relationship between the presentation given in this work and the reader’s own reality, see further a retrospective treatment in-depth in Chapter IHV.
The word “or” I use throughout in the broad sense ‘either the one alternative, or the other alternative, or both alternatives’.
See section 5.1 above concerning sections II F (fused descriptive and normative propositions) and V (reconstructions and redefinitions).
Unless more special definition is explicitly stated or is clear from the context, I use “analysis and argumentation” as a derived variant of “language and argumentation”. There are two reasons for my use of this variant. First, I wish to point to a practically important specification: In relation to the broad area designated “language and argumentation”, “analysis” points to the sub-area of more reflected activity. Secondly, there is the consideration for effective communication of a major feature of the perspective and topic of the present work, namely the focusing of and on everyday language in contrast to artificial languages, including in particular logic and mathematics (section 5.1 above, introductory remarks, cf. the present section 5 in its entirety): To remind the reader of this major feature of the perspective and topic of the work, in a number of places I bring in the qualifier “formulated in everyday language”. Even though strictly speaking one might justify the formulation “language and argumentation formulated in everyday language”, such a formulation may at first glance provoke resistance (“language… formulated in… language” may at first glance look like three terms for the same thing) and may thus get in the way of comprehension. Therefore I link the qualifier “formulated in everyday language” to the formulation “analysis and argumentation”.
As the work proceeds, it will provide a basis for a retrospective treatment in-depth of the paragraph containing the present note, see Chapter IHV, in the second indent.
Is the author a realist?
Of a philosophical nature too, if one uses the designation “applied philosophy”.
What does the author believe science is?
On the theme of independence, see further in section 7 below; a brief specification in section II A 8 below; and a retrospective treatment in-depth, with further references, in Chapter IHV.
To take general philosophy as an example, and especially in relation to definition theory: Concepts formed on the basis of “falsificationism” (Popper) or “physicalism” (Quine) show themselves incapable of capturing the wealth of nuances, the internal coherence (system character and dynamics), the independence and the factual significance of the definition field of everyday language; see respectively sections II B 1 (4) and G 2, below.
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Eng, S. (2003). Introduction. In: Analysis of Dis/Agreement — with particular reference to Law and Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0381-9_1
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