Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Sources, Objectives and Principles of EC Law

  • Chapter
The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 64))

  • 370 Accesses

Abstract

The Sources of EC law have roughly been divided into the categories of primary law,1 secondary law and case law. The emphasis is on the EC and EU Treaties, binding secondary legislation and the preliminary rulings of the ECJ. The Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty), as amended, among others, by the Single European Act (SEA),2 the Treaty on European Union (the EU Treaty),3 the Amsterdam Treaty4 or most recently by the Nice Treaty,5 is the most important source of primary law. The Treaties can from the practical point of view be referred to as the constitution of the Community, because their provisions take priority over all other sources of law within the EC, they define the limits of the EC’s competence to act and provide the legal basis for secondary legislation. The EC Treaty sets out the basic objectives, principles, foundations and policy of the Community and the rules which govern its institutions. It establishes a European Community with legal personality.6 The protocols annexed to the EC Treaty form an integral part of it.7 The EC Treaty is essentially a framework Treaty (traité cadre), which leaves its institutions, namely the Commission and Council with increased consultation and sometimes through co-decisions with the European Parliament, to fill in the gaps by means of secondary legislation.8

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Reference

  1. See Joutsamo-Aalto-Kaila-Maunu 2000, pp. 55–57 on the categorization of primary norms: the three constitutive Treaties, the amending Treaties, the Treaties of Accession and the supplementary Treaties. The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty),Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom-Treaty) are the three constitutive Treaties of the Community. The latter category refers to the direct elections of the EP, and thus to OJ No. L 278, 8.10.1976, p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  2. See OJ No. L 169, 29.6.1987, p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  3. See OJ No. C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  4. See OJ No. C 340, 10.11.1997, p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  5. See OJ No. C 80, 10.2.2001, p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  6. See Article 281 EC (ex-Article 210 EC) and on the legal personality of EU see Klabbers, pp. 231–253.

    Google Scholar 

  7. See Article 311 EC (ex-Article 239 EC) and C-323/88 Sermes (1990) ECR 3027, esp. p. 3057. See Steiner, p. 7.

    Google Scholar 

  8. See Article 293 EC (ex-Article 220 EC) and Hartley 1998, pp. 94–97.

    Google Scholar 

  9. See OJ No. L 299, 1972, p. 32, as amended OJ No. C 27, 26.1.1998, p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  10. See OJ No. L 266, 9.10.1980, p. 1, as amended OJ No. C 27, 26.1.1998, p. 34.

    Google Scholar 

  11. These are designated “Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting in the Council” or “Agreement between the Representatives”. Their legal status varies, and they can fall into the category of an international agreement binding in the same way as the subsidiary conventions; a political accord, which is legally non-binding (e.g. The “Luxemburg Accords”) or an accord, which is binding by virtue of the Treaty provision in question.

    Google Scholar 

  12. See Article 133 EC (ex-Article 113 EC) or Article 310 EC (ex-Article 238 EC).

    Google Scholar 

  13. See the ERTA case 22/70 Commission v. Council (1971) ECR 263, esp. p. 273.

    Google Scholar 

  14. See Article 308 EC (ex-Article 235 EC), the ERTA-case 22/70 Commission v. Council (1971) ECR 263, esp. pp. 273–274, paras. 9–10 and Opinion 1/94, (1994) ECR I-5267, esp. p. 1–5276 ff. and comments in Lewis, pp. 12–14.

    Google Scholar 

  15. See Article 310 EC (ex-Article 238 EC).

    Google Scholar 

  16. See JO No. 93, 11.6.1964, p. 1431 and Joutsamo-Aalto-Kaila-Maunu 2000, p. 815.

    Google Scholar 

  17. See OJ No L 25, 30.1.1976, p. 2, or as revised, e.g. the Fourth Lom¨¦ Convention in OJ No. L 229, 17.8.1991, p. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  18. See Kapteyn, pp. 1334–1336, Joutsamo-Aalto-Kaila-Maunu 2000, pp. 15–16, 802–803 and on the Agenda 2000 for example Bull. EU 12 ¡ª 1997, point. I.5.

    Google Scholar 

  19. See OJ No. L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  20. See Article 300 EC (ex-Article 228 EC).

    Google Scholar 

  21. See OJ No. L 263, 27.9.1978, p. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  22. See OJ No. L 264, 27.9.1978, p. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  23. See OJ No. L 265, 27.9.1978, p. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  24. See OJ No. L 136, 28.5.1975, p. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  25. See Articles 131–134 EC (ex-Articles 110–115 EC) on the common commercial policy (CCP) and Joutsamo-Aalto-Kaila-Maunu 2000, pp. 768–774.

    Google Scholar 

  26. See Raitio 1994, pp. 65–70 and 104/81 Kupferberg I (1982) ECR 3641, esp. pp. 3659–3671, 253/83 Kupferberg II (1985) ECR 157, esp. pp. 180–187 and the WTO case C–149/96 Portugal v. Council (1999) ECR I–8395, esp. pp. 1–8427–1–8451.

    Google Scholar 

  27. See Eerola, pp. 44–45. The framework decisions shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. Eerola has commented on the function and importance of framework decisions in the sphere of harmonization of national criminal laws.

    Google Scholar 

  28. See Lewis, p. 12 and the ERTA-case 22/70 Commission v. Council (1971) ECR 263, esp. pp. 276–279.

    Google Scholar 

  29. On the discussion see Toth 1984, pp. 2–3, Ojanen 1996, pp. 175–183 or MacCormickSummers 1997, pp. 415–417.

    Google Scholar 

  30. See Bebr 1981, p. 9 and Toth 1984, p. 81.

    Google Scholar 

  31. See Mackenzie Stuart-Warner, p. 276 and Koopmans, pp. 21–24. In addition to Mackenzie Stuart, a former ECJ Judge T. Koopmans has stated that when the ECJ relies on its own judgments it appears to consider them as a binding authority.

    Google Scholar 

  32. See Anderson, pp. 314–315, Bengoetxea 1993, p. 69, Brown-Kennedy, pp. 319–320, Schermers-Waelbroeck, pp. 440–441, Trabucchi, pp. 56–87 or Slynn, p. 423, in which Slynn has stated: “The Court may never refer to stare decisis or the doctrine of precedent, or be strictly bound by its own decisions, yet in general it clearly does follow them¡ There are passages in the judgments where the weight and the number of the previous decisions seem almost to be felt to be such as to make them binding in fact, if not in theory.”

    Google Scholar 

  33. See MacCormick-Summers 1997, pp. 416–417, esp. p. 417: “The ECJ judges never refer to past decisions as `precedents’, but they do use the cases as justification for stated rules or principles. Usually the Court cites a line of cases concerning a firmly-established point. Thus an ECJ opinion might say: `in accordance with the settled case law’ and then cite a string of cases. The opinion would then state an abstract principle, often using language identical to that used in the prior cited cases themselves.”

    Google Scholar 

  34. ibid., p. 420.

    Google Scholar 

  35. See Arnull 1993, p. 262 or Van der Woude, p. 459. The CFI is formally bound by an ECJ decision, if the ECJ decides that a case falls within the jurisdiction of the CFI and therefore remands the case to it or if the ECJ refers an appealed case back to the CFI, it is bound by the decision of the ECJ on points of law.

    Google Scholar 

  36. See Millett, p. 74.

    Google Scholar 

  37. For further discussion see MacCormick-Summers 1997, pp. 421–424 and Kanninen 1998, pp. 73–77.

    Google Scholar 

  38. On the concept of ratio decidendi see Cross, p. 76 and on the influence of ratio decidendi in EC law see Koopmans, pp. 22–24 and MacCormick-Summers 1997, pp. 427–428. It is in practice difficult to separate the ratio decidendi from obiter dicta in the judgments of the European courts, but theoretically the obiter dicta can hardly be perceived as binding, because by definition it is not a “reason for a decision”.

    Google Scholar 

  39. See Bengoetxea 1993, p. 69. According to Bengoetxea, one should be able to trust that future relevantly similar cases will be treated in a like manner and thus the principle of legal certainty is important in this context as well.

    Google Scholar 

  40. See 28–30/62 Da Costa en Schaake (1963) ECR 31.

    Google Scholar 

  41. See Brown-Kennedy, pp. 352–353.

    Google Scholar 

  42. See 283/81 CILFIT (1982) ECR 3415, esp. p. 3430 and on the acte clair-doctrine Kapteyn, pp. 521–525, Raitio 2000a, pp. 310–320, Raitio 2000b, pp. 437–445, Kanninen 2002, pp. 32–47 and paras. 10–19 of the recent case C-99/00 Lyckeskog (4 June 2002), not yet published in ECR. The Lyckeskog case seems to have clarified the notion of `court of the last instance’ in the framework of Article 234(3) EC (ex-Article 177(3) EC).

    Google Scholar 

  43. See MacCormick-Summers 1997, p. 422.

    Google Scholar 

  44. See 66/80 International Chemical Corporation (1981) ECR 1191, esp. p. 1223.

    Google Scholar 

  45. See Joutsamo-Aalto-Kaila-Maunu 2000, p. 282, MacCormick-Summers 1997, pp. 422–423, and for an opposed view see Toth 1984, pp. 65–69. Toth argues that national courts are not bound by the ECJ’s previous case law, but rather that they are permitted to rely on it.

    Google Scholar 

  46. See A-G Warner’s opinion in case 112/76 Manzoni (1977) ECR 1657, esp. p. 1662, which in fact stresses the stare decisis-doctrine.

    Google Scholar 

  47. See Mackenzie Stuart-Warner, pp. 273, 275.

    Google Scholar 

  48. See Koopmans, pp. 16–17 and MacCormick-Summers 1997, p. 425.

    Google Scholar 

  49. See Klami 1997, p. 12. The leading case is cited again and again in the subsequent case law, and after a while that may be the only case referred to as evidence of a consistent line of judgments. An example of a leading case is the case 8/74 Dassonville (1974) ECR 837 in the light of the subsequent case law, e.g. the German Beer case 178/84 Commission v. Germany (1987) ECR 1227, esp. p. 1269, para. 27. One might argue, however, that in the context of Article 28 EC (ex-Article 30 EC) also the Cassis de Dijon-case 120/78 ReweZentral (1979) ECR 649 is so important that it can be perceived as a leading case as well.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Such a situation is often at hand in the context of the principles, which I have designated as “principles based on the case law of the ECJ”.

    Google Scholar 

  51. See Brown-Kennedy, p. 347 and MacCormick-Summers 1997, pp. 424 or 426 and the opposite view in Toth 1984, p. 70, in which he states: “While judicial decisions do not make the law, they contain authoritative statements of what the law is on a given point at a given time. It may therefore be concluded that the judgments of the European Court are not sources but authoritative evidences of Community law”.

    Google Scholar 

  52. See Joutsamo 1979, p. 33 and JO No. 152, 13.7.1967, p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  53. See C-162/96 Racke (1998) ECR I-3655, esp. p. 1–3704, para. 46.

    Google Scholar 

  54. See Kapteyn, p. 115.

    Google Scholar 

  55. See 6/72 Continental Can (1973) ECR 215, esp. pp. 244–245, in which there is a reference to ex-Article 3(f) EC in order to interpret the ex-Article 86 EC or C-379/92 Peralta (1994) ECR I-3453, esp. pp. 3495–3496.

    Google Scholar 

  56. See Kapteyn, p. 113 and 31 ILM 876 (1992).

    Google Scholar 

  57. On the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty see Articles 11–28 EU (ex-Articles J.1¡ªJ.18 EU).

    Google Scholar 

  58. On the third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty see Articles 29–45 EU (ex-Articles K.1¡ªK.17 EU).

    Google Scholar 

  59. See Articles 29–42 EU (ex-Articles K.1¡ªK.14 EU).

    Google Scholar 

  60. The human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as democracy and the rule of law are protected as objectives of a common foreign and security policy as defined in Article 11 EU (ex-Article J.1 EU). Therefore the actual status of human rights as objectives or underlying general principles of the EC requires more specific study than just a mere referral to the wording of the Article 2 EC. Still, the so-called hard values relating to economic growth are still present as far as the objectives of the EC Treaty are concerned.

    Google Scholar 

  61. See Bull. EU 10 ¡ª 1999, points. 1.2.1 and I.3 or Bull. EU 12 ¡ª 1999, points 1.1.1 and I.23.

    Google Scholar 

  62. See Article 2 EC compared with ex-Article 2 EC.

    Google Scholar 

  63. See Siedentop, pp. 25–46.

    Google Scholar 

  64. See 270/80 Polydor (1982) ECR 329, esp. pp. 348–349, para. 18 in particular, or 104/81 Kupferberg I (1982) ECR 3641, esp. p. 3666, paras. 29–30.

    Google Scholar 

  65. See C-260/89 ERT (1991) ECR I-2925, esp. p. I-2963.

    Google Scholar 

  66. See 6/72 Continental Can (1973) ECR 215, esp. p. 244, para. 24 or 167/73 Commission v French Republic (1974) ECR 359, esp. p. 369, para. 17.

    Google Scholar 

  67. See Kapteyn, pp. 1386–1387. The `sustainable development’ can be held as an objective rather than a principle.

    Google Scholar 

  68. See Joutsamo-Aalto-Kaila-Maunu 2000, pp. 18–20.

    Google Scholar 

  69. See Ellis-Tridimas, p. 41.

    Google Scholar 

  70. See 203/86 Spain v Council (1988) ECR 4563, esp. p. 4599, para. 10; 154, 205, 206, 226–228, 263, and 264/78 and 31, 39, 83 and 85/79 Valsabbia (1980) ECR 907, esp. p. 1002, para. 54, or 197–200, 243, 245 and 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle (1981) ECR 3211, esp. p. 3252, para. 41.

    Google Scholar 

  71. See Koskenniemi 1998, p. 1187 about the “formalism” and its current developments in international law.

    Google Scholar 

  72. See 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (1976) ECR 455, esp. p. 474, para. 24.

    Google Scholar 

  73. See OJ No. L 45, 19.2.1975 p. 19.

    Google Scholar 

  74. See C-262/88 Barber (1990) ECR I-1889.

    Google Scholar 

  75. See OJ No. L 39, 14.2.1976, p. 40.

    Google Scholar 

  76. See OJ No. L 6, 10.1.1979, p. 24.

    Google Scholar 

  77. See OJ No. L 225, 12.8.1986, p. 40.

    Google Scholar 

  78. See OJ No. L 46, 17.2.1997, p. 20.

    Google Scholar 

  79. See C–246/96 Magorrian and Cunningham (1997) ECR I–7153, esp. pp. 1–7182–1–7189.

    Google Scholar 

  80. It can be doubted, though, if the general principles in practice can be derived from the legal systems of all the Member States, but as inaccurate as it may be, a certain sufficient generality may suffice now for the purposes of this study. On the derivation of the general principles see Craig-de B¨²rga, pp. 306¡ª 330 and the case in which this problem is apparent: 155/79 AM and S v Commission (1982) ECR 1575.

    Google Scholar 

  81. For examples of the literal approach see Arnull 1990, pp. 1–2, Schwartze 1988, p. 690 or Tähti p. 484.

    Google Scholar 

  82. See Article 10 EC (ex-Article 5 EC).

    Google Scholar 

  83. See Article 12 EC and Articles 34(3), 39(2), 81, 82 and 90 EC (ex-Articles 6, 40(3), 48(2), 85, 86 and 95 EC, respectively).

    Google Scholar 

  84. See Article 141 EC (ex-Article 119 EC).

    Google Scholar 

  85. See Articles 3 and 13 EC (ex-Articles 3 and 6a EC).

    Google Scholar 

  86. See Article 5(1) EC and 220 EC (ex-Articles 3b(1) EC and 164 EC).

    Google Scholar 

  87. See Article 5(2) EC (ex-Article 3b(2) EC).

    Google Scholar 

  88. See Article 5(3) EC (ex-Article 3b(3) EC).

    Google Scholar 

  89. See Kapteyn pp. 158–162 for the concept of mutual co-operation.

    Google Scholar 

  90. See, e.g. 106/77 Simmenthal (1978) ECR 629, esp. pp. 644–646 and 222/86 Unectef v Heylens (1987) ECR 4097, esp. p.4117.

    Google Scholar 

  91. See 119 and 126/79 Lippische Hauptgenossenschaft (1980) ECR 1863, esp. pp. 1879–1881.

    Google Scholar 

  92. See Joutsamo 1997b, pp. 3–4.

    Google Scholar 

  93. See Laakso 1999,. pp. 1088–1091.

    Google Scholar 

  94. See 8/74 Dassonville (1974) ECR 837, the Cassis de Dijon-case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral (1979) ECR 649 and the Sugar-case 181/84 Man (Sugar), (1985) ECR 2889.

    Google Scholar 

  95. See the Articles 30, 39(3),46, 55, 86(2) or 298 EC (ex-Articles 36, 48(3), 56, 66, 90(2) or 225 EC, respectively).

    Google Scholar 

  96. See Kapteyn, pp. 144–145.

    Google Scholar 

  97. See Asp, pp. 406–407.

    Google Scholar 

  98. See cases 55/75 Balkan-Import Export (1976) ECR 19 and 201and202/85 Klensch (1986) ECR 3477, which relate to the special non-discrimination provisions in the agricultural field or cases 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (1976) ECR 455, C-137/94 Richardson (1995) ECR 1–3407, C-450/93 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen (1995) ECR I-3051 or C-13/94 P. v S. and Cornwall County Council (1996) ECR I-2143, which are all related to the sex discrimination.

    Google Scholar 

  99. See the Greek Maize case 305/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic (1989) ECR 1461 esp. p. 1477, C-179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova (1991) ECR I-5889 esp. p.1–5927 and C-419/92 Scholz (1994) ECR I-505, esp. p. I-520.

    Google Scholar 

  100. See 75 and 117/82 Razzouk and Beydoun (1984) ECR 1509, esp. p. 1510, para 4: “The principle of equal treatment of both sexes, which forms part of the fundamental rights the observance of which the Court has a duty to ensure, must be applied to men and women employed by the Community itself within the framework of the Staff Regulations. In relations between the Community institutions, on the one hand, and their employees and the dependants of employees, on the other, the requirements imposed by the principle of equal treatment are in no way limited to those resulting from Article 119 of the EEC Treaty or from the Community directives adopted in this field.”

    Google Scholar 

  101. See C-262/88 Barber (1990) ECR I-1889 and C-139/95 Balestra (1997) ECR 1–549.

    Google Scholar 

  102. See the Council Directives 77/117/EEC (OJ No. L 45, 19.2.1975, p. 19), 76/207/EEC (OJ No. L 39, 14.2.1976, p. 40), 79/7/EEC (OJ No. L 6, 10.1.1979, p. 24), 86/378/EEC (OJ No. L 225, 12.8.1986, p. 40) and 96/97/EEC (OJ No. L 46, 17.2.1997, p. 20).

    Google Scholar 

  103. See 294/83 `Les Verts’ (1986) ECR 1339, esp. p. 1365, paras. 23–24.

    Google Scholar 

  104. See the ERTA case 22/70 Commission v Council (1971) ECR 263, esp. p. 277, para. 42. Lob See 294/83 `Les Verts’ (1986) ECR 1339, esp. p. 1366, para. 25.

    Google Scholar 

  105. See Opinion 1/91 (1991) ECR I-6079, esp. p. 6102, para. 21.

    Google Scholar 

  106. See 314/85 Foto-Frost (1987) ECR 4199, esp. p.4231, paras. 16–18 and C-2/88 Imm., Zwartveld (1990) ECR I-3365, esp. p. I-3372, para. 16.

    Google Scholar 

  107. See Joutsamo 1997b, p. 3 compared with Article 220 EC (ex-Article 164 EC).

    Google Scholar 

  108. See C-299/95 Kremzow (1997) ECR I-2629, esp. pp. 1–2639¡ªI-2647.

    Google Scholar 

  109. See Raitio 1998a, pp. 95–99, Joutsamo-Aalto-Kaila-Maunu 2000, pp. 43–45, and cases 8/55 F¨¦d¨¦char (1954–56) ECR 245, esp. p. 299 and the ERTA-case 22/70 Commission v. Council (1970) ECR 263, esp. p. 274. One can refer to the implied powers doctrine or the preemption doctrine in this context.

    Google Scholar 

  110. See C-415/93 Bosman (1995) ECR I-4921, esp. p.1–4926 and I-5065, which is one of the few cases in which the subsidiarity principle has been weighed in the context of other principles.

    Google Scholar 

  111. See Kapteyn p. 139.

    Google Scholar 

  112. On the term `heuristics’, i.e. the way the decision is actually made, see Klami 1997, p. 13.

    Google Scholar 

  113. See C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097.

    Google Scholar 

  114. See 2/91 Meng (1993) ECR I-5751.

    Google Scholar 

  115. See C-317/91 Audi (1993) ECR I-6227.

    Google Scholar 

  116. See Reich, p. 477.

    Google Scholar 

  117. ibid., p. 485.

    Google Scholar 

  118. See the German Beer case 178/84 Commission v Germany (1987) ECR 1227, esp. p. 1270, para. 32.

    Google Scholar 

  119. See Bull. EC 12 ¡ª 1992, points I-15¡ªI.23.

    Google Scholar 

  120. See Emiliou, pp. 140–142.

    Google Scholar 

  121. See the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of Council on unbundled access to local loop, Brussels, 12 July 2000, COM(2000) 394, p. 5, para. 11: “In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty, the objective of achieving a harmonised framework for unbundled access to the local loop in order to enable the competitive provision of an inexpensive, world-class communications infrastructure and a wide range of services for all businesses and citizens in the Community cannot be achieved by the Member States in a secure, harmonised and timely manner under current national or Community law and, therefore, can be better achieved by the Community. This Regulation confines itself to the minimum required in order to achieve those objectives and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose.”

    Google Scholar 

  122. See the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, OJ No. C 340, 10.11.1997, p. 105 and esp. p. 106.

    Google Scholar 

  123. ibid., p. 107, in which there is a statement: “Where the application of the principle of subsidiarity leads to no action being taken by the Community, Member States are required in their action to comply with the general rules laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, by taking all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under the Treaty and by abstaining from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.”

    Google Scholar 

  124. See Weatherill 2000, pp. 1–20.

    Google Scholar 

  125. See Article 220 EC (ex-Article 164 EC) and its interpretation in Joutsamo 1987, pp. 39–40, Tähti, p. 480 or Hartley 1998, p. 131. The word `law’ in Article 220 EC refers to something over and above the EC Treaty itself, e.g. to the general principles of law.

    Google Scholar 

  126. In some cases for annulment of the EC measures the pleas based on the infringements of the general principles of EC law have had little practical impact on the outcome of the cases. See 130/75 Prais (1976) ECR 1589 (freedom of religion in Article 9 of the ECHR) or 44/79 Hauer (1979) ECR 3727 (right to trade and to property).

    Google Scholar 

  127. See 237/82 Jongeneel Kaas (1984) ECR 483, 201and202/85 Klensch (1986) ECR 3477 or 5/88 Wachauf (1989) ECR 2609.

    Google Scholar 

  128. See 5/71 Schöppenstedt (1971) ECR 975.

    Google Scholar 

  129. See Steiner, pp. 61–62.

    Google Scholar 

  130. See Schermers-Waelbroeck, p. 22.

    Google Scholar 

  131. ibid., pp. 27–29.

    Google Scholar 

  132. See 8/56 Alma (1957–58) ECR 98.

    Google Scholar 

  133. See Schermers-Waelbroeck, p. 29 and p. 145, in which they refer to the terminology used in case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (1976) ECR 474.

    Google Scholar 

  134. See 13/61 Bosch (1962) ECR 45, esp. p. 52, which is, according to the CELEX-database, the first case in which the term `legal certainty’ has been mentioned in the index of the judgment. The principles of legitimate expectations, acquired rights or non-retroactivity of legislation are intertwined with that of legal certainty.

    Google Scholar 

  135. See C-314/91 Weber (1993) ECR I-1093, esp. p. I-1109, para. 8.

    Google Scholar 

  136. See 7/56 and 3–7/57 Algera (1957) ECR 39, esp. pp. 54–56 or Rec. de la C.E.C.A. (1957), Vol. III, p. 81, esp. pp. 114–116.

    Google Scholar 

  137. See 32/62 Alvis (1963) ECR 49, esp. p. 55.

    Google Scholar 

  138. See 3/54 ASSIDER (1954–56) ECR 63, esp. pp. 69–71 or Rec. de la C.E.C.A. (1954–56), Vol.1, p. 123, esp. pp. 138–141, 8/55 F¨¦d¨¦char (1954–56) ECR 245, esp. pp. 256–258 and 3 and 4/64 Chambre Syndicale de la Sid¨¦rurgie Française (1965) ECR 441, esp. pp. 454–455 and esp. pp. 459–462 (Opinion of A-G Roemer).

    Google Scholar 

  139. See 32/62 Alvis (1963) ECR 49, esp. p. 55 or Rec. (1963), Vol. IX, p. 99, esp. p. 114, and 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint Association (1974) ECR 1063, esp. p. 1080.

    Google Scholar 

  140. See 8/55 F¨¦d¨¦char (1955) ECR 292, esp. p. 299.

    Google Scholar 

  141. See 18and 35/65 Gutmann (1967) ECR 61, esp. pp. 65–66 or 14/68 Walt Wilhelm (1969) ECR 1, esp. p. 15.

    Google Scholar 

  142. See 144/86 Gubisch (1987) ECR 4861, esp. pp.4872–4877, C-406/92 Tatry (1994) ECR 1–5439, esp. p. I-5473 and C-351/96 Drouot Assurances, (1998) ECR I-3075, esp. p. I-3097, para. 16.

    Google Scholar 

  143. See 14/81 Alpha Steel (1982) ECR 749, esp. p. 768.

    Google Scholar 

  144. See 222/84 Johnston (1986) ECR 1651, esp. pp. 1681–1683.

    Google Scholar 

  145. See 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig (1966) ECR 299, esp. p. 338.

    Google Scholar 

  146. See 264/82 Timex (1985) ECR 849, esp. p. 850.

    Google Scholar 

  147. See T-105/95 WWF UK v Commission (1997) ECR II-313, esp. p. li-314 or II-336. 159 See 155/79 AM and S v Commission (1982) ECR 1575, esp. pp. 1605–1609.

    Google Scholar 

  148. See 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission (1989) ECR 2859, esp. pp. 2922–2924 and esp. paras. 17–19 or 85/87 Dow Benelux (1989) ECR 3137, esp. pp. 3156–3157.

    Google Scholar 

  149. See 44/79 Hauer (1979) ECR 3727, esp. p. 3749, para. 30 and C-44/89 von Deetzen (1991) ECR I-5119, esp. p. 1–5156, para. 26.

    Google Scholar 

  150. See C-162/96 Racke (1998) ECR 1–3655, esp. p. I-3705, para. 49.

    Google Scholar 

  151. See 4–13/59 Mannesmann (1960) ECR 113, esp. p. 128 or 43, 45 and 48/59 Lachmüller (1960) ECR 463, esp. p. 464 and 476.

    Google Scholar 

  152. See 4–13/59 Mannesmann (1960) ECR 113, esp. pp. 126,130,131 and 133, in which the defendant of the case maintained that the provisions of the German law of unjustified enrichment (Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung) are not applicable in the case at hand and the ECJ appears to have accepted the view in its judgment. The ECJ referred to an infringement of the rule of law relating to the application of the Treaty instead of German general principles.

    Google Scholar 

  153. See Article 6 EU (ex-Article F EU) and cases 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm (1969) ECR 419, esp. p. 425, 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) ECR 1125, esp. p. 1134, 4/73 Nold (1974) ECR 491, esp. p. 507 or 222/84 Johnston (1986) ECR 1651, esp. p. 1682.

    Google Scholar 

  154. See also Joutsamo 1979, pp. 34–37 or Joutsamo 1991, pp. 63–65. Joutsamo has divided the general principles into those which are predominantly procedural in nature and those which are predominantly substantial principles. He has designated legal certainty as a procedural principle of law, whereas I find that it is a material principle as well

    Google Scholar 

  155. See, e.g. 6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964) ECR 585, esp. pp. 593–594, 14/68 Walt Wilhelm (1969) ECR 1, esp. p. 14, para. 6, 167/73 Commission v. France (1974) ECR 359, esp. p. 371, para. 35, 148/78 Ratti (1979) ECR 1629, esp. pp. 1641–1642, paras. 18–24 and p. 1644, para. 38 or 152/84 Marshall (1986) ECR 723, esp. p. 747, para. 41.

    Google Scholar 

  156. See, e.g. 26/62 Van Gend en Loos (1963) ECR 1, esp. p. 13, 57/65 Lütticke (1966) ECR 205, esp. pp. 210–211, 28/67 Molkerei–Zentrale (1968) ECR 143, esp. pp. 155–156, 13/68 Salgoil (1968) ECR 453, esp. pp. 462–463, 9/70 Grad (1970) ECR 825, esp. pp. 836–839, 43/71 Politi (1971) ECR 1039, esp. p. 1048, para. 9, 41/74 Van Duyn (1974) ECR 1338, esp. pp. 1347–1349, 87/75 Bresciani (1976) ECR 129, esp. p. 139, 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena (1976) ECR 455, esp. pp. 479–480, 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (1977) ECR 113, esp. pp. 126–128, 38/77 Enka (1977) ECR 2203, esp. pp. 2211–2212, paras. 8–11, 148/78 Ratti (1979) ECR 1629, esp. pp. 1640–1647, 8/81 Becker (1982) ECR 53, esp. pp. 70–71 and 76, para. 47, 152/84 Marshall (1986) ECR 723, esp. pp. 747–750, 80/86 Kolpinghuis (1987) ECR 3969, esp. p. 3986, para. 10 and C–91/92 Faccini Dori (1994) ECR I–3325, esp. p. I–3355, para. 20, C–430/93 and C–431/93 van Schijndel (1995) ECR I–4705, esp. p.1–4736 or the WTO case C–149/96 Portugal v. Council (1999) ECR 1–8395, esp. pp. I–8427–1–8451. In the case law mentioned above the ECJ has not expressly designated the direct effect as a principle of EC law.

    Google Scholar 

  157. See, e.g. 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (1976) ECR 455, esp. p.474, para. 24 compared with p. 476, para. 41 and p. 478, para. 59, 106/77 Simmenthal (1978) ECR 629, esp. pp. 633–634 or 643, para. 14 and 111/75 Mazzalai (1976) ECR 657, esp. p. 665, para. 7/9.

    Google Scholar 

  158. See Hartley 1998, pp. 211–215 about the concept of indirect effect and cases 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (1977) ECR 113, esp. pp. 127–129, 14/83 Von Colson (1984) ECR 1891, esp. pp. 1901–1910, 79/83 Harz (1984) ECR 1921, esp. pp. 1935–1944, 157/86 Mary Murphy (1988) ECR 673, esp. p.690, para. 11, 80/86 Kolpinghuis (1987) ECR 3969, esp. pp. 3986–3987, paras. 11–15, C-106/89 Marleasing (1990) ECR I-4135, esp. p. 1–4159, para. 8 and C-334/92 Wagner Miret (1993) ECR I-6911, esp. p. I-6932, paras. 20–21.

    Google Scholar 

  159. See, e.g. C–6/90 and C–9/90 Francovich (1991) ECR I–5357, pp. I–5413–I–5418, esp. p. I–5414, para. 35, C–46/93 and C–48/93 Brasserie du P¨ºcheur and Factortame III (1996) ECR I–1029, esp. pp. I–1135–I–1155, esp. p.I–1144, para. 31, C–392/93 British Telecommunications (1996) ECR I–1631, esp. pp. I–1667–1–1669, C–5/94 Hedley Lomas (1996) ECR I–2553, esp. pp. I–2612–I–2614, C–178/94, C–179/94, C–188/94 and C–190/94 Dillenkofer (1996) ECR I–4845, esp. pp.1–4877–1–4880 and C–238/94, C–291/94 and C–292/94 Denkavit (1996) ECR 1–5063, pp. 1–5099–I–5102, esp. p. I–5100, para. 47. The term principle is also used in the literature, for example in Aalto 1997, p. 151, Aalto 1999, pp. 159–172 or Raitio 1998c, pp. 630–650.

    Google Scholar 

  160. See Mäenpää, p. 196.

    Google Scholar 

  161. See Article 133 EC.

    Google Scholar 

  162. See 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena (1976) ECR 455, esp. p. 474, para. 28.

    Google Scholar 

  163. See 6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964) ECR 585, esp. p. 593.

    Google Scholar 

  164. ibid., p. 594.

    Google Scholar 

  165. See the European Communities Act 1972, S.I. 1972, No. 1590. In Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 it has been stated: “(1) All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed pp. 21–26. 10 See Dicey, pp. 183–205.

    Google Scholar 

  166. See R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame, (1990) 2 AC 85.

    Google Scholar 

  167. See Hartley 1998, p. 255 and Macarthys Ltd v. Smith (1979) 3 All ER 325, esp. p. 329 and Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd (1983) 2 AC 751.

    Google Scholar 

  168. See Barling-Davies-Stratford, p. 83 and R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2), (1991) AC 603.

    Google Scholar 

  169. See Bebr 1974, pp. 3–37, Joutsamo 1979, pp. 211–260 or Raitio 1994, pp. 13–31.

    Google Scholar 

  170. See the “Solange” case Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 29 May 1974, (1974) 2 CMLR 540, Steinige and Weinlig, 25 July 1979, (1980) 2 CMLR 531 and Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, 22 October 1986, (1987) 3 CMLR 225.

    Google Scholar 

  171. See 106/77 Simmenthal (1978) ECR 629, esp. p. 643, para. 17, in which there is a term `the principle of precedence of Community law’.

    Google Scholar 

  172. See 106/77 Simmenthal (1978) ECR 629, esp. p. 644, paras. 21 and 22 and Barling-DaviesStratford, pp. 82–83.

    Google Scholar 

  173. See Winter, p. 425.

    Google Scholar 

  174. See 26/62 Van Gend en Loos (1963) ECR 1, esp. p. 12. The same kind of argumentation is also in 6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964) ECR 585, esp. p. 593.

    Google Scholar 

  175. See Joutsamo 1979, p. 224.

    Google Scholar 

  176. ibid., p. 225.

    Google Scholar 

  177. See Usher 1981, p. 21.

    Google Scholar 

  178. See OJ No. C 177, 4.7.1983, p. 13.

    Google Scholar 

  179. See 9/70 Grad (1970) ECR 825, esp. pp. 836–839, 38/77 Enka (1977) ECR 2203, esp. pp. 2211–2212, paras. 8–11 and 148/78 Ratti (1979) ECR 1629, esp. p. 1642, paras. 23–24.

    Google Scholar 

  180. See Raitio 1994, pp. 57–62 and cases 28/67 Molkerei-Zentrale (1968) ECR 143, esp. p. 156 and 13/68 Salgoil (1968) ECR 453, esp. p. 461.

    Google Scholar 

  181. See Kapteyn, p. 532.

    Google Scholar 

  182. See Article 249 EC.

    Google Scholar 

  183. See 9/70 Grad (1970) ECR 825, esp. p. 837, para. 5.

    Google Scholar 

  184. See Article 234 EC.

    Google Scholar 

  185. See 41/74 Van Duyn (1974) ECR 1338, esp. p. 1348, para. 12.

    Google Scholar 

  186. ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  187. See Usher 1981, p. 23.

    Google Scholar 

  188. See 152/84 Marshall (1986) ECR 723, esp. p. 724, para. 4.

    Google Scholar 

  189. ibid., esp. p. 749, para. 48 and C-91/92 Faccini Dori (1994) ECR I-3325, esp. p.1–3355, para. 20.

    Google Scholar 

  190. See Haapaniemi, pp. 6–18 and 84–105, Maunu, pp. 333–342 or Raitio 1999a, pp. 82–101 and, e.g. the cases C-72/95 Kraaijeveld (1996) ECR I-5403 and C-76/97 Tögel (1998) ECR I-5357.

    Google Scholar 

  191. See Kapteyn p. 526 and the cases 28/67 Molkerei-Zentrale (1968) ECR 143, esp. p. 156 or 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (1976) ECR 455, esp. p. 471 compared with p. 474, para. 24.

    Google Scholar 

  192. See 111/75 Mazzalai (1976) ECR 657, esp. p. 665, para. 7/9, in which the ECJ stated: “Under Article 177, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community, regardless of whether they are directly applicable.”

    Google Scholar 

  193. See Bebr 1970, p. 257, Winter, pp. 425–438, Dashwood, pp. 229–245, Toth 1978, pp. 61–64, Usher 1981, pp. 23–25, Prechal, pp. 246–305 or the discussion in the FIDE Congress 1998 on which see Timmermans, pp. 16–37 and Barav, 418–458.

    Google Scholar 

  194. See Timmermans, pp. 18–21.

    Google Scholar 

  195. See 32/74 Haaga (1974) ECR 1201, esp. pp. 1207–1208, 111/75 Mazzalai (1976) ECR 657, esp. p. 665, para. 10/11 or 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (1977) ECR 113, esp. p. 127, para. 29. toi See 14/83 Von Colson (1984) ECR 1891, esp. p. 1906, para. 14 and 79/83 Harz (1984) ECR 1921, esp. p. 1939, para. 14.

    Google Scholar 

  196. See 14/83 Von Colson (1984) ECR 1891, esp. p. 1909, para. 26.

    Google Scholar 

  197. See 157/86 Mary Murphy (1988) ECR 673, esp. p. 690, para. 11, in which the judgment was given in the context of Article 141 EC (ex-Article 119 EC).

    Google Scholar 

  198. See 14/83 Von Colson (1984) ECR 1891, esp. p. 1909, para. 28.

    Google Scholar 

  199. See C-106/89 Marleasing (1990) ECR I-4135, esp. p. 1–4159, para. 8.

    Google Scholar 

  200. See 80/86 Kolpinghuis (1987) ECR 3969, esp. p. 3986, para. 13.

    Google Scholar 

  201. See Ojanen 1993, p. 100 and Raitio 1994, p. 101.

    Google Scholar 

  202. See 14/86 Pretore di Salo (1987) ECR 2545, esp. p. 2570, paras. 18–20, 80/86 Kolpinghuis (1987) ECR 3969, esp. p. 3987, para. 13 and C-168/95 Arcaro (1996) ECR I-4705, esp. p. 4730, para. 42.

    Google Scholar 

  203. See C-334/92 Wagner Miret (1993) ECR I-6911, esp. p. 1–6932, para. 21. In the 1990s the ECJ has thus used the term `principle’ in the context of the indirect effect.

    Google Scholar 

  204. See C-177/88 Dekker (1990) ECR I-3941, esp. p. 1–3975, para. 23.

    Google Scholar 

  205. See Raitio 1999a, pp. 90–101 about cases C-188/95 Fantask (1997) ECR I-6783 and C-72/95 Kraaijeveld (1996) ECR I-5403.

    Google Scholar 

  206. See 33/76 Rewe-Zentral (1976) ECR 1989, esp. p. 1997, para. 5.

    Google Scholar 

  207. See C-213/89 Factortame (1990) ECR I-2433, esp. p. I-2473¡ªI-2474.

    Google Scholar 

  208. See Usher 1998a, pp. 85–87 and 222/84 Johnston (1986) ECR 1651.

    Google Scholar 

  209. See 33/76 Rewe-Zentral (1976) ECR 1989, esp. p. 1998 or 45/76 Comet (1976) ECR 2043, esp. p. 2053.

    Google Scholar 

  210. See Klami 1997, pp. 12–13.

    Google Scholar 

  211. See The sixteenth Annual Report on monitoring the application of Community law, 1998, OJ No. C 354, 7.12.1999, p. 1, esp. p. 183.

    Google Scholar 

  212. See KKO 1997: 105, D: S-96/2410; E:11.6.1997; T: 2287; A: 27.6.1997 and originally the Case L 95/1106 of the District Court at Pieksämäki (Pieksämäen käräjäoikeus), judgment No. 1975 on 19 December 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  213. See OJ No. L 61, 5.3.1977, p. 26.

    Google Scholar 

  214. See more specifically Raitio-Aalto, pp. 220 and 223–225, Raitio 2000a, pp. 311–312 and Raitio 2000b, pp. 444–445.

    Google Scholar 

  215. See Klami 1986, pp. 55–56 and Klami 1997, p. 32.

    Google Scholar 

  216. See C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich (1991) ECR I-5357, esp. p. I-5418..

    Google Scholar 

  217. ibid., esp. p. I–5415, para. 37. The designation as principle has been confirmed in subsequent case law, e.g. in C–46/93 and C–48/93 Brasserie du P¨ºcheur and Factortame III (1996) ECR I–1029, esp. p. I–1144–1–1145, paras. 31–32, C–392/93 British Telecommunications (1996) ECR 1–1631, esp. p. I–1667, para. 38, C–5/94 Hedley Lomas (1996) ECR I–2553, esp. p. I–2612, para. 24 and C–178/94, C–179/94, C–188/94 and C–190/94 Dillenkofer (1996) ECR I–4845, esp. pp. I–4878, para. 20.

    Google Scholar 

  218. On the background of State liability in the framework of the Treaty before the Francovichcase see Aalto 1999, pp. 35–51, Junkkari, pp. 368–369 and cases 6/60 Humblet (1960) ECR 559, esp. p. 569, 4/69 Lütticke (1971) ECR 325, esp. p. 337, para. 10, 5/71 Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt (1971) ECR 975, esp. p. 984, para. 11, 39/72 Commission v Italian Republic (1973) ECR 101, esp. p. 112, para. 11, 60/75 Russo v AIMA (1976) ECR 45, esp. p. 56, para. 9 and 83/76, 94/76, 4/77, 15/77 and 40/77 HNL (1978) ECR 1209, esp. p. 1224, paras. 5–6.

    Google Scholar 

  219. See Raitio 1998c, p. 643 and A-G L¨¦ger in C-5/94 Hedley Lomas (1996) ECR I-2553, esp. pp. I-2578-I-2581 and esp. paras. 100–106.

    Google Scholar 

  220. See C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich (1991) ECR I-5357, esp. p.1–5413, para. 31 and the cases 26/62 Van Gend en Loos (1963) ECR 1 or 6/64 Costa v ENEL (1964) ECR 585.

    Google Scholar 

  221. See C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich (1991) ECR I-5357, esp. p. 1–5414, para. 33.

    Google Scholar 

  222. ibid., esp. p. 1–5415, para. 42 and the cases 60/75 Russo v AIMA (1976) ECR 45, 33/76 Rewe-Zentral (1976) ECR 1989 and 158/80 Rewe v Hauptzollamt Kiel (1981) ECR 1805.

    Google Scholar 

  223. See Aalto 1999, p. 35 or Cappelletti, pp. 64–65.

    Google Scholar 

  224. See C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich (1991) ECR I-5357, esp. p. I-5415, para. 40.

    Google Scholar 

  225. See C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du P¨ºcheur and Factortame III (1996) ECR I-1029, esp. p. I-1149, para. 51.

    Google Scholar 

  226. See C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer (1996) ECR I-4845, esp. p. I-4891 and comment in Jarvis, p. 396.

    Google Scholar 

  227. See Tuori 1997a, p. 319.

    Google Scholar 

  228. The principle of proportionality has frequently been defined as a general principle in some textbooks such as Craig-de B¨²rca, p. 340, Eerola -Mylly -Saarinen, p. 110 or Steiner, p. 65. See also case 8/55 F¨¦d¨¦char (1954–56) ECR 292, esp. p. 302.

    Google Scholar 

  229. See Emiliou, p. 143.

    Google Scholar 

  230. See 43, 45 and 48/59 Lachmüller (1960) ECR 463, esp. p.472, in which the Court states that Article 230 EC (ex-Article 173 EC) lays down the general principle that the European Court of Justice shall review the legality of the acts of the Commission other than recommendations and opinions. As a background reasoning for the acts of invalidity can therefore be held the principle of legality, which in turn can be viewed as a general principle of law.

    Google Scholar 

  231. See C-44/89 von Deetzen (1991) ECR I-5119, esp. p. 5155.

    Google Scholar 

  232. See Tähti p. 461 and cases 1/72 Frilli (1972) ECR 457, 152/73 Sotgiu (1974) ECR 153 and 168/82 Ferriere Sant’Anna (1983) ECR 1681. After the Treaty of Amsterdam this applies to the principle of equality as well, because the scope of non-discrimination was enlargened by Article 13 of the new EC Treaty. The non-discrimination principle can be perceived as a specific enunciation of the general principle of equality.

    Google Scholar 

  233. See, e.g. 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm (1969) ECR 419, esp. p. 423.

    Google Scholar 

  234. See Tuori 1992, pp. 451–464.

    Google Scholar 

  235. See references to Article 10 EC in 6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964) ECR 585, esp. p. 594, 33/76 Rewe-Zentral (1976) ECR 1989, esp. p. 1997, para. 5, 79/83 Harz (1984) ECR 1921, esp. pp. 1921–1922, 152/84 Marshall (1986) ECR 723, esp. p. 747, para. 41,C-213/89 Factortame (1990) ECR I-2433, esp. p. I-2473, para 19, C-106/89 Marleasing (1990) ECR I-4135, esp. p. I-4159, para. 8, C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich (1991) ECR I-5357, esp. p. I-5414, para. 36, 91/92 Faccini Dori (1994) ECR I-3325, esp. p. I-3357, para. 26, C-430/93 and C-431/93 van Schijndel (1995) ECR I-4705, esp. p. I-4736, para. 14.

    Google Scholar 

  236. See 79/83 Harz (1984) ECR 1921.

    Google Scholar 

  237. See 33/76 Rewe-Zentral (1976) ECR 1989, esp. p. 1997, 45/76 Comet 1976) ECR 2043, esp. p. 2053, 199/82 San Giorgio (1983) ECR 3595, esp. pp. 3613–3614 and C-213/89 Factortame (1990) ECR I-2433, esp. p. 1–2473, para. 19.

    Google Scholar 

  238. See Mäenpää, pp. 193–200.

    Google Scholar 

  239. On an elaborate division of human or fundamental rights, see Siltala 200 lb, pp. 739–743.

    Google Scholar 

  240. See Geddes, p. 107. According to Geddes the right to privacy is not strictly a right which is derived from the general principles of Community law, but is akin to such a right.

    Google Scholar 

  241. ibid., pp. 105–110. By rights of natural justice he refers to the right to legal representation, protection from self-incrimination, confidentiality of communication between lawyer and client, the right to be heard before a decision affecting the individual concerned is made and the right to be given reasons for that decision as well as the right to an effective judicial remedy.

    Google Scholar 

  242. See Joutsamo-Aalto-Kaila-Maunu 1996, pp. 21, 28–46 in comparison with JoutsamoAalto-Kaila-Maunu 2000, pp. 21, 27–43. In the latter Joutsamo has added the requirements of Rechtstaat,or the principle of legality, in his list of leading principles of EC law. On the other hand, he has labelled the principle of subsidiarity as a competence principle.

    Google Scholar 

  243. See Usher 1998a, p. 12.

    Google Scholar 

  244. See Hartley 1998, p. 130, Barling-Davies-Stratford, p. 80 and Tähti, pp. 479–481.

    Google Scholar 

  245. See Arnull 1990, p. 1 and footnote 2, in which he has listed some examples of the literature dealing with the general principles. He has referred to the English literature with one exception, namely the fourth edition of the Schermers ¡ª Waelbroeck published in 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  246. See Tähti, p. 483 in comparison with Arnull 1990, p. 2. Tähti has referred to Arnull, who actually does not treat the case law of the ECJ in such a literal way as Tähti seems to think. Hence Arnull finds it necessary to study how the ECJ may be influenced by general principles of EC law even where it does not refer to them expressly. According to Arnull, one has to identify not only those areas where particular general principles have played an important role in the development of EC law, but also those in which their impact has been barely perceptible.

    Google Scholar 

  247. See C-309/89 Codorniu (1994) ECR I-1853.

    Google Scholar 

  248. See 26/62 Van Gend en Loos (1963) ECR 1, esp. p. 12.

    Google Scholar 

  249. See Tuori 1998, p. 1008.

    Google Scholar 

  250. See Tähti p. 506 and Makkonen 1968, p. 144. Tähti has referred to Makkonen to illustrate the imprecision of the general principles. Makkonen has described the general principles as a sea without a shore.

    Google Scholar 

  251. See C-291/96 Criminal Proceedings against Martino Grado and Shahid Bashir (1997) ECR I-5531.

    Google Scholar 

  252. See Usher 1998a, p. 8.

    Google Scholar 

  253. See Joutsamo 1987, pp. 33–49.

    Google Scholar 

  254. See Letto-Vanamo, pp. 57–58 and pp. 147–159. The Nordic legal culture could, according to her, form the fourth legal culture in EC.

    Google Scholar 

  255. See 14/61 Hoogovens (1962) ECR 253, esp. pp. 283–284 in which the A-G Lagrange states that the Court is not content to adopt a common denominator between the different systems but chooses from each Member States those solutions which, having regard to the objects of the Treaty, appear to be the best. See also, e.g. 222/83 Differdange v. Commission (1984) ECR 2889, esp. p. 2895, para 5 or 155/79 AM and S v Commission (1982) ECR 1575, esp. pp. 1605–1609 (privacy).

    Google Scholar 

  256. See Klami 1992, pp. 841–852, esp. p. 843.

    Google Scholar 

  257. See Tähti, pp. 443–447.

    Google Scholar 

  258. See the Factortame II case C-221/89 Factortame (1991) ECR I-3905, esp. p. 3964. 263 See 152/73 Sotgiu (1974) ECR 153, esp. p. 162.

    Google Scholar 

  259. See C-294/89 Commission y French Republic (1991) ECR I-3591, esp. p. I-3605.

    Google Scholar 

  260. See 63/86 Commission y Italian Republic (1988) ECR 29, esp. p. 53.

    Google Scholar 

  261. See 13/61 Bosch (1962) ECR 45, esp. p. 52 and C-323/88 Sermes (1990) ECR I-3027, esp. p. 1–3050.

    Google Scholar 

  262. See Kapteyn, p. 526.

    Google Scholar 

  263. See Tähti, p. 445.

    Google Scholar 

  264. On `the dimension of weight’ see Dworkin 1978, pp. 26–28.

    Google Scholar 

  265. See Dauses, p. 407.

    Google Scholar 

  266. See Kelsen 1970, pp. 221–222 or Kelsen 1960, p. 228, respectively.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Juha Raitio
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Raitio, J. (2003). The Sources, Objectives and Principles of EC Law. In: The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 64. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0353-6_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0353-6_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6264-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0353-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation