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New Developments in Coalition Theory

An Application to the Case of Global Pollution

  • Chapter
Environmental Policy in an International Perspective

Part of the book series: Economy & Environment ((ECEN,volume 26))

Abstract

This article reviews recent developments on the analysis of the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements, which is called “new coalition theory”. Under this heading recently developed coalition games and equilibrium concepts are summarized, but also new interpretations of old concepts. It is emphasized that for analytical reasons but also to derive sound policy recommendations it is crucial to distinguish between the rules of coalition formation and the equilibrium concepts applied to determine the outcome in a coalition game. The aim of this article is to provide an introduction to new coalition theory, to highlight its analytical superiority over “old concepts” and to discuss policy implications of important results.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Hagen, Germany

    Michael Finus

Authors
  1. Michael Finus
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester, USA

    Laura Marsiliani

  2. University of Durham, UK

    Laura Marsiliani

  3. Rostock University, Germany

    Michael Rauscher

  4. Tilburg University, The Netherlands

    Cees Withagen

  5. Free University, The Netherlands

    Cees Withagen

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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Finus, M. (2003). New Developments in Coalition Theory. In: Marsiliani, L., Rauscher, M., Withagen, C. (eds) Environmental Policy in an International Perspective. Economy & Environment, vol 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0333-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0333-8_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6274-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0333-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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