Abstract
This is a very pregnant formulation, and its relevance for defining truth is clear: We are free when deciding what the expressions of our language should mean; thereafter, however, when using these expressions to describe the world, we are confronted with the problem of distinguishing between sentences which correspond to facts and those ones which do not, and solving this problem cannot be given by our free decision. (We are not free even in the case that the respective sentences concern mathematical constructions, but here we will turn our attention to the empirical case.)
D. Davidson says (in his (1997) paper):
[w]hether or not it is raining does not depend on whether I believe it, or everyone believes it, or it is useful to believe it; it is up to nature, not to me or my society or the entire history of the human race. What is up to us is what we mean by our words, but that is a different matter. (p. 13)
This contribution has been supported by Grant Agency of Czech Republic, Grant No 401/99/0006.
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Materna, P. (2003). Is Strong Correspondence (Theory of Truth) Possible?. In: Hintikka, J., Czarnecki, T., Kijania-Placek, K., Placek, T., Rojszczak, A. (eds) Philosophy and Logic in Search of the Polish Tradition. Synthese Library, vol 323. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0249-2_2
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