Abstract
Neither Priscian nor his commentators are really clear about which features can be considered necessary and sufficient in order to define a given lexical category. A component which should be taken into consideration is certainly the type of meaning of an expression. For instance, the type-meaning SUBSTANCE or QUALITY, at a certain level, can be employed to identify a set of expressions. Among other features used to specify lexical categories, special importance is vested in the formal (i.e., a noun has a different ending from a verb) and phrasal ones (i.e., an adjective combines with nouns changing their endings).
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Reference
Dial. 124, 11–16.
Log. Ingred. 140, 23–24: “substantia alia prima alia secunda, hoc est substantial nomen substantiae aliud est particular, aliud universale”.
Ibid. 13–16: “accipitur quoque hoc nomen ‘substantia’ in designatione nominum tarn generalium quam specialium quam singularium, quae scilicet ipsas substantias in essentia significant”.
Log. Ingred. 168, 16–17: “in designatione etiam vocum significantium quantitates quidam hoc nomen ‘quantitas’ accipi iudicant”.
Dial. 83, 2–4: ‘“ad aliquid’ nomen multis modis accipimus: modo enim ipso in rebus, modo in vocibus utimur. Est autem vocum nomen secundum hoc quod ipsas relationes nominat”.
Log. Ingred. 223, 29–34: “notandum vero quod hoc nomen ‘qualitas’ diversis modis accipitur. Accipitur enim nomen omnium rerum huius praedicamenti [...] Accipi etiam videtur in designatione vocum significantium qualitatem”.
Dial. 124, 27–125, 18.
Dial. 111, 19–112, 21.
Dial. 123, 15–18.
Dial. 388, 3–7: “Nichil itaque aliud rationabiliter ex verbis Aristotelis concipi potest nisi differentia vocabulorum, substantivorum scilicet et sumptorum, quae videlicet cum in significatione et soni similitudine conveniunt, ut privatum et privatio, cecus et cecitas, secundum predicationem tarnen modumque significandi discrepant”.
Dial. 597, 23–29.
In Cat. 162, D.
Porphyry, In Arist. Cat. 58 passim.
As for instance witnessed by Helias, In Categ. 129–30; quoted in L. Obertello (1974).
I use the term ‘nominal’ in alternative to ‘nominalis’ to refer to the option adopted by the commentators. Naturally such exegetic option combines with the metaphysic positions taken by the authors on problems like universals and abstract entities. In our opinion, in order to understand the origin of the nominalist tradition, it is preferable to keep these two aspects distinct, though it is not always done in the contemporary discussion of this subject. A summary of recent studies on the origin of medieval nominalism is contained in the monographic issue of Vivarium (1992), XXX-1 (articles by Mews, Kneepkens, Marenbon, Ebbesen, Normore, Iwakuma, Martin, Luscombe, Colish, Courtenay). See also Iwakuma (1995), (1997a), Mews (1998).
For instance the pseudo-Augustinus in the Categoriae decern expressed himself in the following terms: “primo de iis quae sunt, secundo de iis quae percipiuntur, tertio de iis quae dicuntur [...] mixtam disputationem debemus accipere”: PL 32, 1422, chapter 3.
Dial. 19, 7–15.
De Fide Trinitatis 265, A-B: “illi utique nostri temporis dialectici, immo dialecticae haeretici, qui non nisi flatum vocis putant esse universales substantias”.
Abelard’s position can be seen perhaps as not so isolated after the discovery of a text composed some time before c. 1120 (cf. Iwakuma (1997a), n.24; Marenbon (1997b)).
I agree with Marenbon (1997a) (pp. 101–116) on his emphasising the non-linguistic aspects in Aristotle’s Categories, and on the central importance of the dispute between lectio rei and lectio nominis. However his conclusions are for me somehow unexpected, in fact in the characterization of Abelard’s position as summing up the two exegetic positions the central notion of meaning has almost entirely vanished.
In Cat. 169.
In Isag.II, 321.
In Isag. II, 200; 210.
Differentiated, according to their different levels of ‘doctrinal’ abstraction, in non abstract moving forms, partially abstract and motionless forms, abstract and motionless forms; cf. De Trinitate II, 5–14.
“De qua quidem humanitate ipse ita ambigue loquitur ut earn speciem animalis esse videatur annuere” (Log. Ingred. 42, 19–20). See the whole passage: 42, 14 – 43, 8.
Log. Ingred. 223, 29 – 224, 3; cf. next paragraph for an analysis. In loc. cit. a possible substitute of ‘form’-’quality’ is ‘proprietas’.
I intend here the principal meaning of substance names: in the case of the secondary substances both the concrete and abstract nouns (‘homo’ vs ‘humanitas’) have a different nominatio (the concrete men and the form, respectively) but the same meaning.
Dial. 93, 5.
Dial. 432, 25–27.
Log. Ingred. 256, 29; 257, 19–24; 259, 2; about motion: 296, 9–10.
Log. Ingred. 300, 28. Among the forms mentioned: albedo, sessio, cursus, calciatum.
De Inst.Arith.l.
Contra Eut. 90, 79–82. In fact, in defining the notion of ‘essence’ (‘nature’, ‘substance’), Boethius states that it applies to something quod est. Unlike the English (Rand) and Italian (Obertello) translation I prefer ‘that is’ for Boethius’ ‘quod es’, rather than ‘which exists’.
De Trin. 8, Chapter 2, passim.
Log. Ingred. 23, 28.
Log. Ingred. 167, 16–18: “imitates etiam et numerus secundum ipsam essentiam rei cogitatur, quia in essentia sua res quaelibet una est”.
On this topic, see 4.2.
Log. Ingred. 150, 22–25: “non ad substantialem statu m essentiae denotandum, sicut [est] ‘rationale’ vel ‘album’, quae non in essentia rem nominant, sed ex qualitate tantum conveniunt, quae scilicet qualitas quia non est essentia rei, extraneae naturae dicitur”.
Dial. 84, 1–2.
As for instance ‘albedo’; in Dial. 370, 14. A 425, 4–10 an ‘essentia accidentis’ is mentioned.
In Dial. 372, 8 we find: ‘essentia desígnala a propositions’.
Dial. 121: Liber tertius, ‘De definitis\ 43 Dial. 119, 13; 121, 14; 121, 32.
Cf. Dial. 124, 27–28.
Dial. 129, 21–23.
Dial. 124, 33–34.
On the notion of ‘adjacence’, also see infra in this chapter and in 4.4. 48 Dial. 131, 20–25.
Dial. 124, 11–14.
1: Dial. 52, 17; 425, 22. l’: Log. Ingred. 127, 14–15; 128, 6; 142, 5–6; 145, 7. 2: Dial 52, 20. 2’: Log. Ingred. 140, 23–24; 152, 7; 159, 24.
Log. Ingred. 140, 3–16.
The sense of the definition of substance2 therefore is: “the term ‘substance’ also stands for those essences which exist per se, and which do not need to adhere to any matter”.
“Alii in praedicamento substantialia tantum vocabula ponunt quae scilicet rem subiectam in essentia nominant ut ‘homo’, ‘albedo’, ‘animal’, ‘color’” (Log. Ingred. 115, 19–21). Apart from quotations in note 50, cf. Log. Ingred. 151, 12–13 (substantialia formarum); 243, 15–16 (substantialia significantia qualitatis); 244, 4 (substantiva qualitatum); 245, 31–33 (substantialia qualitatum).
Cf. supra chapter 1.
Peter Helias, ed. Reilly 191, 37–38: ‘”nichil’...significat rem quae non est pro substantia et nichilitatem pro forma”, quoted in de Rijk (1967–1), p.231.
The discussion on the meaning of ‘chimera’, for instance, is rather laborious and ends almost with the admission of a possible imposition to non-existing things: “sicut enim dictum est in impositione hominis, dicatur ista res homo, sic etiam dictum est in huiusmodi re non existente: dicatur ista res opinabilis, ut sic etiam non existentium nomina inventa sint ad agendum de ipsis secundum hoc quod in impositionem veniunt” (Dial. 137, 32–35).
The full passage is in Log. Ingred. 140, 14–22.
Log. Ingred. 16, 22–25.
I.e. linkable, through ‘es’, to a subject in nominative case; see Log. Ingred. 17, 31–33.
Log. Ingred. 83, 31 – 84, 2.
Log. Ingred. 85, 26–35.
Log. Ingred. 223, 29 – 224, 2. The parallel text of Dial. 93, 2–9 does not talk of quality, perhaps because it pays more attention to the ‘real’ aspects, i.e. less controversial, of the Aristotelian text, “quam magis in consuetudine ducimus...”.
Dial 425, 4–9.
It also involves the fixation which occupies Abelard’s mind throughout the books of the Dialéctica: “sicut in nostra fixum est sententia, nullo modo inter accidentia differentias admittamus” (Dial 543, 31–32).
Log. Ingred. 115, 19; cf. also 127, 14; 128, 6; 243, 15; 245, 30.
Log. Ingred. 145, 7.
Dial. 124, 33.
Cf. the text quoted above on the different meanings of ‘acciden’.
Dial. 425.
Log. Ingred. 151–152; 223, 35; Dial. 57, 8; 65, 13; 595, 32.
E.g. “...alterum iam ostendit in substantialibus nominibus. Nunc vero alterum monstrat in adiectivis” (Log. Ingred. 244, 20).
Dial. 81, 33;90, 13.
Dial. 83, 2–4: “‘Ad aliquid\..est autem vocum nomen secundum hoc quod ipsas relationes nominat”; cf. also: Log. Ingred. 217, 21–22.
Log. Ingred. 222, 31: it is perhaps a comprehensive denomination for this lexical sub-class; ‘respectives’ are those relative things which are signified by an adjacent quality expression.
In particular we will concentrate on the syntactic relevance connected with the modalities of signification, the other kind of relevance (the semantic one) being scarcely documented; however, any clarification of the difficulties which occur (for instance albedo est album?) is strictly dependent on the solution of the problem of ‘syntactic relevance’.
“‘Dajre’ [...] secundum copulationem alterius ad alterum generat intellectum [...] adiacere [...] sine verbo fieri non contingit. In hoc enim verbum a participio habundat” (Dial. 149, 1–14). Among other texts on the copulatio: Log. Ingred. 347, 36–37; 348, 15–16; 357, 17–18; 359 passim; Dial. 129 passim. The terminology of the adjacence is introduced with particular regard to the positions of ‘es’: cf., Sup. Top. 228, 14–16, and the commentary on De Int. X-XI in Log. Ingred.. In Dial 130, 4–5 there is a mention of adhaerentia suo fundamento (of the meaning of the predicate to that of the subject).
Cf., Log. Ingred. 384, and the commentary on the Aristotelian passages on compositio in adiecto.
In Cat. 167, D.
In Cat. 168, B-D: “...rursus si transfigurado non sit, ut quaedam mulier musica, haec igitur appellatio non est denominativa, sed aequivoca, uno enim nomine et disciplina et ipsa musica dicitur”. This kind of transformations, which we regard as important, is little investigated in literature.
On paronymy, see Jolivet (1975b) and the classics by Henry (1967), (1974).
On this issue see Henry (1967), (1972), (1984). With respect to the contexts analysed, Henry opts for a ‘quidditative’ reading of the participle: “the participle as a potential term of a proposition becomes a convenient means of preliminary ascent from the nominal to the quidditative level...it so happens that Anselm elucidated the meaning of the paronym...in term of the participle...” (Henry (1984), 161. Cf. also Henry (1967), 82; 114).
This example is not very clear, nor if we put ‘Studium’’ in place of ‘virtus’. Perhaps ‘virtus’ stands for something like ‘exquisitio’.
Empty fundamental categories are introduced by R. Montague (1973); see Appendix A.l.
Both ‘lectio’ and the nominal form ‘legens’ pose a number of interesting and delicate questions (not documented though) about the relationship between the meanings of abstract nouns of action, participle-like forms and nouns of substance/quality. Intuitively a grammatical relation seems to exist between expressions such as ‘curri’ and ‘currens’, or like ‘homo’, ‘humanus’, ‘humanitas’; one could decide to assign only one of the expressions presenting these morphological similarities to a fundamental category and then derive all the other ones in some way. However, the exact definition of the rules for assigning expressions to derived categories appears to be “quanto subtilior, tanto difficilior”.
The verb ‘to be’ is said to occur as ‘secundum adiacens’ when it is not followed by other expressions, like in ‘Socrates is’; ‘is’ occurs as ‘tertium adiacens’ when it is followed by a noun or an adjective, like in ‘Socrates is white’.
In the chapter of Dialectica dedicated to the issue of indefinite parts, only prepositions and conjunctions are taken into consideration; in fact the apparent exhaustivity of the definite vs indefinite distinction leads to include — among the indefinite expressions — other parts whose meaning does not have the traits of definiteness which are peculiar to nouns and verbs. As will be seen, there are syncategorematic expressions which — from a semantic point of view behave like conjunctions and prepositions. A further assumption of ours is therefore relative to the extension of the notion of indefiniteness and to the fact that Abelard, in his ‘De indefinitis’ takes into consideration only part of the expressions whose meaning is not definite.
Log. Ingred. 337, 11 and ff.
An objection which seems to find Priscian in agreement concerns the non-distinction between (syllabae) and conj-prep, as a consequence of the lack of attribution of a meaning to the latter dictiones (cf. Log. Ingred. 337, 19–21). We also find the annotation: “si enim negatio nihil intellectus continet, nullum intellectum habet negatio quern non habeat affirmatio” (ibid 339, 17–18); this seems to concern more in general any particle able to modify the semantic content of its antecedent (or subsequent) nominal/verbal expression. Concepts are particular kinds of meanings which refer prima facie to actual (or mental) significations: “si enim significat utique intellectum constituit ad quem necesse est esse vel rem aliquam vel imaginem rei in qua nitatur intellectus” (Log. Ingred. 338, 41 – 339, 1). Neither difficulty however is decisive, at least until Abelard committing himself to solve them shows his preference for the dialectic theory of conj-prep syncategoremacity.
The term ‘syncategorema’ which dates back to Priscian, comes into use just after Abelard’s age: cf. Kretzmann (1982b).
“Ipsae (conj-prep) tarnen non significant cum nullius rei in se conceptionem teneant sive fictae sive verae se animum inclinant ad quaedam concipiendi modum” (Log. Ingred. 340, 4–6). This is Abelard’s answer to the second objection quoted in note 88.
Dial. 118, 4–5; the first of the afore-mentioned difficulties (cf. n. 88) represents that authoritative argument which Abelard wants to support here.
Ibid.
Dial. 119, 23–26.
Dial. 120, 3–7.
In my opinion, in describing a linear path from the thesis exposed in Log. Ingred. to the doctrine in ‘De indefinite’, Dambska (1977), 10–20, underestimates the similarities existing between the successive expositions of the issue and the laborious (and rather peculiar!) alternation of questions and solutions.
Log. Ingred. 461, 24–25.
Log. Ingred. 461, 9–11.
Log. Ingred. 461–462.
Log. Ingred. 464, 7–10.
Dial. 184, 12 and ff.
Dial. 184, 32–35.
Dial. 184, 34–185, 1.
Dial. 187, 1.
Dial. 187.
Dial. 188, 26–28.
For a discussion on this aspect see 3.1 in fine.
We translate the Abelardian expression ‘casuales’ in the same way as Knuuttila 1993, pp. 82–96.
Log. Ingred. 492, 23–32.
Introd. 228, 14–19.
Log. Ingred. 334, 31–36.
Log. Ingred. 339, 17–19.
Ibid. The similar passages which we have repeatedly quoted are particularly relevant as they document the same treatment of the co-signification with regard to various kinds of non-definite expressions (conj-prep, copula, negation, other adverbs).
Log. Ingred. 339, 20–22; cf. also Log. Ingred. 359, 7–8; 362, 32–33; 452, 5–8.
Dial. 138, 21–22; 138, 38 – 139, 2; 162, 10–12; in Dial. 159, 11–12 the conclusion that “nullum per ‘es’ interpositum accidens attribui” is drawn from the confutation of the thesis according to which ‘es’ signifies an inherence relation.
Log. Ingred. 346, 13–19; Sup. Top. 272, 9; Dial. 159, 24–26; other texts on the ‘universal’ meaning of ‘es’: Log. Ingred. 360, 15–16; Sup. Top. 274, 36–37; Dial. 131, 23–24; 132, 16–17. 116 Log. Ingred. 452, 3–5.
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Pinzani, R. (2003). Categories and Lexicon. In: The Logical Grammar of Abelard. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 51. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0239-3_3
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