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Grammatical Sources

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The Logical Grammar of Abelard

Part of the book series: The New Synthese Historical Library ((SYNL,volume 51))

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Abstract

In 1943 Hunt remarked that the history of grammar was not a very appealing subject of study and that, after Thuro’s work was presented, only a few studies focused on the development of grammatical doctrines.1 The situation has changed since Hun’s articles; in recent years many studies on pre-modist grammatical theories have been published, together with some noteworthy editions.2 The deeper analysis of medieval grammatical texts has confirmed and strengthened Hun’s rather peremptory statement: “no study of the logical doctrines of the early twelfth century would be adequate which did not take account of Priscian and of the glossators of his works”.3 In this respect Abelard makes no exception; in his work Priscian’s opinions have the same authority as those of Aristotle and Boethius. The arguments of contemporary grammarians are often reflected or discussed; the Peripateticus palatinus himself appears to support those grammarians who also deal with logic (qui etiam logicae deserviunt).

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Reference

  1. Hunt (1941), 194.

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  2. General bibliography on medieval grammar: Robins (1951), (1967); Bursill-Hall (1975); Vineis — Maierù (1990); Auroux (1992); Law (1993a). References: Ashworth (1978); Koerner (1980); Pinborg (1990); Rosier (1990); Law (1993b); Kneepkens (1995); Fredborg (1995).

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  3. 3Ibid.

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  4. Bursill-Hall ((1971), p. 27) refers this observation to the middle of the eleventh century. On the other hand, Law (1992), and Luhtala (1993) point out the existence of a school of Priscian’s commentators in the ninth century where logical issues were dealt with.

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  5. De Rijk (1967–1), 120. The same author talks of an extremely radical interplay between the domains of logic and grammar (118).

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  6. Interesting, in this respect, Iwakuma (1999) where many texts are quoted about the collocation of grammar under the logic genus.

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  7. Cf. infra 1.4.

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  8. Introd. 273, 37–39.

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  9. The same is true for grammarians of Abelard’s age; for instance: “non enim sola significatio sed modus significandi facit veritatem vel falsitatem, sed quia magis hoc ad dialecticam pertinet quam ad gramaticam, illud ad tempus postponamus” (William of Conches, Glosae, in Fredborg (1973), 31). It is interesting to notice the recurrence of this as a topos in contemporary linguistics. Lewis, for instance, in connection with the semantics of lexical markers (Cf. Katz — Fodor (1963), Katz — Postal (1964)) notes the following: “...we can know the Markerese translation of an English sentence without knowing the first thing about the meaning of the English sentence: namely, the conditions under which it would be true. Semantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not semantics” (Lewis (1972), 1).

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  10. Inst. 55, 4–5. In the following notes we directly refer to the edition or, between square brackets, to the article containing the (excerpts of) the partial edition.

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  11. Ibid., 6–9: “Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare. [...] Proprium est verbi actionem sive passionem sive utrumque cum modis et formis et temporibus sine casu significare.”

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  12. Inst. 35, 7–8: “(prepositiones) habent tarn in compositione quam in appositione signficationem”; 94, 3: “continuativae (coniunctiones) sunt quae significant ordinem”; 94, 21–22: “continuativae [...] cum dubitatione aliqua essentiam rerum significant”.

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  13. Inst. 56, 29 – 57, 1 : “Nomen est pars orationis, quae uniuscuiusque subiectorum corporum seu rerum communem vel propriam qualitatem distribuit”; 61–62 passim: “Gentile est quod gentem significat [...] Collectivum est quod singulari numero multitudinem significat. [...] Ordinale est quod ordinem significat [...] Numerale est quando numero demonstrat [...] Temporale est quod tempus ostendit [...]Locale est quod locum significat.”

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  14. Inst. 56 passim: “Proprium est adverbii cum verbo poni nec sine eo perfectam significationem posse habere. [...] Praepositionis autem proprium est separatim quidem per appositionem casualibus praeponi [...] coniunctim per compositionem. [...] Proprium est coniunctionis diversa nomina vel quascumque dictiones casuales vel diversa verba vel adverbia coniungere”. 58, 19–22: “Haec enim quoque quae a qualitate vel quantitate sumuntur [speciali], id est adiectiva, naturaliter communia sunt multorum: adiectiva autem ideo vocantur quod aliis appellativis, quae substantiam significant, vel etiam propriis adici soient”.

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  15. Inst. 55, 10–12: “Participium autem iure separatur a verbo, quod et casus habet, quibus caret verbum, et genera, ad similitudinem nominum, nec modos habet, quos continet verbum”.

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  16. Inst. 57, 8. The morphological accidents of the verb are: gender, time, mode, species, figure, conjugation, and person with number (Inst. 369, 16–17). The presence of different features like “faisceaux de déterminations” is stressed by Baratin (1984), 156–157.

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  17. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)] 218.

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  18. Ibid.

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  19. l9 Notae[Hunt (1941)] 213.

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  20. Glosae [Fredborg 1973] 33: “Accidentia igitur partium orationis dupliciter dicuntur, partim enim dicuntur accidentia communes dictionum proprietates, partim communes secundariae significationes; species namque dicitur accidens nomini quia est communis omnium nominum proprietas derivari ab aliquo vel a nullo. [...] Numerus vero est eiusdem nominis accidens, i.e. secundaria significatio. Cum enim principaliter significet qualitates, secundario determinat utrum de uno an de pluribus sit sermo, quod in gramatica dicitur numerus”. On the figura, casus and species, see ibid., 33–37.

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  21. Op. cit. 43: “Significamus igitur aliquando actionem ita quod secundario meditationem ut ‘lecturio’, quandoque inchoationem ut ‘legisco’, quandoque frequentationem ut ‘lectito’ et similia. Haec igitur determinationes circa actionem vel passionem dicuntur formae realis in gramatica, vocalis vero dicuntur terminationes quae hoc designant”.

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  22. Glosae [Fredborg 1973] 29: “Ut igitur breviter dicamus omne pronomen significat substantiam de qua est sermo per ipsum, ita quod nullam eius qualitatem. Differt ergo a nomine et convenit cum eo. In hoc enim quod significat substantiam convenit cum eo, sed in modo significandi differt ab illo. Nomen enim sic significat substantiam quod et illius qualitatem”.

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  23. Op. cit. 30: “Nos vero dicimus quod imperfecta oratio inhaerentiam significat ut ista: ‘homo albus’, inhaerentiam accidentis et subiecti. Si inde concluditur: ergo significat verum vel falsum, dicimus non. Quia non omne quod significat inhaerentiam verum vel falsum significat, sed illud quod proponendo illam significat. Non enim sola significatio sed modus significandi facit veritatem vel falsitatem”.

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  24. Op. cit. 31: “Sed de adiectivis nominibus quaeremus quid significent. Dicimus igitur quod ‘albus’ idem accidens significat quod et ‘albedo’, sed aliter quia determinat inhaerentiam illius accidentis et subiecti quod hoc nomen ‘albedo’ non facit. Ergo haec duo nomina non in re significata differunt sed in modo significandi”.

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  25. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)] 212.

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  26. Glosae [Fredborg 1973] 22.

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  27. Op. cit. 23–24: “Appellativum nomen habet significationem, i.e. communem qualitatem, et officium, i.e. ostendere de qua specie rerum sit id de quo est sermo [...] Pronomen vero nullum istorum facit quia non significat communem qualitatem nec ostendit de qua specie rerum sit sermo [...] Significatio vero proprii nominis est propria qualitas, officium vero eiusdem est sic ostendere de quo sit sermo quod separet ilium ab omnibus aliis, quamvis hoc saepe non faciat aequivocatione impediente. Pronomen vero etsi significationem non habet proprii nominis, officium tarnen habet, i.e. determinate et separatim ab omnibus aliis ostendere de quo sit sermo”.

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  28. Op. cit. 25: “Ad querendum igitur de re simplici inventae sunt quaedam dictiones quae ab officio dicuntur interrogativae”.

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  29. Inst. II, 54, 5 – 55, 3.

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  30. Inst. II, 55, 6–56, 27.

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  31. Robins (1967), following Apollonius, definitely includes the interjection in Priscian’s classification. Nonetheless, some doubt could arise while considering the almost incidental and deferred character of the quotation above. The same doubt is expressed by Peter Helias: “secundum Priscianum vero non est unus modus significandi per se, propter quern reperta sit interiectio; ideoque non sunt nisi septem partes orationis. Donatus vero...” (Summa [ed. Toison] 32, 35–38); [ed. Reilly] 882, 95–97.

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  32. Inst. XI, 549, 27–28; XII, 577, 2–3; XIV, 35, 7–8; XV, 60, 2–3; XVI, 93, 2–5.

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  33. Inst. II, 59, 29–33: “aliae fere omnes species in nominibus inveniuntur appellativis. Sunt autem hae: adiectivum, ad aliquid dictum, quasi ad aliquid dictum, gentile, patrium, interrogativum, infinitum, relativum vel demonstrativum vel similitudinis, collectivum, dividuum, facticium, generale, speciale, ordinale, numerale, absolutum, temporale, locale”

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  34. Cf. Rosier — Stefanini (1990), 291 ff., who basically accepts Baratin’s indications (1977), 217–40.

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  35. Inst. II, 55, 6–7.

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  36. Inst. II, 58, 14–16. Cf. also II, 61, 11–13; XVII, 131, 1–20.

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  37. As for Abelard’s one see: infra 2.2, 2.3.

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  38. Thurot(1869), 178.

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  39. Inst. XVn, 152, 8–12: “Ipsa verba (substantiva-vocativa) per se substantiam uniuscuiusque propriam colligant vel substantiae nominationem, necessario relictis pronominibus, quae ipsa quoque substantiam quantum ad vocem solam significant, ad nomina se applicant, quae propriam qualitatem demonstant”.

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  40. Inst.XVIII, 210, 13–15.

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  41. Inst. XVII, 152, 11.

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  42. Inst. II, 59, 24–60, 1.

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  43. Inst. II, 59, 27.

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  44. The doctrine of impositio nominum has different origins, which are probably unrelated: it is a matter considered for instance in the Platonic Cratylus (in particular in Cratylus 387a –43le: on this source see Gambarara (1992)), in the Old Testament (Genesis, 19–20), in’s commentators (some indications can be found in Pinborg (1972)), in Dionysius Thrax (see Gambarara (1992), and in the Latin grammatical tradition (for instance in Varro and Priscian).

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  45. Varro, De Lingua hat. V, I, 2. In Traglia’s translation (1979): “each word presents two fundamental aspects: the etymology and semantic value”; it could be that Varro just had the etymological derivation in mind, but he does not state it explicitly and what he writes is vague enough to allow more than one interpretation.

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  46. Inst. II, 60, 1–5: “(species) propiae autem derivativorum sunt hae: patronymicum, possessivum, comparativum, superlativum, diminutivum, denominativum (in quo intellegimus cum multis aliis etiam comprehensivum, de quibus in loco dicemus), verbale, participiale, adverbiale”.

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  47. Inst. III, 83, 17–18.

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  48. Inst. IV, 117, 2.

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  49. Inst. IV, passim.

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  50. Inst. II, 58, 19–20; 60, 15.

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  51. De Rijk (1967–1), 228–29; Fredborg (1977), 28 and ss.

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  52. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)], 219, note 1.

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  53. See also Fredborg (1977), 24–25.

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  54. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)], 218, note 1; where the concept of ‘modus significando’ comes into play (cf. supra 1.2).

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  55. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)], 225 – 228.

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  56. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)], 227, 41 – 228, 2: we find there de relato opinions (although shared in the substance).

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  57. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)], 226, 36 – 227, 2.

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  58. Introd. 270–276 (see infra 5.2)

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  59. Notae [Fredborg (1977)], 36, note 85.

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  60. Notae [Hunt (1941)], 219, note 4.

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  61. The same opinion of Magister G (=William of Champeaux?) is probably recalled in Sent. I [Fredborg (1977)], 35, 23 and ss.

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  62. Notae [Hunt (1941)] 228, 25–32.

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  63. Glosae [Fredborg (1981)], 30: “Nomina igitur vel significant substantias vel ea quae insunt substantiis vel quaedam figmenta animi vel modos loquendi”. About modi loquendi the author points out: “(nomina significant) modos loquendi de rebus, ut ‘omnis’ — unde Aristoteles: ‘omnis’ enim non significat universale, sed quoniam universaliter — similiter ‘quidam’, ‘aliquis’, ‘nullus’ et huiusmodi, quae dialectici vocant signa propositionum”.

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  64. Thinking of course in terms of categories identified by a purely semantic t y p e. As we have seen, both Priscian and his commentators admitted different and complementary characterizations.

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  65. Glosae [Fredborg (1981)], 36, 184 – 37, 217.

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  66. Glosae [Fredborg (1981)], 37: “et sic omne nomen significat qualitatem communem vel propriam corpori vel rei”.

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  67. As for the main meaning and nominatio in William, see infra the paragraph on signification.

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  68. Cf. for this thesis: Rosier-Stefanini (1990) 295.

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  69. Glosae [Fredborg (1973)] 7.

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  70. Op. cit., 8.

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  71. Op. cit., 9–10.

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  72. For the developments in Abelard cf. infra 3.3.

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  73. In this connection, the causa inventionis is also recalled, in a rather confusing way, considering, the vague character of the definition: “causa vero inventionis adiectivorum haec est: cognitis substantialibus qualitatibus ignorantur accidentalis. Ideo inventa sunt quae sic significarent ipsas quod etiam inesse alicui determinarent” (op. cit., 10).

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  74. Inst. XVII, 108–109.

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  75. Inst. XVII, 111, 12–19.

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  76. Inst XVII, 116, 5–19.

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  77. Inst. XI, 554, 6–11.

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  78. Inst. XVII, 227, 45–47.

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  79. Inst. XVII, 127, 17 and following; 170, 20–22; XVIII, 211, 22.

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  80. Inst. XVII, 183, 4–5; XVIII, 210, 11–12.

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  81. Inst. XVII, 148, 4–5; 159, 20–23.

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  82. Inst VIII, 374, 13–15.

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  83. Inst. XI, 555, 3–5.

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  84. Ibid. 1–3.

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  85. Inst. XI, 552, 24–25; 553, 1–2; XVIII, 212, 27; 234, 10.

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  86. Inst. XVIII, 223, 8–11.

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  87. Inst.XVIII, 211, 22–23; cf. also XI, 552, 26–27.

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  88. The agreement can be described on a categorial level considering for instance a category as a set of features specifications, or, on a syntactic level, taking into account rules which change the form of expressions. The two theoretical perspectives could each explain the kind of phenomena addressed by Priscian.

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  89. On the notions of government and transitio (-intransitio-reciprocatio) see Kneepkens (1978), (1990a); de Libera-Rosier (1992) II, pp. 159–178; Rosier (1988); Covington (1984); Kneepkens (1995). As for the origins of the notion of transitivity: Luhtala (1992). Some of the distinctions stressed by Kneepkens (1990b) (such as the one between constructio dictionis orationis) can be represented, from our point of view, by specifying different characteristics of the syntactic rules. However, in order to evaluate the precise sense of such an exercise, we should develop our framework further to the limits of this exposition.

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  90. Kneepkens (1990a), 166–167.

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  91. Ibid.

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  92. Op. cit., 168; cf. also Kneepkens (1990b).

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  93. Summa [ed. Toison] 1, 4–13; [ed. Reilly] 832, 5–13.

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  94. Ibid., 30.

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  95. Summa [ed. Toison] 3, 90 – 14, 90; [ed. Reilly] 836, 85 – 856, 16.

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  96. Inst. IV, 117, 3–4: “(denominativum) habet igitur generalem nominationem omnium formarum, quae a nomine derivantur”.

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  97. Inst. V, 185, 11–12.

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  98. Inst. H, 57, 3–5.

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  99. For positio-nominatio see Inst. XVII, 121, 21–22; 150, 2–4 (positio nomen = give a name = to name); nevertheless in Inst. XVII, 145, 16–23: “positio nominum inventa ad significationem”.

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  100. ‘Prima’ is not contrasted here with ‘secunda’ like in the logical tradition (i.e. as connoting the use of a term) but with the meaning of ‘first baptismal ac’.

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  101. See note 44.

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  102. Inst.XII, 585, 17–19.

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  103. Inst.XVII, 149, 30–150, 5.

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  104. Inst. XVII, 151, 5–6.

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  105. Glosulae [de Rijk (1967)] 228, note 1.

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  106. A possible exception comes from the following paragraph: “qui autem invenit prius hanc vocem ‘homo’, non respexit ad illam speciem informem, sed ad rem sensibus subiacentem. [...] Si autem postea animus rationalis, quadam similitudinem aliarum rerum ductus, rem quandam unam quidem et omnibus hominibus communem [...] eamque hoc nomine ‘homo’ designavit”: Glosulae [Hunt (1941)] 212, note 4.

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  107. [Hunt (1941)] 218, n. 1; 219, n. 1.

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  108. Glosulae [de Rijk (1967)] 228: “nomen non significat substantiam et qualitatem insimul nuncupative [...] sed substantiam tantum nominat, quia ei fuit impositum, qualitatem vero significat non nuncupative, immo representando et determinando circa substantiam, propter quam tarnen notandam substantie fuit impositum. [...] album per impositionem significat corpus, idest nuncupative [...] albedinem vero significat per representationem ut principalem causam”.

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  109. Tract. [Fredborg (1977)] 28, 6–7.

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  110. Op. cit., 28: “hoc nomen homo substantiam habet specialem naturam, scilicet animal risibile mortale, quam nominat, attribuendo ei communem formam quam voco humanitatem [...] Albus vero hoc nomen habet substantiam (omne quod participat albedine) quod nominat, ponendo in eo albedinem ut qualitatem. Et licet infinita corpora nominentur hoc nomine albus, unde videtur multas habere substantias [...] tarnen propter qualitatem quam notat [...] finitum est [...] videmus album nominare corpora [...] ex qualitate extrínseca [...] etiam concedamus albus unam habere substantiam”.

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  111. Op. cit. 30–31: “Socrates hoc nomen substantiam habet specialem naturam hominis, qualitatem eandem quam superius diximus, nominat vero individuam rem cui positum est. Similiter homo substantiam habet animal ipsum, qualitatem quam prius, nominat vero specialem rem cui datum est. Albus habet substantiam eandem cum hoc nomine albedo [...] nominat vero albus paternam albedinem”. On the expression ‘paterna albedo’, we only know that it is about the kind of meaning making the difference between ‘albus’ and ‘albedo’.

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  112. Op. cit. 27, 4 and following.

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  113. Op. cit. 29, 3–8.

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  114. This text is to be compared with the one quoted above on the identity theory, as well as with Abelard’s positions discussed in 5.7.

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  115. Glosae [Fredborg (1981)] 30, 27–28.

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  116. Op. cit. 31, 1–3.

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  117. Ibid. 44–49. William’s text corresponds to the famous place of Dial 112 – 113 (cf. infra 4.3).

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  118. Op. cit. 32, 63: “iterum dicimus quod (‘homo’) significat speciem et non indivíduum”.

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  119. Op. cit. 33, 87–102.

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  120. Inst. II, 58, 22. The same expression is used for adverbs — verbs (XV, 60, 2–3).

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  121. Inst. XVII, 124, 11 (with reference to the peculiarity of the Latin language). Still on the syntactic level, the relation between prepositions and nouns is qualified as a sort of ‘adiunctio’ (in appositione-compositione): XTV, 24, 11; 35, 5; XVII, 164, 5–12. In general parts other than nouns and verbs share the same property: “aliae (praeter nomen et verbum) quinque partes orationis, non a sua vi, sed ab adiunctione quam habent ad nomen vel verbum, vocabulum acceperunt” (XI, 551, 12–14).

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  122. Inst. XVII, 130, 17–18. Its syntactic counterpart is constituted by a form of ‘applicatio’ (XVII, 152, 11).

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  123. Inst. XVII, 117, 12–14.

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  124. Inst. XVII, 122, 10–25. Cf. also 130–131.

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  125. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)] 219, note 1. Hunt believes that the notion of ‘inherence’ is borrowed directly from dialectic, presumably from Boethius. (op. cit. 217 and note 5).

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  126. Glosulae [Fredborg (1977)] 25, 6–9. The text coincides with that of Tract, [ibid.]. The editor stresses the fact that both are close to the opinions of magister W., quoted by the anonymous Sent. I (op. cit. 24 and 35–36).

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  127. Fredborg notes that the criticism is common to magister W., Glosulae, Tract, and Abelard (op. cit. 35, note 79).

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  128. Glosulae [Fredborg (1977)] 25, 20–21.

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  129. Op. cit. 26.

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  130. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)] 225 – 228; [de Rijk (1967)] 101 – 105. As for the coincidences of the interpolated text vis-à-vis that of magister Guido, see Kneepkens (1978) 119 – 121.

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  131. Glosulae [Hunt (1941)] 227, 12–14.

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  132. Ibid. 18–29.

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  133. Cf. in particular 5.2.

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  134. Notae [Hunt (1941)] 228 – 229.

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  135. Glosae [Fredborg.(1981)] 33; [(1973)], 30–31.

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  136. Glosae [Fredborg.(1973)] ibid.; and again: “de adiectivis nominibus queremus quid significent. Dicimus igitur quod ‘albus’ idem accidens significat quod et ‘albedo’ sed aliter quia determinat inherentiam illius accidentis et subiecti quod hoc nomen ‘albedo’ non facit” (p. 31)

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    Roberto Pinzani

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Pinzani, R. (2003). Grammatical Sources. In: The Logical Grammar of Abelard. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 51. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0239-3_2

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