Abstract
Theory of Knowledge by Presence is generally attributed to Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, the founder of the School of Illumination (ishrāq)1 and it is he who offers extensive arguments to prove that the self knows itself through a direct and unmediated mode of cognition. However, as is often the case, the most seemingly original ideas are based on or inspired by previous intellectual endeavors. Suhrawardī’s theory of ’ilm al-hudūrī is not an exception either, and upon careful inquiry one finds an early form of this epistemological theory in Ibn Sīnā. This early form of Ibn Sīnā’s ’ilm al-hudūrī is found both as an argument made explicitly to conclude the direct and unmediated nature of self-awareness as well as the argument in its implied form. We will examine both of them closely.
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Notes
For more information on Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī, see M. Amin Razavi, Suhrawardī and the School of Illumination, London: CURZON Press, 1977.
Mehdi Hā’irī Yazdī, The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence, Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1992.
Ibn Sīnā, al-Ta’ligāt, A. Badawi (ed.), Cairo, 1973, pp. 160–61.
F. Shayegan, Avicenna on Time,Ph.D. Dissertation, Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 1986, p. 24. Ibid.,p. 24.
For an extensive discussion of Suhrawardī’s theory of knowledge by presence, see the following works: M. Hā’irī Yazdī, The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence, Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1993, pp. 43–114; M. Amin Razavi, Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination, London: CURZON Press, 1997, pp. 102–17; Gh. Dinānī, Shu’a’ andish-i wa shuhūd dar falsafa-yi Suhrawardī, Tehran: Hikmat Press, 1364.
Michael Marmura “Avicenna’s’Flying Man’ in Context”, Monist 69 (1986), pp. 383–95.
Theresa-Anne Druart (ed.) Arabic Philosophy and the West: Continuity and Interaction, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1988.
Ibn Sīnā, al-Nafs (Psychology),G. C. Anwati and S. Zayid (eds.), Cairo, 9175, 1,1, p.11, and V, 7, p. 225.
In this regard one can refer to Fakhr al-Din Rag ‘s commentary on this passage. See his al-Mabāhith al-mash ragiyyah, Tehran: Asadi Press, 1966, Vol. 1, p. 656.
Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Sharh al-ishārāt,Egypt: al-Khayriyah Press, 1325, v.1.
For further information on the debate between Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Nasīr al-Dīn Tūsī, see: Seyyed Hasan Hasani, Du filsuf-i islāmī: Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Nasīr al-Dīn Tūsī, Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1373.
For a complete discussion on the historical survey of knowledge by presence see Muhammad Fanai Ashkewārī, Qom: Imam Khomeini Press, 1375.
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Aminrazavi, M. (2003). Avicenna’s (Ibn Sina) Phenomenological Analysis of How the Soul (Nafs) Knows Itself (’Ilm Al-Huduri). In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) The Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming. Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0229-4_7
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