The Structure of Action

  • Daniel González Lagier
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 67)


In the previous chapter, I concluded that it may be useful for solving the paradoxes of action, or at least for taking a new look at some of the problems that have come up in philosophy and in criminal-law doctrine, to distinguish three aspects of actions (giving rise to three different meanings of the term ‘action’). In this chapter, I will propose a framework that may be of use in the analysis of result-acts and consequence-acts. For that purpose, I will analyze some of the common elements we find in a great number of actions (if not in all of them) — for instance, in actions such as closing a window, killing another person, making a will, etc. — or, if you wish, in a great number of actions under a particular description (if one opts for a concept of action on the lines of Anscombe and Davidson).


Bodily Movement Institutional Change Voluntary Action Intentional Action Natural Change 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel González Lagier
    • 1
  1. 1.University of AlicanteAlicanteSpain

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