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The Paradoxes Dissolved

  • Daniel González Lagier
Chapter
  • 113 Downloads
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 67)

Abstract

A quick review of the theories of action we have seen in Chapters III and IV, advocated by philosophers and by criminal lawyers, respectively, will reveal parallels between them. Here, instead of explaining more about them in so many words, I will simply present them in the following table (where in the right-hand column, corresponding to criminal law, I will additionally indicate in brackets the equivalent approaches in Anglo-Saxon law):

Keywords

Bodily Movement Social Criterion Criminal Lawyer Human Mental State Voluntary Bodily Movement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. 1.
    Cf. sect. 1.1.2 of Chapter III.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Cf. sects. 2.1 and 3.1 of Chapter IV.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Cf. sect. 2 of Chapter III and sect. 2.2 of Chapter IV.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Cf. sect. 3 of Chapter III and sect. 2.4 of Chapter IV.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    On power-conferring rules, cf. Atienza/Ruiz Manero 1998.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Cf. sect. 5.4 of Chapter IV.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Cf. sect. 6 of Chapter VII.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Cruz 1990, p. 110.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Cf. Chapter VII, Sect. 6.3.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Feinberg 1968, pp. 111 ff. As we have seen in Chapter III, Sect. 3, Feinberg adds that the ascription of an action is performed in order to attribute responsibility (in the widest sense, including merely causal responsibility which does not necessarily imply blame); but we do not need to include this feature here, because he stretches the meaning of ‘responsibility’ too far. For the present context, it is enough to say that when an action is ascribed to someone, this is normally done with some purpose (which must not necessarily be that of blaming or praising).Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    In the sense spelled out in Chapter I, sect. 4.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Nino 1972, p. 37.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Davidson 1980b, p. 113.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Davidson 1980c, p. 180.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Cf. González Lagier 1997.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Cf. sect. 6.3 of Chapter VII.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel González Lagier
    • 1
  1. 1.University of AlicanteAlicanteSpain

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