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The Paradoxes Dissolved

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Book cover The Paradoxes of Action

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 67))

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Abstract

A quick review of the theories of action we have seen in Chapters III and IV, advocated by philosophers and by criminal lawyers, respectively, will reveal parallels between them. Here, instead of explaining more about them in so many words, I will simply present them in the following table (where in the right-hand column, corresponding to criminal law, I will additionally indicate in brackets the equivalent approaches in Anglo-Saxon law):

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References

  1. Cf. sect. 1.1.2 of Chapter III.

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  2. Cf. sects. 2.1 and 3.1 of Chapter IV.

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  3. Cf. sect. 2 of Chapter III and sect. 2.2 of Chapter IV.

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  4. Cf. sect. 3 of Chapter III and sect. 2.4 of Chapter IV.

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  5. On power-conferring rules, cf. Atienza/Ruiz Manero 1998.

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  6. Cf. sect. 5.4 of Chapter IV.

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  7. Cf. sect. 6 of Chapter VII.

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  8. Cruz 1990, p. 110.

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  9. Cf. Chapter VII, Sect. 6.3.

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  10. Feinberg 1968, pp. 111 ff. As we have seen in Chapter III, Sect. 3, Feinberg adds that the ascription of an action is performed in order to attribute responsibility (in the widest sense, including merely causal responsibility which does not necessarily imply blame); but we do not need to include this feature here, because he stretches the meaning of ‘responsibility’ too far. For the present context, it is enough to say that when an action is ascribed to someone, this is normally done with some purpose (which must not necessarily be that of blaming or praising).

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  11. In the sense spelled out in Chapter I, sect. 4.

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  12. Nino 1972, p. 37.

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  13. Davidson 1980b, p. 113.

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  14. Davidson 1980c, p. 180.

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  15. Cf. González Lagier 1997.

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  16. Cf. sect. 6.3 of Chapter VII.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Alicante, Alicante, Spain

    Daniel González Lagier (Professor of Legal Theory)

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  1. Daniel González Lagier
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Lagier, D.G. (2003). The Paradoxes Dissolved. In: The Paradoxes of Action. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 67. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0205-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0205-8_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6443-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0205-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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