Abstract
Similarly to some other English philosophers both in Cambridge (W. E. Johnson) and in Oxford (John Cook Wilson), Austin was not eager to publish. His main aspiration was to philosophise in an esoteric philosophical society, to convince his fellow-philosophers of the correctness of his analyses.1 Until his death in 1960, despite his great popularity among professional philosophers, Austin had published only nine papers. This is also one of the explanations for what his closest friends have called the ‘fantastically erroneous’ interpretations of Austin’s ideas.
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References
The best description of this type of philosophical practice is given in Hare 1972, pp. 38–53.
In the second edition, of 1970, two further papers were added, and another in the third, of 1979.
This can clearly be seen in Ross’s masterpiece The Right and the Good, the main task of which is to discuss three words: ‘right’, ‘good’ and ‘morally good’ (see Ross 1930, p. 1).
Warnock here sees as Austin’s predecessors W. E. Johnson (see Warnock 1969, pp. 7–8).
Interestingly, in his assault on the concept of meaning, Austin does not appeal to the authority of Wittgenstein or Ayer, but to the Aristotelian dialectic. This is typical of the Oxford language philosophers in general. It is not for nothing that Paul Grice called their method the ‘Oxonian dialectic’ (see Grice 1989, pp. 379–81).
Here we can remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s criticism of the Law of the Excluded Middle in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. See especially II, § 81; III, §§ 57–6; V, § 12.
An idea also accepted, as already mentioned (in ch. 4, § 3, (iv)), by Ryle and Carnap.
Austin’s criticism of concepts as properties coheres with Wittgenstein’s criticism of truth-values as properties (see Wittgenstein 1922, 6.111).
Here I am using the word ‘translation’, not in use by Austin, in order to draw attention to the relation of this procedure to the G. E. Moore type of analysis.
Despite the fact that Austin didn’t used the phrase ‘family resemblance’, it is obvious that here he follows Wittgenstein’s theory of ‘family likenesses’ developed in the Blue Book (see Wittgenstein 1958b, p. 17). Indeed, it is well known that towards 1936–7 the Blue and the Brown Books were in circulation in Oxford. The only difference is that Austin does not compare different games but different objects with which a game is played.
Austin’s variant of Moore’s paradox of believing.
Austin’s thought-experiments of his pre-war papers are reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s method of inventing language-games for testing the grammar of expressions, as well as of Wisdom’s Other Minds (see Wisdom 1952) where the same operation is performed: imagining zebras without stripes and cuckoo clocks with a human soul, etc.
In this Austin was not an exception. In a similar vein, Ryle once noted: ‘Most of us, I think, came back to our subjects [after the war] with an increased, not a decreased, appetite’ (Ryle 1968, p. 101).
This criticism of Austin’s is close to Ryle’s criticism of Russell’s ‘acquaintance’ (see ch. 4, § 3, (iv)), and also to Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore’s ‘certainty’.
Austin pointed out that ‘believe’ is not the only word by way of which we can express confidence in what we know. The same can be done with other words and phrases—for example, ‘suppose’, ‘assume’, ‘I am certain’, ‘I am sure’ (see p. 78).
A similar argument is used by Strawson in ‘On Referring’. See ch. 6, § 1, (ii).
Called by Stanley Cavell a “‘third sort” of logic’ (Cavell 1969, p. 10). It is a third logic since it goes beyond the traditional one, but also beyond the New Logic of Frege–Russell. The project for a third logic was worked out in the much more modest form of ‘Logical Neo-Traditionalism’ by Strawson in Introduction to Logical Theory (Strawson 1952). See ch. 6, § 2.
Cavell’s quotation is from Austin 1946, p. 84.
Cavell’s term; we can call them, in accordance with the analytic tradition, indefinables’.
A typical case of what I have already called the thesis of Carnap-Ryle. See ch. 4, § 3, (iv).
An example from ‘The Meaning of a Word’, already cited in § 2, (iii).
A counter-argument is developed by Norman Malcolm. According to him, ‘nothing that could happen to me in the next moment would be accepted by me now as proof that I now dream’ (Malcolm 1952, p. 186).
Here is the connection between Austin’s radical theory of language and his radical epistemology.
According to Ayer, what we have to consider in epistemology is ‘a number of alternative recommendations concerning the way in which we are to describe [our sensations]’ (Ayer 1940, p. 55).
See on this term Hampshire 1969, pp. 35–6.
Let us remember (as noted in §1, (iii)) that Austin edited H. W. B. Joseph’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Leibniz (Joseph 1949).
Indeed, ‘ordinary language is not the last world: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word’ (1956a, p. 185). See on this (iv).
A different thing from Wittgenstein’s philosophical conservatism. See on the latter, for example, Nyíri 1982.
Keith Graham speaks of Austin’s ‘ingrained conservatism’ (Graham 1977, p. 37), ‘which finally asserts itself as the strongest force in his investigations’ (ibid., p. 263).
Already in 1966 Austin’s concern with the ‘total speech-act’ was seen as related to phenomenology and existentialism (see Cerf 1966, pp. 281 ff.).
The problem here is that the radically critical linguistic phenomenology nevertheless starts from something given, which was often considered to be its chief failure (see Isaacs 1960, pp. 214–15).
This is a central tenet of analytic philosophy, formulated for the first time by Russell, according to whom in the practice of the new method in philosophy ‘a certain humility as to our knowledge is induced: we become glad to know anything in philosophy, however seemingly trivial’ (Russell 1914b, p. 244).
Here Austin’s words are in broad agreement with Wittgenstein’s: ‘There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods’ (Wittgenstein 1953, § 133).
For Wittgenstein’s single method see ch. 3, § 1, (iv)—(vii).
The use of unrealistic terminology is not the only fault of philosophers. In addition, they also split into philosophical parties (schools), each school founded on only one aspect of ordinary language. Different philosophical parties do not understand each other simply because they speak different idioms. By the way, this reproach echoes Ryle’s disgust with schools and parties in philosophy. See on this ch. 4, § 1, (vi).
Here Austin repeats a definition of philosophy given in Russell 1945, p. 13.
The belief that philosophy has a high didactic value was shared by a great number of Oxford philosophers, for example by Ryle. See ch. 4, § 4, (vii).
I would guess that Austin’s theory of statement was influenced by Frege’s ‘assertoric sentence [Behauptingssatz]’ (see Frege 1979, p. 129).
For Austin’s ‘families of words’ see Frigierri 1981, p. 53.
Why it is called so we shall see in the next chapter. By the way, many contemporaries, e.g. A. J. Ayer, received the impression that ‘Strawson had roundly defeated Austin in… [the] debate about Truth’ (see Mehta 1963, p. 72; see also p. 57).
He had already substantiated their independence in Sense and Sensibilia.
Incidentally, this flop came at approximately the same time as Ryle’s failure to articulate precisely the analytical method in Dilemmas.
Actually, the source of this understanding of Austin’s was his teacher Prichard, who had already stated in 1940: ‘[P]romising resembles asking a question or issuing an order, in that it consists not in making a statement but in doing something, in the sense in which we oppose doing to mere talking’ (Prichard 1968, p. 171).
Austin’s turning attention to conventions in language stimulated such works as Lewis 1969 and Bennett 1976.
The term (assertoric) ‘force’ was introduced in the logic of Frege; see Frege 1979, p. 251. Dummett also speaks of ‘interrogative’ etc. force in Frege (see Dummett 1981, p. 113).
These are not Austin’s terms. Here I am simply using Wittgenstein’s terminology of saying/showing better to present Austin’s understanding, as well as to indicate its historical connections with Frege—Wittgenstein.
In reference to this, Searle noted: ‘although Wittgenstein did inspire much of this investigation into the actual use of language, he would not have liked the idea of a general theory of speech acts’ (Searle 1978, p. 194).
Analysed in Davidson 1986a.
Austin’s programme for suggesting the ‘nomenclature’ of speech-acts (pp. 101, 112) in fact follows Russell’s belief that the description of the logical forms is a ‘question of nomenclature’ (Russell 1918c, p. 227).
Later Searle criticised Austin’s nomenclature of illocutionary acts exactly at this point. His argument was that Austin’s lists ‘are not classifications of illocutionary acts, but of English illocutionary verbs’ (Searle 1979, p. 9).
As a matter of historical fact, however, this conclusion is not a result of the theory of illocutionary acts. Austin already made it in the Sense and Sensibilia lectures of 1947–9. What is new is how he applies it to the theory of illocutionary acts.
A programme developed in Searle and Vanderveken 1985.
On Austin’s philosophical practice as ‘fun’ see Pitcher 1973, p. 24.
Here Austin’s method is clearly close to that of Ryle’s categories as discussed in ch. 4, § 2, (iv).
See for criticism of this argument Rosenberg 1974.
See, for example, Carnap 1937, §§ 40, 82.
This point of Austin’s was criticised by some philosophers who looked upon it as a commitment ‘to givenness and knowledge by acquaintance’ (Arrington 1975, p. 300).
In these arguments the connection of Austin’s epistemology with G. E. Moore’s ‘defence of common sense’ is obvious.
Remnants of this project can be seen in one of the latest books of Austin’s pupil Urmson (see Urmson 1990).
‘Pretending’ is intensively discussed by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations pp. 227–9
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Austin, J.L. (2003). Philosophy as a Strict Science. In: A Hundred Years of English Philosophy. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 94. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0177-8_6
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