Abstract
The investigation undertaken in this book tries to provide an understanding of the main points in the development of the analytic programme in philosophy as practised in England during the twentieth century.
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The current orthodoxies’ `should be seen as consisting not so much in any agreed budget of doctrines, but rather in a kind of consensus, usually but not always tacit, precisely on the question who was and who was not a “negligible back-number” [in it]’ (Warnock 1976, p. 48).
For the first time in Broad 1923, pp. 18–25; then in Broad 1924.
On the struggle for intellectual supremacy in England of this period see Grattan-Guinness 1986.
An analysis of this article is provided in Milkov 2002a. Another critical paper on Wittgenstein from this period—Braithwaite 1933—came direct from Cambridge and aroused Wittgenstein’s anger, expressed in his `Letter to the Editor’ (see Wittgenstein 1933). After this incident, nobody dared to oppose Wittgenste in publicly.
One of the few exceptions was R. B. Braithwaite. See, for example, Braithwaite 1927.
A procedure developed independently in Wisdom 1965. See also Wisdom 1991.
See Black 1933, pp. 115–17. In this work, Black also eliminates Russell’s Theory of Types and the Axiom of Infinity.
In a letter to G. H. von Wright of 12 February 1950 Wittgenstein noted: ‘1 was very glad indeed to hear that Geache’s [sic!] lectures are good. Frege was just the right food for him ’ (Wittgenstein 1983, p. 61 ).
See on this ch. 3, § 7.
Besides Farrell 1946, and the therapeutic philosophy of John Wisdom (discussed in Milkov 1997a, i, pp. 435–521), the best exemplars of the ‘Cambridge School’ are Malcolm 1940a, 1940b and Paul 1936. “The conflict between Vienna and Cambridge was discussed in (a).
See Milkov 2002a.
See Wisdom 1952.
Above all, by the neo-Fregeans of the Third Cambridge Circle.
Wittgenstein quarrelled with A. J. Ayer simply because in a lecture on the BBC in 1946 the latter declared `that John Wisdom’s view of philosophy could be taken as a pointer to his own ’ (Ayer 1977, p. 305 ).
In contrast, on 12 January 1951 Wittgenstein found Oxford `a philosophical desert’ (Wittgenstein 1984a, p. 131 ).
In this sense, they followed the Cambridge realism of Moore–Russell.
This feeling was taken seriously by Dummett—a philosopher in many respects surprisingly close to the `linguistic philosophers’—who stated at that time: `I wish to argue that philosophy as an independent subject is finished’ (Dummett 1959b).
The reason for this was that analytic philosophy in USA was formed under the influence of Vienna Circle and Warsaw School émigrés. The result of this influence is very well demonstrated in a recent statement of Quine’s: `I don’t feel England has had a great impact on my work’ (Borradori 1994, p. 38).
Portrayed in Peacocke 1997, pp. 1–2.
In Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy,P. M. S. Hacker falsely took the justificational turn in English analytic philosophy as the end of analytic philosophy as such. Besides, he states incorrectly that this took place in the mid-1970s (see Hacker 1996, p. 264). In fact, this was prepared in developments from the mid-1950s and, as just shown, was made explicit in the mid-1960s.
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Milkov, N. (2003). Introduction. In: A Hundred Years of English Philosophy. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 94. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0177-8_1
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