Abstract
This chapter addresses the question whether people using a natural resource in common are themselves capable of contributing to governing their exploitation of that resource.1 This question is relevant in practice because it is not always the case that government agencies responsible for managing the use of natural resources have been able to prevent negative impacts on the resource and bring about sustainable resource use. Natural resources under pressure include fish and wildlife, water, range and pastureland, agricultural land, and forest and bush land. Self-management solutions in sustaining natural resources are being applied in practice, as this book describes with respect to water resources. In several European countries farmers are ready to enter voluntarily co-operative agreements (CAs) with drinking water companies and are willing to change their farming practices in order to maintain or improve water quality.
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van der Schans, J.W. (2003). The Concept of Resource Users’ Self-governance. In: Brouwer, F., Heinz, I., Zabel, T. (eds) Governance of Water-related Conflicts in Agriculture. Environment & Policy, vol 37. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0101-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0101-3_2
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