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In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies

Chapter
Part of the Origins book series (ORIN, volume 2)

Abstract

This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.

Keywords

Classical Negation Logical Constant Paraconsistent Logic Limit Logic Adaptive Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceGhent UniversityBelgium

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