Abstract
In the philosophical literature, the natural phenomena for which science can provide explanations are usually divided into particular events and general laws. For instance, Wesley Salmon writes:
Scientific explanations can be given for such particular occurrences as the appearance of Halley’s comet in 1759 or the crash of a DC-10 jet airliner in Chicago in 1979, as well as such general features of the world as the nearly elliptical orbits of planets or the electrical conductivity of copper. [1984, 3]
Kristof De Clercq is a Research Assistant of the Fundfor Scientific Research — Flanders.
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Weber, E., de Clercq, K. (2002). Why the Logic of Explanation is Inconsistency-Adaptive. In: Meheus, J. (eds) Inconsistency in Science. Origins, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_10
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